Keats v. State

• Decision Date: 20 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-171.,04-171.
• Parties: Wade Travis KEATS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

115 P.3d 1110

2005 WY 81

Wade Travis KEATS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.

No. 04-171.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 20, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Representing Petitioner: W. Keith Goody, Alpine, Wyoming.

Representing Respondent: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Melissa M. Swearingen, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Swearingen.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Wade Travis Keats was convicted of first-degree arson in July of 2001. This Court affirmed that conviction on February 13, 2003. See Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, 64 P.3d 104 (Wyo.2003) (Keats I). On November 17, 2003, Keats filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The district court denied Keats' petition finding Keats failed to meet the required factual burden for showing ineffective assistance of counsel. Keats then filed a petition for writ of review, which we granted. We conclude Keats' trial counsel was ineffective; therefore, we reverse his conviction and remand to the district court for a new trial.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Keats presents two issues for our review:

I. Was defense counsel ineffective for failing to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness and deficiency and by failing to investigate a mental health defense? Accordingly, were the petitioner's rights under the 5^th, 6^th, and 14^th amendments to the United State's [sic] Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution violated?

II. Was appellate counsel ineffective for not raising ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal? Therefore, were the petitioner's rights under the 5^th, 6^th and 14^th amendments to the United State's [sic] Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution violated?

The State rephrases the issues as follows:

I. Whether the district court properly determined that petitioner failed to support his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

II. Whether the district court properly determined that petitioner failed to support his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

FACTS

[¶ 3] We summarized the facts of the original incident in Keats I, ¶¶ 3-6.

On the evening of December 30, 2000, appellant angrily left some friends, stating to one friend "if [you don't] want to go to jail, get out of the car. . . ." The friend complied. Appellant then returned to his mobile home in the early morning hours of December 31, 2000, and, appearing angry and intoxicated, asked his roommate to "get [her] stuff and leave, get out of his house." After gathering some of her property, and her son, in order to leave the residence, the roommate observed appellant break a window and then saw a small fire in the hallway. She extinguished the fire, and as she left, appellant "was talking about burning the house down with himself in it and he was tired of everybody using him." The roommate reported the incident to an emergency dispatcher.

Campbell County sheriff's deputies responded to appellant's residence just after 1:00 a.m. on December 31, 2000. As they stood outside the mobile home, they observed appellant periodically inside the residence, but he did not initially respond to their requests to exit the residence or talk to them. Eventually, the officers entered the residence and located appellant in the bathroom. A lengthy period of interaction and attempted negotiation between appellant, the officers, and, at appellant's request, another individual ensued. During this period, appellant's unstable demeanor vacillated rapidly between suicidal, threatening, anger, laughter, and depression. For example, appellant frequently exited and retreated to the bathroom, told the officers to get out of his house, threatened to kill himself if they did not do so, displayed three different knives, at times held a knife to his abdomen and throat, stabbed knives into the bathroom wall, door, and floor while yelling at the officers to "come and get some of this," laughed at the officers, and stated that if the officers came through the bathroom door, a knife was positioned such that it would harm appellant.

Appellant ultimately proceeded to light several fires at different times and at different locations within the residence. The officers, and firemen, were able to extinguish and control these fires until at least one fire began to spread, filling the mobile home with smoke. At one point, appellant broke a window, but upon seeing an officer outside the window pointing a flashlight and firearm at him, appellant took two deep breaths of fresh air and returned to the smoke-filled residence. Eventually, amidst the smoke, flames and steam, the officers subdued appellant, who was proceeding through the mobile home with a knife in his hand, and placed him into custody. The mobile home was "damaged probably beyond replacement fixing."

The State charged appellant with first-degree arson and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, both felonies. A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree arson, but acquitted him of the possession of a deadly weapon charge. The district court sentenced appellant to a three- to seven-year prison term. He appeals from that judgment and sentence.

Keats' direct appeal was handled by trial counsel's law office, and trial counsel's employee provided Keats' appellate representation. On appeal, Keats claimed the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on specific intent; improperly limited the evidence presented to the jury about his mental condition; and improperly refused two of his proposed jury instructions. Keats I, at ¶ 2. We affirmed Keats' conviction, concluding the district court did not err in refusing to give Keats' proposed jury instructions and that Keats' other arguments were not supported by cogent reasoning or pertinent authority. Keats I, at ¶ 36.

[¶ 4] Keats then filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting trial counsel was ineffective and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal. At an evidentiary hearing concerning Keats' petition for post-conviction relief, the parties developed additional facts concerning Keats' mental state and trial counsel's strategies. The main focus of the hearing appears to have been trial counsel's decision not to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness (NGMI). During the course of the hearing it was discovered Keats' mother had informed trial counsel that Keats had a history of mental health problems and an inability to stabilize his moods. Trial counsel admitted he had been told Keats had behavioral problems, mood swings, and would often get depressed. Trial counsel was also aware Keats had been on and off medication for these problems during his adult life.

[¶ 5] Following the arson incident, Keats was involuntarily placed in the mental health unit of the hospital, and the State initiated a Title 25 action against him.¹ Trial counsel met with Keats while he was in the mental health unit and was aware of the Title 25 action. The medical records from Keats' hospital stay indicate Keats had a major depressive disorder and reality distortion. Keats was also diagnosed with many symptoms compatible with bipolar disorder. Trial counsel was aware of this diagnosis. Later, the State dropped the Title 25 action on the condition that Keats be admitted to a mental health facility. Keats was admitted to such a facility, and while there he was diagnosed with a substance abuse problem and a bipolar disorder.

[¶ 6] Trial counsel testified his strategy was to argue that Keats' specific intent was not to burn down the house but rather to kill himself and, therefore, he lacked the specific intent required for arson. Before trial began, Keats and his mother both discussed the option of a NGMI plea with trial counsel. Trial counsel informed them "that it was not possible to do an insanity plea and then attempt a defense of specific intent, and he kept saying this is a specific intent case, and he said the two were not compatible." Also before trial, the district court ruled through a motion in limine that trial counsel could not introduce evidence dealing with Keats' mental state because trial counsel did not enter a NGMI plea.

[¶ 7] Dr. William Logan, a psychiatrist, also testified at the hearing for post-conviction relief. He testified Keats "suffers from a bipolar disorder and that his judgment and behavioral control, his recognition of wrongfulness, was significantly compromised at the time the arson occurred." It was Dr. Logan's opinion "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Mr. Keats suffered from a mental disease, Bipolar Disorder, depressed at the time of the offense." He further opined the "mental disease was of sufficient severity that the disease compromised Mr. Keats' cognitive, emotional and behavioral stability to the extent that he did not have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to his behavior, or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law."

[¶ 8] At the hearing, appellate counsel testified she was aware Keats was admitted to the mental health unit of the hospital after the incident. She stated she understood mental illness would be relevant to whether a person could form a specific intent. She also recognized that had the NGMI plea been entered it would have been more likely the evidence regarding Keats' mental state would have been introduced. Nevertheless, she testified she never considered bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

[¶ 9] The district court denied the petition finding Keats failed to meet his required factual burden for proving his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district...