Kaur v. Singh

• Decision Date: 25 May 2010
• Citation: 73 A.D.3d 1178,900 N.Y.S.2d 895
• Parties: In the Matter of Aurshpunit KAUR, respondent, v. Aurwindur SINGH, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

900 N.Y.S.2d 895

73 A.D.3d 1178

In the Matter of Aurshpunit KAUR, respondent,

v.Aurwindur SINGH, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 25, 2010.

Mark P. Isaacs, Valley Stream, N.Y., for appellant.

Amy L. Colvin, Huntington, N.Y., for respondent.

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Aurwindur Singh appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (St.George, J.), dated March 27, 2009, which, after a hearing, inter alia, found that he had committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and menacing, and directed the issuanceof an order of protection in favor of the petitioner and against him.

ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

"The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court" ( Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d 1141, 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585; see Family Ct. Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Halper v. Halper, 61 A.D.3d 687, 875 N.Y.S.2d 916; Matter of Lallmohamed v. Lallmohamed, 23 A.D.3d 562, 806 N.Y.S.2d 622), whose "determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record" ( Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d at 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585; see Matter of Robbins v. Robbins, 48 A.D.3d 822, 851 N.Y.S.2d 877; Matter of Phillips v. Laland, 4 A.D.3d 529, 530, 771 N.Y.S.2d 718). Here, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supported the Family Court's determination that, on November 27, 2008, the appellant committed acts which constituted the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and menacing, warranting the issuance of an order of protection ( see Family Ct. Act § 832; Penal Law § 240.26[1]; § 120.15; Matter of Czop v. Czop, 21 A.D.3d 958, 959, 801 N.Y.S.2d 63; Matter of Jessica C. v. Esteban B., 13 A.D.3d 183, 785 N.Y.S.2d 915; Yvette H. v. Michael G., 270 A.D.2d 123, 704 N.Y.S.2d 573).

Contrary to the appellant's contention, it was not incumbent upon the Family Court to specify the particular family offense, i.e., what degree of menacing his acts constituted, where it was clear from the record that his acts constituted menacing in the third degree ( see Matter of Abbott v. Burnes, 27 A.D.3d 555, 813 N.Y.S.2d 133; Matter of Topper v. Topper, 271 A.D.2d 613, 613-614, 706 N.Y.S.2d 147).

The appellant's...