Kavanaugh v. Thompson
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-01393 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2023 |
| Parties | EDWARD LEON KAVANAUGH, Petitioner v. WARDEN R. THOMPSON, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Pro se Petitioner Edward Leon Kavanaugh (“Petitioner”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). While he was incarcerated at Low Security Correctional Institution Allenwood in White Deer Pennsylvania (“LSCI Allenwood”), he commenced the above-captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He attempts to collaterally attack the validity of his federal conviction, as imposed by the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (“Western District of Texas”). For the reasons set forth below the Court will dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction and deny the pending motions seeking the appointment of counsel as moot.
On December 6, 2013, in the Western District of Texas, Petitioner appeared before a Magistrate Judge and pleaded guilty to single count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. See United States v. Kavanaugh, No. 1:13-cr-00469 (W.D. Tx. Oct. 15, 2013), ECF No. 32. On March 28, 2014, by an amended judgment, a District Judge accepted Petitioner's guilty plea, adjudicated him guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and sentenced him to a term of one-hundred and fifty-one (151) months of imprisonment followed by a term of three (3) years supervised release. See id., ECF Nos. 40, 42. Petitioner, who was found to be a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, see id., ECF Nos. 71, 75, appealed his sentence, see id., ECF No. 44. On August 25, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed his appeal as frivolous. See id., ECF No. 49.
Thereafter, on June 23, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines' career offender enhancement, and requested that the Western District of Texas resentence him without application of that enhancement. See id., ECF No. 53. On July 19, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that Petitioner's motion to vacate his sentence be denied because it was untimely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. See id., ECF No. 71. On August 7, 2019, the District Judge adopted the Report and Recommendation. See id., ECF No. 75.
Roughly three (3) years later, on September 8, 2022, Petitioner filed his Section 2241 petition in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) He asserts four (4) grounds for relief in his petition. (Id. at 6-8.) His first ground appears to be that one of his predicate state offenses, which was used to enhance his federal sentence (i.e., his offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), is not a crime of violence and, thus, invalidates his status as a career offender. (Id. at 6 ().) His second ground is that, during his sentencing hearing, the District Judge incorrectly stated that he pleaded guilty to a “conspiracy” offense, as opposed to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. (Id.) His third ground is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that incorrect statement. (Id.) And his fourth and final ground is that, “under new Supreme Court substantive findings of law[,]” his offense level for sentencing purposes should be decreased from level twenty-four (24) to level twenty-two (22). (Id. at 8.) In connection with most of these grounds for relief, Petitioner asserts that he is “actual[ly] and factual[ly] innocen[t] of [his] sentence.” (Id. at 6, 8.) As a result, he seeks his immediate release from custody. (Id. at 8.)
After Petitioner paid the requisite filing fee in this matter (Doc. No. 4), the Court deemed his petition filed, directed service upon Respondent-the Warden at LSCI Allenwood, and instructed Respondent to file a response within twenty (20) days (Doc. No. 9). On October 11, 2022, Respondent filed a response to the petition, arguing that Petitioner's challenge to the validity of his federal sentence does not fall within the narrow exception authorized by the saving clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, such that it would authorize Petitioner to assert his habeas claims via 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 14.) Petitioner has since filed a reply (Doc. No. 17), as well as two (2) motions seeking the appointment of counsel (Doc. Nos. 15, 16).
Thus, the instant petition, which has been fully briefed by the parties, is ripe for the Court's resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Respondent that the petition is subject to dismissal for Petitioner's failure to satisfy the narrow exception set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As a result, the Court will dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
“Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal prisoners.” Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82).[1]In its current form, this authorization is found at 28 U.S.C § 2241 (“Section 2241”) of the Judicial Code, “which provides that federal judges may grant the writ of habeas corpus on the application of a prisoner held ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'” See Id. at 178 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).
Generally speaking, a federal prisoner is required to address his application for a writ of habeas corpus to “the person who has custody over him[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (). “The logic of this rule rests in an understanding that the warden . . . has day-to-day control over the prisoner and . . . can produce the actual body.” Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Relatedly, “district courts may only grant habeas relief against custodians ‘within their respective jurisdictions.'” See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)) and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) for the following proposition: Section 2241(a) “requires nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian”).
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”), this requirement for federal prisoners to file in their district of confinement “meant that ‘the few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal penal institutions are located were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions far from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses[,] and the records of the sentencing court solely because of the fortuitous concentration of federal prisoners within the district.'” See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1952)). In response to this overburdening, and the “serious administrative problems” that it created, Congress responded in 1948 by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Section 2255”). See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178 (internal citation omitted) (citing Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967-68); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249 ().
Thus, “the sole purpose” of Section 2255 was, as explained by the United States Supreme Court “to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (citing Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 1948, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175); United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953) ().
It is against this historical backdrop that the following legal principle was put into effect: when a federal inmate is seeking to collaterally attack the validity of his federal conviction or sentence, he must generally do so by way of a motion filed pursuant to Section 2255.[2] See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178 ( that “a federal prisoner's first (and most often only) route for collateral review of his conviction or sentence is under [Section] 2255”); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249 ( that Section 2255, not Section 2241, is “the usual avenue for federal prisoners seeking to challenge the legality of their confinement”). Indeed, the plain text of Section 2255 “provides that a habeas petition filed in the prisoner's district of confinement ‘shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief.'” See Bruce, 868 F.3d...
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