Kaur v. N.Y. City Health and Hospitals Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2011 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Kuldip KAUR, etc., appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, et al., respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
82 A.D.3d 891
In the Matter of Kuldip KAUR, etc., appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, et al., respondents.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
March 8, 2011.
Robert F. Danzi, Westbury, N.Y. (Christine Coscia of counsel), for appellant.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel; Alyse Fiori on the brief), for respondents.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and L. PRISCILLA HALL, JJ.
In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), dated September 22, 2009, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner's son was born on November 10, 2000, by emergency caesarian section after the petitioner's uterus ruptured during an attempted vaginal birth following a prior caesarian section delivery (hereinafter VBAC). The petitioner alleges that the VBAC was performed without her informed consent. The infant allegedly suffered severe brain damage as a result of protracted oxygen deprivation.
Almost nine years later, on July 20, 2009, the petitioner moved for leave to serve a late notice of claim on the respondents, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Elmhurst Hospital Center, and Elmhurst Hospital Center's Community Medical Center. The petitioner did not assert that the respondents committed malpractice in their performance of the VBAC or the subsequent caesarian section; rather, she contended that the malpractice stemmed from the respondents' failure to obtain her informed consent to attempt a VBAC. The Supreme Court denied the motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim and dismissed the proceeding, finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the lengthy delay in commencing the proceeding or to demonstrate that the respondents had actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter. The...
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