Kee v. Satterfield
| Citation | 149 P. 243,46 Okla. 660,1915 OK 365 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 1915 |
| Docket Number | 4086. |
| Parties | KEE v. SATTERFIELD. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where a demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action may have been improperly overruled, yet if the demurrant was not harmed by such ruling, the judgment will not be reversed, following the provisions of Rev. L. 1910, § 6005.
Under the provisions of the Code, it is not necessary that a pleading state facts to bring the cause under any particular form of action at common law, but it is sufficient if the pleading state facts in a plain and concise manner, from which the court can see that the plaintiff is entitled to some legal or equitable relief.
A contract will be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as it existed at the time the contract was made, so far as it can be ascertained. So, where a contract for the sale of land provided that the consideration was $5,000 in cash, and the further consideration of $1,000 worth of lots to be platted and laid out, being a portion of the land sold, but the contract further provides that the vendor agrees to pay the market price for said lots at the time they are set apart and conveyed to him, held, that the true meaning of the contract is that the price of the land is $6,000, $5,000 of which to be paid in cash, and the balance of $1,000 in lots to be set apart and conveyed to the vendee.
Such contract is not void for uncertainty in the description of the land, because the $1,000 worth of lots is a part of the purchase price, and not an agreement on the part of the vendor to buy any specified lots.
Under the provisions of the above contract, it is the duty of the vendee, or a purchaser from him with notice, to set apart and convey to the vendor $1,000 worth of lots, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the vendor until a demand and refusal to set apart and convey such lots.
Dedications of land for public purposes are of two kinds: First statutory; and, second, implied or dedications at common law. All that is required to make an implied dedication is the assent of the owner and the use of the premises for the purposes intended by the dedication, for the reason that the law considers the acts of the owner as an estoppel in pais and precludes him from revoking the dedication. So, where land is platted into streets, lots, and blocks, and the lots are sold according to the plat, the dedication is complete as a common-law or implied dedication, although some of the requirements of the statute have not been observed.
Where a vendor of land makes an absolute deed prior to the payment of all the purchase price, a personal judgment cannot be rendered against a subpurchaser, although he took with notice that a part of the purchase price was unpaid, but in such case the original vendor is entitled to a judgment in rem against any of the land remaining in the possession of such subpurchaser.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 2. Error from Superior Court, Custer County; A. J. Welch, Special Judge.
Action by L. D. Satterfield against O. B. Kee. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Modified and affirmed.
Vendor held not entitled to personal judgment for unpaid price against subpurchaser entitled to judgment in rem against land.
The amended petition in this action, upon which the case was tried, alleges, in substance, that on the 24th of March 1902, the plaintiff, Satterfield, was the owner of certain land described in the petition, and that on this date one A F. Kee, through O. B. Kee, his brother, offered to purchase this land, and agreed to pay the sum of $5,000 and to plat the land in lots and blocks and when so platted to convey to the plaintiff $1,000 worth of said lots, based upon the market price, within 30 days after the location of the Southwestern Normal School had been decided by the Supreme Court of the territory of Oklahoma. The contract is set out in full in the petition, but is not set out here, as it will be found in the findings of fact by the judge, hereinafter set out in full. The petition further alleges that in pursuance of this contract, and for the purpose of enabling Kee to plat the land in lots and blocks, and to avoid clouding the title, and as a part of the transaction, Satterfield and wife executed a warranty deed to said Kee for the land in question. The petition further alleges that while this contract and deed ran to A. F. Kee, they were taken for the sole benefit of O. B. Kee, the plaintiff in error. The petition further alleges that O. B. Kee was present at the time the contract and deed were made, and had full knowledge thereof, and that on or about November 1, 1902, the litigation relative to the location of the Southwestern Normal School came to an end, and it was established at Weatherford upon a part of the quarter section in controversy, which had been omitted from the deed from Satterfield to Kee for this purpose; that about the 7th day of August, 1903, and after the location was determined, O. B. Kee, the plaintiff in error, caused this land to be surveyed into lots and blocks, and made a dedication thereof, the certificates of which are set out in the petition, but are not necessary to be set out here, and that the plaintiff in error has sold and disposed of all of said land except certain portions set out in the petition, and not necessary to be designated. The prayer of this petition is that the market value of the lots retained by Kee be established as of August 7, 1903, and partition be had and decreed thereof as between the plaintiff and defendant, and there be set aside to the plaintiff such lots as in the aggregate will equal $1,000 on September 27, 1903, and that said O. B. Kee be required to execute to plaintiff a deed therefor, or that the decree be taken as such, or that the sheriff make a deed to plaintiff as provided by statute, and, further, that commissioners be appointed to set aside to plaintiff same, and that partition be had, and that the plat of land be corrected and decreed regular, and that plaintiff have his costs, etc., and that the plaintiff's title be quieted, and for other further relief. The second cause of action in the petition is a cause of action in ejectment pure and simple. Afterwards, and when the case was called for trial, Satterfield, the plaintiff below, was allowed to amend the prayer for judgment as follows:
"That in the event the court cannot decree the plaintiff to be entitled to an interest and estate in said real estate as hereinbefore prayed for, then, in that event, plaintiff have judgment for $1,000, with interest according to law, and for such other and further relief as may be just."
To this amended petition there was a demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, and because the amended petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, and exceptions duly saved. The defendant then answered, denying all of the allegations of the petition, and pleading the two-year statute of limitations, the five-year statute of limitations, and the three-year statute of limitations. By consent a jury was waived, and this cause was submitted to the court, who made the following findings of fact and law:
Said party of the first part hereby agrees to pay the market price for said lots aforesaid at the time the same are set apart and conveyed to him by proper deed of general warranty; and it is hereby agreed by the parties hereto that the party of the first part here now makes to the party of the second part his check for $500.00 as a forfeit if he shall fail to carry out the agreements binding upon him in the above contract, and the party of the second part makes his check to the party of the first part for the sum of $500.00 upon the terms and conditions as stated for the first party, said checks to be deposited with this contract in the National Exchange Bank and taken out of the same by the mutual consent of both parties hereto.
[Signed] A. F. Kee,
L. D. Satterfield.'
Second. On the same day, and as a part of the same transaction, L. D. Satterfield and wife executed and delivered their deed of said land to A. F. Kee, and received from him $5,000 in the form of a check, which was afterwards paid in due course.
Third. On March 24, 1902, in the evening after the transaction between A. F. Kee and L. B. Satterfield, A. F. Kee conveyed the land to O. B. Kee for a consideration of $5,000.
Fourth. O. B. Kee...
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