Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 82-1810

• Decision Date: 26 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1810,82-1810
• Citation: 707 F.2d 355
• Parties: Joseph B. KAUFMANN, Appellant, v. Daniel E. SHEEHAN, James R. Cain, and the Catholic Archbishop of Omaha, d/b/a Archdiocese of Omaha, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 355

707 F.2d 355

Joseph B. KAUFMANN, Appellant, v. Daniel E. SHEEHAN, James R. Cain, and the Catholic Archbishop of Omaha, d/b/a Archdiocese of Omaha, Appellees.

No. 82-1810.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 18, 1983.

Decided May 26, 1983.

Joseph B. Kaufmann, pro se.

Edward D. Hotz, and Jeanne A. Weaver of Hotz, Kluver, Kizer & Jahn, P.C., Omaha, Neb., for defendants-appellees.

Before BRIGHT, ROSS and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Joseph B. Kaufmann appeals from the district court's ¹ order denying his motion to amend his complaint to add claims of deprivation of due process by officials of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, and granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on his allegations of defamation and conspiracy to commit defamation. Because his due process arguments deal solely with procedures established by church authority, we believe that we here deal with questions of ecclesiastical due process and that such questions must be left to church authorities. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Archdiocese of Omaha employed Kaufmann as a parish priest. In the spring of 1975, Kaufmann expressed dissatisfaction with his current assignment to Archbishop Daniel E. Sheehan and requested a leave of absence. Before entertaining Kaufmann's request, the Archbishop required that he consult a psychiatrist. Kaufmann complied and saw Omaha psychiatrist Dr. John Blodig twice during the fall of 1975. In October 1975, Kaufmann voluntarily resigned his position and moved to San Francisco, California, to seek employment as a priest with the Archdiocese of San Francisco.

San Francisco church officials requested information about Kaufmann from the Archdiocese of Omaha. Father James R. Cain answered the inquiry in a letter dated December 3, 1975. The letter stated that although there was no objection to Kaufmann's working in San Francisco, he was in need of psychiatric care. The day Father Cain's letter was written church officials in San Francisco denied Kaufmann's request for employment and recommended that he return to Omaha.

At this point, Kaufmann authorized Dr. Blodig to release his evaluation to the Archdiocese of Omaha. Dr. Blodig complied and sent his report to Archbishop Sheehan on March 22, 1976. The Archbishop then wrote to the Archdiocese of San Francisco on March 29, 1976, setting forth most of Dr. Blodig's report in his letter. This letter is the origin of most of the controversy presented in this case. In substance, it expressed concern about Kaufmann's need for further psychiatric treatment as suggested by Dr. Blodig's report. Sometime thereafter, Kaufmann wrote to the Vatican's Apostolic Delegate in Washington, D.C., and the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome seeking to be released from his vows of priesthood. In two letters dated August 30, 1976, and December 27, 1977, Archbishop Sheehan wrote to these church officials in response to their queries about Kaufmann's request to leave the priesthood and forwarded copies of Dr. Blodig's report to them. Kaufmann alleged that the publication of Dr. Blodig's report constituted defamation and was part of a continuing civil conspiracy among Omaha archdiocesan officials to prevent him from obtaining a position with the Archdiocese of San Francisco.

In the spring of 1976, Kaufmann attempted to resolve his differences with Archbishop Sheehan by submitting his claims for conciliation and arbitration through an archdiocesan grievance procedure. Although the record is unclear, Kaufmann apparently abandoned this process at an early stage. (The grievance procedure called for informal conciliation, then arbitration, and finally trial before the Archdiocesan Administrative Tribunal, which would follow canon law in resolving disputes. Kaufmann never progressed beyond the initial informal conciliation stage). Kaufmann claimed that he was denied due process because church officials did not comply with the grievance procedure. He then commenced this action.

The district court dismissed Kaufmann's conspiracy and defamation claims as time-barred under Neb.Rev.Stat. Sec. 25-208 (Reissue 1979) (action for libel must be brought within one year from the date of the publication of the defamatory matter upon which the action is based). This complaint was filed September 18, 1979, twenty-one months after Archbishop Sheehan's most recent publication of Dr. Blodig's allegedly defamatory report on December 27, 1977. The district court stated:

While Nebraska recognizes a cause of action for civil conspiracy, the courts have emphasized that the gravamen of the action is not the conspiracy itself but the underlying tort [citing Dixon v. Reconciliation, Inc., 206 Neb. 45, 291 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1980) ] ....

In this case the underlying tort is defamation .... Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is the one set out in the Nebraska statutes for the tort of defamation.

Slip op. at 4. The court reasoned that merely alleging a conspiracy to commit a tort should not change the statute of limitations governing the underlying tort.

To permit the plaintiff to circumvent the applicable statute of limitations for defamation by the simple procedure of alleging a conspiracy to defame would defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations imposed by the legislature. There appears to be no logical distinction between the alleged conspiracy to defame and the alleged defamation itself. Both causes of action injure or damage the reputation of the plaintiff.

Id. at 5 (quoting Auld v. Mobay Chemical Co., 300 F.Supp. 138, 141 (W.D.Pa.1969)).

Kaufmann argues primarily in this appeal that he was deprived of his due process rights promised by the church, but because of the less than clear nature of his argument, we have reviewed the statute of limitations question. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Kaufmann's claims for defamation and conspiracy to commit defamation as untimely under the applicable Nebraska statute of limitations.

Kaufmann acting pro se moved for leave to amend his first amended complaint. Kaufmann sought to add two new claims to his complaint by alleging that church officials violated canon law by depriving him of a due process hearing before a church tribunal. ² The district court determined that the addition of these claims "would not advance [appellant's] cause and would be prejudicial and costly to the [appellees]. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 [83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222] (1962) [court may deny motion to amend based on futility of amendment]." Id. at 6. In the court's view, these additional claims, which it characterized as alleging a "violation of ecclesiastical due process," patently failed to state a claim against appellees. The court remarked that "[i]f there is an earthly forum for the adjudication of such allegations, it is not a federal court." Id. at 6-7. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to amend.

Kaufmann argues that the good which the due process procedure of the Archbishop promised him in writing is a secular good, and that the charges published about him were secular accusations. He does not attempt to make serious argument to support these accusations. We think it clear that the proposed amendments to the complaint cannot be so construed.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires," but the granting of such a motion is left to the discretion of the district court. Russ v. Ratliff, 578 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir.1958). We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend.

Because appellant drafted his proposed am...