Kaufmann v. Siemens Med. Solutions U.S. Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 09–3480,10–1507.,s. 09–3480 |
| Citation | 638 F.3d 840 |
| Parties | Daniel J. KAUFMANN, Appellant,v.SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joseph Anton Polaschek, argued, Davenport, IA, for appellant.Mikkie R. Schiltz, argued, Charles E. Miller, on the brief, Davenport, IA, for appellee.
Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Kaufmann appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment to Siemens Medical Solutions (“Siemens”) on his claim for unpaid wages for fiscal year 2003 under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (“IWPCL”) and the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to Siemens on his claim for liquidated damages based on unpaid wages for fiscal year 2004 under the IWPCL, Iowa Code § 91A. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Kaufmann has worked in various sales-related capacities for Siemens since 2000. During fiscal year 2004 (October 1, 2003, to September 30, 2004), Kaufmann worked as the national sales director for Siemens's Specialty Markets and Alternate Channels division. In this position, Kaufmann supervised a sales force from Millennium Solutions (“Millennium”), a company with which Siemens contracted to be its exclusive dealer of Siemens ultrasound equipment in the United States. In this capacity, Kaufmann was tasked with supervising and training the Millennium sales force. Kaufmann played no role in supervising or training any member of Siemens's direct sales force. Although Siemens mandated its direct sales force to “defer and refer” sales leads to the Millennium sales force, they were not cooperative and continued to sell Siemens ultrasound equipment in Millennium's territory.
Kaufmann's compensation for fiscal year 2004 was governed by Siemens's Sales Compensation Plan Component Summary and the 2004 Sales Variable Pay Plan (collectively, “Pay Plan”). The Pay Plan entitled Kaufmann to variable pay based on four metrics, including commissions based on sales. Pursuant to the Pay Plan, commissions were to be paid monthly. Commissions were only “credited or payable to the participant ... assigned to the territory within which the sale occurred.” Likewise, “[i]t is necessary, to be entitled to commission, that the participant be personally and directly responsible, and have been assigned such responsibility, for such sales.” Because Kaufmann was not directly responsible for sales made by Siemens's direct sales force—and consequently would not be entitled to commissions for those sales—Kaufmann viewed the direct sales force's practice of selling Siemens ultrasound equipment in Millennium's territory as “poaching” sales from the Millennium sales force which, in turn, reduced the amount of Kaufmann's commission.
Kaufmann testified that he asked Sam Patton, a vice president at Siemens, for additional compensation based on the sales by Siemens's direct sales force in Millennium's territory. Kaufmann testified, and produced evidence in the form of an e-mail from Patton, that Patton agreed to compensate him for these sales. Ultimately, however, Siemens reversed Patton's decision and did not compensate Kaufmann for the sales made by the direct sales force in Millennium's territory. Nonetheless, Siemens did give Kaufmann credit for attaining his sales targets for fiscal year 2004, which he had not met, based on sales by the Millennium sales force. However, Kaufmann still failed to qualify for various sales incentives awarded by Siemens during fiscal year 2004.
Kaufmann filed his complaint against Siemens on September 7, 2006, in Iowa state court, seeking recovery of unpaid wages for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Siemens removed the action to federal district court and, soon after, moved for summary judgment on all of Kaufmann's claims. The district court granted Siemens's motion as to Kaufmann's wage claim for fiscal year 2003 because the claim was barred by Iowa's two-year statute of limitations for wage claims. The district court also granted Siemens's motion as to Kaufmann's claim for unpaid sales incentives for fiscal year 2004. 2
A jury trial was held on the remaining wage claims for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. At the close of the evidence, Siemens moved for judgment as a matter of law on both claims. The district court denied this motion. The jury returned a verdict for Kaufmann on the fiscal year 2004 wage claim in the amount of $125,819 and a verdict for Siemens on the fiscal year 2005 wage claim. The jury also found that Siemens intentionally withheld Kaufmann's wages for fiscal year 2004, potentially subjecting Siemens to liability for liquidated damages under the IWPCL.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), Siemens renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the fiscal year 2004 claim. The district court denied the motion as to the wage claim but granted the motion as to the liquidated damages claim. Kaufmann appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to his wage claim for fiscal year 2003 and the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on his liquidated damages claim based on his wage claim for fiscal year 2004.
II. DISCUSSIONA. Fiscal Year 2003
Kaufmann first challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to Siemens on his claim for unpaid wages for fiscal year 2003. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Taylor v. St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 625 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir.2010) (per curiam). Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Our subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based upon diversity of citizenship, and the parties agree that Iowa law governs our analysis. See Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v. Tim McCandless, Inc., 606 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir.2010).
A two-year limitations period applies to wage-claim actions under the IWPCL. See Iowa Code § 614.1(8). “The two-year statute of limitations for wages commences as each payment comes due.” Gabelmann v. NFO, Inc., 571 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Iowa 1997). “Thus, an employee may recover only so many payments as are within two years of when the petition is filed.” Id.
Siemens's 2003 fiscal year ended on September 30, 2003. According to the Pay Plan, Commission payments were due to be paid by the last day of the following quarter, December 31, 2003. Therefore, the limitations period for wage claims from Siemens's fiscal year 2003 ended on December 31, 2005. Kaufmann filed his complaint on September 7, 2006. The district court held that Kaufmann's claim fell outside of the two-year limitations period: “Kaufmann says he was promised compensation for the [fiscal year 2003] sales as early as February 2003, he did not receive the compensation, he knew at December 31, 2003 that he had not received the compensation, and his commission payments were due by that date.”
Kaufmann argues, however, that we should apply principles of equitable estoppel to toll the limitations period because Siemens allegedly has a practice of revising payments to its employees beyond the date when payment is due. According to Kaufmann, an “inference [can] be drawn from this knowledge ... that no wage paid by Siemens is ever final” and, therefore, equitable estoppel should apply to toll the limitations period indefinitely.
Under Iowa law, “a party who has fraudulently prevented the other party from seeking redress within the limitations period cannot benefit from the statute of limitations.” Boehme v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa 2009). “A party asserting equitable estoppel must demonstrate the following by clear and convincing evidence: ‘(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact rely on such representations to his prejudice.’ ” Id. at 146–47 (quoting Hook v. Lippolt, 755 N.W.2d 514, 525 (Iowa 2008)).
We find that Kaufmann's equitable estoppel argument fails on the first requirement of the test detailed in Boehme. “To establish false representation or concealment, there must be evidence the party acted ‘with the intent to mislead the injured party.’ ” Id. at 147 (quoting Hook, 755 N.W.2d at 525). Even if we were to credit Kaufmann's assertion that Siemens revised payments to employees after the payment deadline, Kaufmann produced no evidence that such a practice was done “with the intent to mislead” him. Accordingly, because Kaufmann has failed to meet the first prerequisite to applying equitable estoppel, we need not proceed further, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Siemens on Kaufmann's wage claims for fiscal year 2003.
B. Fiscal Year 2004
Kaufmann next appeals the district court's grant of Siemens's Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on his claim for liquidated damages under the IWPCL based on unpaid wages for fiscal year 2004 that the jury determined Siemens intentionally withheld. We review the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. Fuller v. Fiber Glass Sys., LP, 618 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir.2010). “Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when no reasonable jury could have found for the nonmoving party.” Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prods., 295 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir.2002). In deciding whether to affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law, “we consider all evidence in the record without weighing credibility, and resolve conflicts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Schooley v. Orkin Extermination Co., Inc., 502 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir.2007).
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