Kavanaugh v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:19-cv-3256-MTS |
| Parties | WILLIAM DANIEL KAVANAUGH, Plaintiff, v. DUSTIN EDWARDS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant Edwards's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. [83], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. [43] for several constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. For reasons discussed below, the Court grants summary judgment as to some claims but denies summary judgment on others.
Plaintiff William Daniel Kavanaugh, a pro se litigant, brought this action against Defendant Dustin Edwards and against Nicholas Osmer (“Osmer”), police detectives for the Florissant Police Department, in connection with a traffic stop.
On July 17, 2018, Defendant initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Plaintiff.[1]Defendant approached the vehicle and spoke with Plaintiff. Compare Doc. [85-3], with Doc. [882] ¶¶ 43-45. While the parties dispute most of what was said during this conversation, both parties agree that Plaintiff told Defendant about an outstanding warrant for arrest by the State of Arizona (the “Arizona warrant”). Doc. [88-2] ¶ 10; Doc. [85-2] ¶ 12(d). During the conversation, Defendant states Plaintiff exhibited nervous behavior[2]“consistent with narcotic usage based upon [Defendant's] training and experience with drug crimes and investigations.” Doc. [85-2] ¶ 11. Plaintiff disputes this behavior and maintains Defendant has been “untruthful” about Plaintiff's “behavior and actions during the traffic stop.” Doc. [87] at 4.
Defendant requested Plaintiff exit the vehicle and Plaintiff complied. Defendant conducted a pat down search of Plaintiff for weapons and found none. Defendant asked Plaintiff for consent to search the vehicle for contraband. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff gave consent. Doc. [88-2] ¶ 14; Doc. [85-2] ¶ 18; Doc. [85-5] ¶ 11. At this point, Plaintiff states Defendant placed him under arrest pursuant to the Arizona warrant. Doc. [88-2] ¶ 15. Defendant denies this arrest. Defendant searched the vehicle and did not find any contraband.
At some point while roadside, Defendant requested Florissant Dispatch conduct a computer inquiry of Plaintiff's name. The inquiry confirmed Plaintiff had an active probation violation in the State of Arizona for possession of drugs and that Plaintiff was currently on parole through the State of Illinois. Also, at some point while roadside, Osmer arrived on the scene.
Plaintiff claims Defendant asked him for consent to conduct a strip search at the scene of the traffic stop, to which Plaintiff did not consent. Plaintiff claims Defendant conducted a strip search of Plaintiff where Defendant “sexually assaulted” him. Doc. [85-1] at 5, 9, 17-18, 20. Plaintiff explains that Doc. [88-2] ¶ 24. Defendant denies he conducted a strip search of Plaintiff during the traffic stop. After the alleged strip search, Plaintiff states Defendant removed the handcuffs, “called [him] a piece of shit and told [Plaintiff] to stay the fuck out of Florissant.” Doc. [88-2] ¶ 26-27.
A later search[3]of the vehicle was conducted and two clear plastic baggies containing a crystalized substance were found in a concealed compartment in the front passenger door of the vehicle. Defendant believed the crystalized substance to be consistent with methamphetamine. Defendant handcuffed[4] Plaintiff for violating the Missouri controlled substance law and placed Plaintiff in his patrol car to take to the police station. Upon arrival at the Florissant Police Department, Plaintiff alleges Defendant placed Plaintiff in an interview room and conducted a second strip search of Plaintiff. Doc. [88-2] ¶ 34. Defendant denies he performed a strip search of Plaintiff at the police station. Doc. [85-2] ¶ 28. According to Plaintiff, his last contact with Edwards was when Edwards took Plaintiff to a booking cell at the police station. Doc. [85-4] at 22 (86:13-21). Ultimately, Plaintiff was “booked, processed and released pending application of [a] warrant” for a drug charge relating to the traffic stop. Doc. [85-3] at 2. After the St. Louis County Police Department Crime Laboratory confirmed the substance found in the vehicle was methamphetamine, Doc. [85-8], on November 28, 2018, Plaintiff was charged in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri for “Possession of Controlled Substance Except 35 Grams or Less of Marijuana/Synthetic Cannabinoid-Class D Felony.”[5]Doc. [85-9].
Plaintiff claims Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully conducting a traffic stop, searching the vehicle and cell phone without a warrant, arresting Plaintiff without a warrant, and conducting two strip searches of Plaintiff, one during the traffic stop and one at the police station. Doc. [85-1]. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims, except for the claim based on the unlawful traffic[6]stop and alleged strip search during the traffic stop.[7] Doc. [83].
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court is bound to liberally construe his filings in order to do substantial justice. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Solem, 691 F.2d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1982). However, a litigant's pro se status does not excuse him from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of this District. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) ().
“A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). A dispute is not “genuine” unless the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of explaining the basis for its motion, and it must identify those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). “The moving party can satisfy its burden in either of two ways: it can produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or it can show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Bedford, 880 F.3d at 996. If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case with respect to which he or she has the burden of proof, the moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court views any factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Plaintiff brings several Fourth Amendment claims against Defendant. “The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Robinson v. Hawkins, 937 F.3d 1128, 1136 (8th Cir. 2019). Pertinent to the motion here, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are based on a warrantless search of the vehicle, cellphone, and his person, and a warrantless arrest. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues there were no Fourth Amendment violations or that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action for damages.” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A police detective, like Defendant, is entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence establishes (1) a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation such that a reasonable person would have known that his actions were unlawful. Blazek v. Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2014). In the context of a qualified immunity defense on an unlawful search or arrest claim, the Court ascertains whether a defendant violated clearly established law by asking whether there was “arguable probable cause” for the challenged conduct. Ryno v. City of Waynesville, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 411389, at *6 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2023). If possible, the Court may resolve the case under either prong of the analysis. Blazek, 761 F.3d at 923; Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Because an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless both prongs are satisfied, our analysis will end if either of the two is not met.”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
Plaintiff claims Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching the vehicle without a warrant, probable cause, or consent. It is undisputed no warrant existed to search the vehicle. “Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable subject to a few well-established exceptions.” United...
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