Kavanagh v. Kelly
| Citation | 25 A.2d 547,131 N.J.Eq. 398 |
| Decision Date | 16 April 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 6434.,6434. |
| Parties | KAVANAGH et al. v. KELLY, State Tax Com'r. In re GREENE'S ESTATE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. To render inter vivos transfers taxable as made in contemplation of death, there must be proof that they were motivated by those considerations which lead to testamentary disposition of property.
2. In the absence of evidence from which it can be logically and legitimately inferred that the inter vivos transfers were made by the decedent in contemplation of death, the assessments thereon must, of necessity, be vacated.
3. In these proceedings, evidence exhibiting (1) the qualities of the transferor, (2) his habits and propensities, (3) his age and state of health at the time, (4) the pertinent circumstances amid which he was situated, (5) his conduct both prior and subsequent to the transfer, (6) the intrinsicalities of the inter vivos gifts, (7) their proximity to the date of death, and (8) the fashion of his former and ultimate testamentary dispositions, provide a field of fact from which the impelling motive of the inter vivos transfers may be harvested.
Proceeding in the matter of the appeal of William A. Kavanagh and another, as executors, etc., from the inheritance tax assessment made by William D. Kelly, state tax commissioner, in the estate of James W. Greene, deceased.
Decree in accordance with opinion.
Mark A. Sullivan, of Jersey City, for appellants.
David T. Wilentz, Atty. Gen, and William A. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen, for respondent.
JAYNE, Vice Ordinary.
On June 16, 1939, one James W. Greene, a resident of South Orange, New Jersey, died at the age of seventy-five years, leaving a gross estate of $2,085,048.49. The state tax commissioner increased the value of the estate alleged to be taxable under the provisions of Chapter 228, Laws of 1909, section 1, subsection "Third," as amended by Chapter 244, Laws of 1934, pp. 698, 699 (), by adding the sum of $231,203.24, which was determined to be the total value of certain inter vivos transfers of the capital stock of J. W. Greene, Inc., made by the decedent in the years 1934 and 1935. The valuation attributable to these transfers is not criticized. This produced, after the allowance of deductions, a net taxable estate valued at $2,152,243.42.
The commissioner resolved that transfer inheritance taxes should be levied upon the inter vivos transfers in that they were in his judgment gifts made by the decedent in contemplation of death. The appellants assert that the assessment of the tax on these transfers was unjustifiable and erroneous. The factual propriety of these assessments is therefore the sole controversial issue to be determined.
The following memorandum will afford some acquaintance in general with the dates, the donees and the dimensions of the inter vivos gifts:
On August 27, 1934:
To his brother Charles L. Greene, 200 shares
To his sister Anna Bray, 100 shares
To his sister Susan Cormier, 100 shares
To his sister Mary J. Greene, 100 shares
To his sister Katherine V. Fralick, 100 shares
On June 4, 1935:
To his brother Charles L. Greene, 100 shares
To his brother George R. Greene, 100 shares
To his brother William R. Greene, 100 shares
On December 18, 1935:
To his sister Anna Bray, 50 shares
Obviously, these transfers were not made by the decedent within two years of his death and therefore the statutory presumption that he was actuated by a testamentary motive does not arise. To affirm these assessments their justification must be found to be supported by the requisite proof that the transfers were in fact made as substitutes for testamentary disposition. Squier v. Martin, 131 N.J.Eq. 263, 24 A.2d 865.
The motive of the donor is the determinative. Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J. L. 189, 14 A.2d 482. Motive is that within the individual which incites him to action. A motive is in general a consideration which determines choice and becomes an incentive to the performance of some act. A motive probably does not operate to influence positive action unless there are facts in existence which create the motive. It would be idle to undertake to catalogue the circumstances which, in reasonable probability, would excite a design to pursue some particular course of action. The operation of human emotions cannot be reduced to definite rules. However, in cases like the present, in which a circumspect effort must be exerted to ascertain the probable intent and purpose of the transferor, evidence exhibiting the qualities of the transferor, his habits and propensities, his age and state of health at the time, the pertinent circumstances amid which he was situated, his conduct both prior and subsequent to the transfer, the intrinsicalities of his inter vivos gifts, their proximity to the date of his death and the fashion of his former and ultimate testamentary dispositions of his estate, provides some field of fact from which the impelling motive of his inter vivos transfers may be harvested.
The evidence in the instant proceeding has been thoughtfully reviewed and considered. It discloses that the decedent was a prosperous business man. He was for many years engaged in the sale of furniture and household furnishings which enterprise he pursued from 1919 until 1936 under the corporate franchise and name, J. W. Greene, Inc. He was twice married. His former wife died in June 1919. His second marriage occurred in 1922. No children were born of either marriage. He had three brothers and four sisters in whose welfare he seems to have retained a constant and affectionate interest.
The decedent was apparently a person of generous inclinations. Throughout a span of years he provided employment in his business for many of his own and his wife's relatives. He contributed liberally and continuously to the comfort of his foursisters. He leased a summer home for several seasons for their occupancy at Hampton Beach, New Hampshire. He financed ocean cruises for their enjoyment. He assured them that they need not undertake to save the proceeds of his gifts because he would provide for them in his will. If at any time they should...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dommerich v. Kelly
... ... The determinant of the taxability of such transfers is the motive of the transferor. Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J. L. 189, 14 A.2d 482; Squier v. Martin, 131 N.J.Eq. 263, 24 A.2d 865; Kavanagh v. Kelly, 131 N.J.Eq. 398, 25 A.2d 547; Plum v. Martin, 132 N.J.Eq. 1, 26 A.2d 529, or, if you prefer, the determinant may be characterized as "the motivating cause" or "a controlling purpose." Vide Schweinler v. Martin, 117 N.J.Eq. 67, 93, 175 A. 71, 82; Cairns v. Martin, 130 N.J.Eq. 313, 22 A.2d ... ...
-
Montclair Trust Co. v. Zink
... ... Kavanagh v. Kelly, 131 N.J.Eq. 398, 25 A.2d 547; Dommerich v. Kelly, 132 N.J.Eq. 220, 27 A.2d 871, affirmed 130 N.J.L. 542, 33 A.2d 893, affirmed 132 N.J.L ... ...
-
Johnson v. Zink
... ... The more recent decisions are: Kavanagh v. Kelly, 131 N.J.Eq. 398, 25 A.2d 547; Plum v. Martin, 132 N.J.Eq. 1, 26 A.2d 529; Dommerich v. Kelly, 132 N.J.Eq. 220, 27 A.2d 871, affirmed 130 ... ...
-
Coffin v. Kelly
... ... Squier v. Martin, 131 N.J.Eq. 263, 24 A.2d 865; Kavanagh v. Kelly, 131 N.J.Eq. 398, 25 A.2d 547; Plum v. Martin, 132 N.J.Eq. 1, 26 A.2d 529; Dommerich v. Kelly, 132 N.J.Eq. 220, 27 A.2d 871; Voorhees v. Kelly, 132 N.J.Eq. 230, 28 A.2d 61. The justification for the assessment depends upon the relevant and credible facts of the individual ... ...