Alberts v. Devine

Decision Date04 June 1985
Citation479 N.E.2d 113,395 Mass. 59
PartiesWilliam E. ALBERTS v. Donald T. DEVINE et al. 1
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Robert J. Doyle, Boston (Bruce V. Keary, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Florence E. Freeman, Weston, for John E. Barclay.

Deborah S. Griffin and Ripley E. Hastings, Boston, for Edward G. Carroll & another.

Jared H. Adams, Boston, for Donald T. Devine.

Ann M. Gilmore, Boston, for Ad-Hoc Committee of Methodist Ministers on the Separation of Church and State, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

In this action, brought by William E. Alberts, a minister of the United Methodist Church, against Donald T. Devine, a psychiatrist, and Edward G. Carroll and John E. Barclay, two of the plaintiff's clerical superiors, we hold that: (1) unless faced with a serious danger to the patient or to others, a physician owes a patient a duty not to disclose without the patient's consent medical information about the patient gained in the course of the professional relationship, and the violation of that duty gives rise to a civil action for whatever damages flow therefrom; (2) a civil action will lie against anyone who, with the requisite state of mind, induces a violation of the physician's duty of confidentiality and thereby causes injury or loss to the patient; and (3) in the circumstances of this case, the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 2 made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), do not preclude inquiry by the courts of the Commonwealth into church processes regarding the appointment and the discharge of ministers, nor do those clauses preclude the imposition of liability on the clerical defendants. 3

Alberts's amended complaint alleges that in April, 1973, and for some period of time before that, he was a minister with the Southern New England Conference of the United Methodist Church (conference), that he and the defendant Devine had entered into a contract for the provision of psychiatric services, and that implicit in their relationship was a warranty that Devine would keep confidential "all information, observations and opinions relating to the diagnosis, condition, behavior, and treatment" of Alberts that Devine might gain in his professional capacity. The complaint further alleges that on or about April 9, 1973, in violation of that warranty and in violation of Devine's explicit promise, made during the course of treatment, to "respect the confidential nature of the relationship between doctor and patient," Devine disclosed to the defendant Carroll, Resident Bishop of the Boston Area of the United Methodist Church and President of the conference, or to Carroll's representative, information about Alberts's "diagnosis, condition, behavior or treatment." The complaint alleges that Carroll and the defendant Barclay, District Superintendent of the Greater Boston District of the conference, intentionally induced the disclosure, and that Carroll and Barclay "informed numerous individual members of the [conference], as well as the various boards, committees and subcommittees of that Conference concerned with the appointment of its ministers to local churches, of their opinions of [Alberts's] mental health." Furthermore, it is averred that Carroll expressed to the public and to news reporters his belief that Alberts "was mentally ill and therefore unappointable," and that his "belief was based on 'competent consultation.' " The complaint alleges that Carroll used the information he obtained from Devine to cause Alberts not to be reappointed as minister of the Old West Church in Boston, and that the unauthorized disclosures caused Alberts considerable loss of earning capacity and other financial losses, damage to his reputation, and great mental anguish requiring medical treatment.

The three defendants filed answers, and Carroll's and Barclay's answer, as amended, included the following defense: "The alleged actions by [Carroll and Barclay], if taken at all, were taken pursuant to their duties and authority as [Alberts's] superiors in the hierarchy of the United Methodist Church and as such are privileged and immune from inquiry by this Court under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."

The three defendants filed motions for summary judgment, and Devine filed a motion to dismiss. The judge allowed Carroll's and Barclay's motion for summary judgment, and she allowed their motions for entry of judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974). She denied both of Devine's motions. The judge also denied a motion filed by Alberts to amend his complaint by adding a count for tortious interference with privacy rights. Carroll and Barclay filed a motion for a protective order quashing any subpoena that might be served on them in connection with a trial of the case or on "any other person who was a member of the United Methodist Church in 1972 or 1973." The motion further requested that the judge limit further disclosure of, and exclude from evidence at trial, deposition testimony previously given, and documents previously identified, by Carroll and Barclay or other named individuals associated with the United Methodist Church. Lastly, the motion requested that the judge rule inadmissible at trial "any evidence relating in any way to the conduct, words and thoughts of defendants Barclay and Carroll and of any other members of the United Methodist Church in 1972 or 1973." As grounds for their motion, Carroll and Barclay asserted a "constitutional prohibition of inquiry by the civil courts into matters of church doctrine and administration." The judge allowed the motion in its entirety.

At the same time that she made those rulings, the judge reported the following questions to the Appeals Court: (1) "[W]hether disclosures [of confidential medical information] by a psychiatrist of a former patient constitutes a cognizable cause of action within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts"; (2) "[W]hether a cause of action for invasion of privacy existed within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts prior to July 1, 1974"; (3) "[W]hether the actions of the defendants Barclay and Carroll are within the ambit of the privileges and immunities granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution"; and (4) "[W]hether [the judge] properly invoked the First Amendment in entering the protective order for defendants Barclay and Carroll." We transferred the case to this court on our own initiative.

Before reaching the reported questions, we must consider a procedural matter: In light of the judgments entered for Carroll and Barclay, do our answers to the reported questions have any significance with respect to Alberts's claims against them? "[A]fter verdict or after a finding of facts under Rule 52 ... [i]f [the judge] is of opinion that an interlocutory finding or order made by [her] so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought to be determined by the Appeals Court before any further proceedings in the trial court, [the judge] may report such matter, and may stay all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties." Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974). Under the rule, a trial judge may report a matter that ought to be determined at the appellate level before judgment is entered or before further proceedings take place. "In essence, the word 'report' connotes a suspension of the trial court's function pending decision by an appellate court." J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 64.1 (1981). Rule 64 does not authorize a report after judgment.

It is not clear from the report nor from the judge's memorandum explaining the reasons for the report whether the judge intended that the answers to the reported questions would apply only to the claims against Devine or whether she also intended them to apply to the claims against Carroll and Barclay. In the memorandum, the judge discusses the relevancy of the questions to the claims against Devine, suggesting that, in keeping with rule 64, the judge reported the case solely to expedite the disposition of the claims against Devine. For example, the judge explained that the questions involving the religion clauses are important to the claims against Devine because, in order to establish damages as to Devine, particularly with respect to loss of earnings, Alberts would have to show that the information allegedly disclosed by Devine contributed to Alberts's loss of employment. The judge also observed that, in order to present that proof, inquiry will be necessary into "the processes of appointment or nonappointment by the governing body of the church together with consideration by a civil court of the interpretation and application of certain codes or canons of [the] church as embodied within its 'Book of Discipline.' " Other language in the memorandum, however, suggests that the judge intended that the Appeals Court's answers to the reported questions would also affect the claims against Carroll and Barclay. For example, the memorandum's concluding paragraph states: "The issues raised on the summary judgments are reported after decision and entry of final judgments as to Barclay and Carroll and the issues raised on interlocutory matters of the plaintiff's motion to amend to add a count of invasion of privacy and the denial of the defendant Devine's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action cognizable by this court are further reported due to the nature of the complaint as filed and the status of the pleadings." Without arguing the procedural point, counsel...

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