Kaylor v. Romines
| Citation | 70 S.E.2d 395,85 Ga.App. 839 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 33989,33989,2 |
| Parties | KAYLOR v. ROMINES |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An objection that the court erred in submitting certain issues of fact to the jury is in effect an objection that the court erred in not directing a verdict as to such issues, and is not reviewable.
2. Portions of the court's charge related to an issue as to which the jury found in favor of the plaintiff in error, and were harmless, if erroneous.
3. (a) The jury was authorized, under the pleadings and evidence in this case, to find that the overcharged in an amount above that set as maximum rent for the housing accommodations under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1881 et seq., was not wilful nor the result of failure to take practical precautions.
(b) The jury was further authorized, after finding in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of a single overcharge, to deduct from said amount sums necessarily spent by the defendant to repair damage to such accommodations by the plaintiff tenant.
R. J. Kaylor filed a treble damage suit for rent overcharges, against James A. Romines, in the Civil Court of Fulton County, alleging that the maximum rent on controlled-housing accommodations occupied by him was $23, and that for a period from January 1, 1950, through April 11, 1951, the landlord demanded and received rent thereon of $70 per month, or a total overcharge of $487.21. The defendant answered, denying the allegations of the petition and setting up as an affirmative defense that the tenant during his occupation of the housing accommodations had damaged them in named particulars in the sum of $364. The case was tried before a jury and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff tenant for the amount of the single overcharge less the entire amount of the cross-action, or a total of $121.67, the method by which the jury arrived at this verdict being admitted by both parties. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for a new trial on the general grounds and two special grounds. Error is assigned on the overruling of this motion.
Yantis Mitchell, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
E. H. Stanford, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
TOWNSEND, Judge (after stating the foregoing facts.)
1. Special ground 1 complains of a lengthy portion of the charge to the jury, on the ground that matters were left to the consideration of the jury as to which no issues of fact were made. Since it is not contended that the charges were inaccurate as to any principle of law, it may briefly be stated that the matter excepted to left it to the jury to determine: first, what the legal maximum rent was; second, whether there was an overcharge; third, the amount thereof; and fourth, whether the plaintiff was entitled to treble damages on the ground that the overcharge was the result of wilfulness or the failure to take practical precautions. The complaint that it was error to leave it to the jury to decide whether or not there had been an overcharge, and whether or not it was wilful, amounts only to a complaint that the court should have directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. A failure to direct a verdict may never be made the ground of a motion for a new trial, and is not reviewable. Roberts v. Groover, 161 Ga. 414(1), 131 S.E. 158. This ground of the amended motion is without merit.
2. The remaining special ground contends that the above charges were error for the reason that, since the cross-action of the defendant was for less than the amount of the single overcharge sued upon, it was error to instruct the jury under any condition whatever that they might return a verdict for the defendant. The jury did in fact return a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of the single overcharge less the amount of the cross-action, and did not return a verdict in favor of the defendant. Consequently, and error in the charge which might have left the jury with the impression that the pleadings and evidence in this case authorized them to bring back a verdict for some amount in favor of the defendant, or a general verdict in favor of the defendant, was harmless, where the verdict as returned was in favor of the plaintiff for an amount authorized under the evidence. Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718(2), 193 S.E. 233. Error, to be reversible, must be harmful. See many cases under Code Ann. § 70-207, catchwords, 'Harmless error.' This ground is without merit.
3. (a) As to the general grounds, the jury was authorized to find from the evidence, construed in its light most favorable to the verdict, that the housing accommodations in question had been first rented on June 1, 1942, by the then owner, Patricia Bell, for a rent of $23, and that a registration was filed by the landlord with the Office of Price Administration showing this amount as the maximum rent; that the accommodations consisted of one floor of a two-story house; that no application to change this rental was ever made, and it continued to be the ceiling rent; that in 1948 the defendant bought the house from the Bells; that the Bells were living there at the time and were occupying the rooms which are the subject matter of this suit; that the defendant in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Maloy v. Dixon
...Joyce v. City of Dalton, 73 Ga.App. 209, 216, 36 S.E.2d 104; Baggett v. Jackson, 79 Ga.App. 460, 463, 54 S.E.2d 146; Kaylor v. Romines, 85 Ga.App. 839, 841, 70 S.E.2d 395; Beecher v. Farley, 104 Ga.App. 785(3), 123 S.E.2d 184; Bell v. Camp, 109 Ga.App. 221(2), 135 S.E.2d 914; Stynchcombe v.......
-
Wood v. Mobley
...564(3), 125 S.E.2d 85; Painter v. State, 112 Ga.App. 24(1), 143 S.E.2d 680. The only civil case using such language is Kayler v. Romines, 85 Ga.App. 839(1), 70 S.E.2d 395, which cites as authority Roberts v. Groover, 161 Ga. 414(1), 131 S.E. 158, which does not sustain the ruling, the case ......
-
Stynchcombe v. Gooding Amusement Co.
...184 Ga. 718, 721(3), 193 S.E. 233; Brown v. Service Coach Lines, Inc., 71 Ga.App. 437, 449(4), 31 S.E.2d 236; Kaylor v. Romines, 85 Ga.App. 839, 841(2), 70 S.E.2d 395. See also Beecher v. Farley, 104 Ga.App. 785, 788(3), 123 S.E.2d 184 and cases For the same reason there is no merit in spec......
- Iteld v. Karp