Keasler v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 24 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-CA-01656-COA,2019-CA-01656-COA |
| Citation | 308 So.3d 441 |
| Parties | Nora Rasco KEASLER and Steve Keasler, Appellants v. Haley Palmer Roberson FOWLER and Zeke Ashton Roberson, Appellees |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: MATTHEW YARBROUGH HARRIS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOE M. DAVIS, New Albany, (FOR HALEY FOWLER)
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A grandmother and step-grandfather petitioned for visitation rights of their grandchild. At a bench trial, the grandchild's mother moved to dismiss the case at the close of the grandparents’ evidence.
¶2. Following trial, the chancellor dismissed the step-grandfather's case for lack of standing and further found that the grandmother "failed to show that additional grandparent visitation would be in the best interest of [the grandchild]." As a result, the court granted the mother's motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3. During their marriage, Haley Fowler and Zeke Roberson had one child together, A.F.1 Roberson's mother, Nora Keasler, and stepfather, Steve, were both actively involved in raising and taking care of A.F. when needed.
¶4. Fowler and Roberson later divorced. Following their separation, the parents initially shared joint physical and legal custody of their daughter. But a chancery court later modified this arrangement to award sole physical custody to Fowler. Roberson maintained joint legal custody and was allowed to see his daughter every other weekend, on alternating holidays, and during alternating weeks in the summer.
¶5. The revised custody arrangement apparently compromised the time A.F. spent with her paternal grandparents. Prior to the custody modification, Keasler and Steve enjoyed various outings and holiday functions with their grandchild. But the new custody arrangement caused them to only see her a few hours each month.
¶6. Grieving the substantial reduction in quality time, Keasler and Steve sued both Fowler and Roberson for visitation of A.F. Roberson later joined "in all respects with the request of [his parents] for Grandparent Visitation."
¶7. A bench trial was held in chancery court. Keasler testified that she deserved visitation rights because she had been a "big part of [A.F.’s] life since birth" and spent a lot of time with her grandchild prior to Roberson's and Fowler's divorce. She also claimed that she sacrificed several weeks and months of her time supervising A.F. at her son's and Fowler's request. To support her testimony, she admitted a slew of pictures of her outings with A.F. and introduced an impressive range of text messages between her and Fowler, where Fowler asked her to keep the baby.
¶8. Most of Keasler's reasons for requesting court-ordered visitation were based on her desire to maintain the close-knit relationship she shared with A.F. She testified that because her son's visitation extended to only four days per month, and he was not "willing to give up those days to let [her] have ... time with A.F.[,]" Keasler's time with her granddaughter was limited to four hours per month. However, she admitted that her son was not completely prohibiting her visitation with A.F. She also testified that she basically lived next door to her son.
¶9. Steve was the second and last person to testify. Aside from revealing that he was self-employed and traveled frequently, he essentially echoed his wife's sentiments. After Steve testified, Fowler moved to dismiss the case "based upon there not being any evidence of unreasonable denial [of visitation] by the son."
¶10. The court reserved ruling on the motion for a later time. In its written judgment, the court first eliminated Steve from its analysis because, as a step-grandparent, he "lack[ed] standing ... to request grandparent visitation."
¶11. The court next confronted Keasler's failure to specify which subsection of the visitation rights statute she wished to proceed under. In light of this "critical omission," the court examined Keasler's eligibility to petition for visitation under multiple subsections of the statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-16-3 (Rev. 2018). According to the chancellor, the claim failed under subsection (1) because there was "insufficient proof surrounding the criteria for assessing the best interest of A.F." Alternatively, Keasler's petition failed under subsection (2) because she failed to show that she was "unreasonably denied visitation" by her son. Under both rationales, the chancellor declined to fully assess specific factors to determine whether visitation was in the child's best interest.
¶12. Based on his findings, the chancery court granted Fowler's motion to dismiss. Aggrieved, Keasler appealed.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13. "In reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal, we apply the substantial evidence/manifest error standards." Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth. v. Montclair Travel Agency Inc ., 937 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "A judge should grant a motion for involuntary dismissal if, after viewing the evidence fairly , rather than in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the judge would find for the defendant." Id . at 1004 (¶13) (emphasis in original). "The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff's evidence were all the evidence offered in the case." Id . at 1004-05 (¶13).
ANALYSIS
¶14. Grandparent visitation rights are purely creatures of statute under Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-16-3. Settle v. Galloway , 682 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Miss. 1996). Subsections (1) and (2) of the statute are two avenues by which a grandparent may petition for visitation. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3. Under subsection (1) "either parent of the child's parent" may petition for visitation rights if the court awards custody to one of the child's parents. Id . Alternatively, subsection (2) is reserved for those grandparents who do not qualify to petition under subsection (1). Id . § 93-16-3(2)(b). We note at the outset that only subsection (1) applies to Keasler's appeal because the court awarded primary physical custody to one parent, Fowler. Id . § 93-16-3(1) ; see also Solomon v. Robertson , 980 So. 2d 319, 320, 322 (¶¶1, 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) ().
¶15. Keasler presents many concerns in her brief, but the dispositive issue in this case is whether the chancery court erred in declining to fully assess A.F.’s best interests under Martin v. Coop , 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Martin , 222 So. 3d 255 (Miss. 2017). In Martin , our Supreme Court established ten factors courts must address to determine the amount of visitation a grandparent should receive. Id . at 916. Its successor, Smith , clarified that chancellors must also use these factors to determine "whether grandparent visitation is in a child's best interest in the first place." Smith , 222 So. 3d at 264 (¶18).
¶16. When a Martin analysis is not performed in grandparent-visitation cases, we will reverse. See T.T.W. v. C.C. , 839 So. 2d 501, 505 (¶12) (Miss. 2003) (); Townes v. Manyfield , 883 So. 2d 93, 97 (¶29) (Miss. 2004) ().
¶17. However, an analysis of Martin is not required when a grandparent fails to satisfy the criteria set forth in section 93-16-3. Vermillion v. Perkett , 281 So. 3d 925, 929 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, a chancery court granted a directed verdict after a grandparent failed to establish that a "viable relationship" existed under subsection (2) of the statute. Id . at 928 (¶1). One of her chief arguments on appeal was that the chancery court failed to analyze the Martin factors. Id . at 932 (¶20).
¶18. This Court reviewed the grandparent's motion for directed verdict under the standard of review for involuntary dismissals. Id . at 929 (¶11). We ultimately rejected the grandparent's argument, holding that "grandparents seeking visitation rights must first satisfy the requirements of section 93-16-3 before the chancellor is required to address the best interest of the child." Id. at (¶21) (emphasis added). In other words, a chancellor is not obligated to conduct a Martin analysis unless the grandparent first meets the prima facie requirements set out in the statute. Id .
¶19. In accord with Vermillion , we find that Keasler failed to first satisfy the requirements of section 93-16-3. Specifically, she did not provide the court with evidence to show that visitation was in A.F.’s best interest. As a result, application of the Martin factors was not required. See also Hillman v. Vance , 910 So. 2d 43, 47 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (); Smith , 222 So. 3d at 259 (); Aydelott v. Quartaro , 124 So. 3d 97, 101 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (...
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