O'keefe v. Atl. Ref. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1946 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | O'KEEFE v. ATLANTIC REFINING CO. |
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Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Dwyer, Judge.
Writ of error by W. John O'Keefe against the Atlantic Refining Company to reverse a judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of summary process in favor of defendant in error. A judgment was entered sustaining the writ and reversing judgment of the justice, and the defendant in error appeals.
Error and case remanded with directions.
George E. Beers and William L. Beers, both of New Haven, for appellant (defendant in error).
Charles Albom, of New Haven (Nelson Harris, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellee (plaintiff in error).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.
The defendant in this writ of error, hereinafter called the lessor, brought an action of summary process against the plaintiff in this writ, the lessee, before a justice of the peace in New Haven, where the land involved was located. The lessee made a motion to transfer the case to the City Court of New Haven; the justice denied it; and ultimately judgment was rendered for the lessor. The lessee then brought this writ of error, alleging, among other grounds for relief, the denial of the motion to transfer the case. The trial court, in sustaining the writ, placed its decision solely upon the ground that the justice erred in that ruling.
Section 5307 of the General Statutes provides: ‘In any civil action returnable before any justice of the peace, either party to the action may, previous to trial, make written motion that such action be removed to any town, borough or city court having civil jurisdiction in the town, city or borough where such action is returnable’; upon the filing of the motion, the justice is required to file with the clerk or judge of the municipal court all the original files, and the action is then to be entered on the docket of the court and to be proceeded with as though it had been originally brought there; and the statute concludes: ‘The provisions of this section shall not affect those of any special act relating to the jurisdiction or procedure of any town, city or borough court.’ The charter of the city of New Haven gives to the City Court of New Haven ‘exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases now cognizable by justices of the peace for the town of New Haven, except actions of summary process and bastardy proceedings,’ 14 Spec.Laws 1905, p. 660; and it further provides that ‘in all civil actions pending before any justice of the peace residing in the town of New Haven, except actions of summary process and bastardy proceedings, any party thereto may, at any time, make application to the clerk of said city court of New Haven for the transfer of said action to the docket of said city court,’ and that, upon following the procedure directed, the case shall be entered upon the docket of the court, which ‘shall proceed in relation to said case as though it had been originally made returnable to said court.’ 15 Spec.Laws 1907, p. 137.
The lessor contends that, as the statute in its concluding clause provides that its provisions shall not affect those of any special act relating to the jurisdiction or procedure of any municipal court, it is not applicable to this case and the city charter governs the situation. The lessee, on the other hand, claims that, as regards the transfer of cases from justices of the peace, it has been superseded by the provisions of the Municipal Courts Act, Chapter 281b of the General Statutes, first enacted in 1939 and amended in 1941. General Statutes, Cum.Sup. 1939, § 1361e et seq.; Sup.1941, § 735f et seq. In so far as matters of jurisdiction or procedure are included in Chapter 281b, it was clearly intended to supersede any different provisions in municipal charters covering the same matter. Lake Garda Co., Inc., v. LeWitt, 126 Conn. 588, 13 A.2d 510. Neither the 1939 nor the 1941 act expressly repealed any provision of any such charter, and a comparison of the terms of Chapter 281b with those of the various city charters shows that the latter contain matters not within the scope of the former. For example, while § 737f gives municipal courts jurisdiction of ‘civil actions for legal or equitable relief, or both, including actions of summary process and bastardy actions,’ some of the special laws expressly give to municipal courts jurisdiction over proceedings for forcible entry and detainer, not mentioned in § 737f; see 13 Spec.Laws 1899, p. 440 (New Haven); 17 Spec.Laws 1917, p. 1006 (Bridgeport); In other charters are special provisions concerning actions by banks located in the city in which recovery is sought upon commercial paper payable at their offices, 19 Spec.Laws 1925, p. 890 (Hartford); 17 Spec.Laws 1917, p. 1119 (New Britain); in others, the municipal courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of all cases, or all with very limited exceptions, which would otherwise be returnable to justices of the peace, 14 Spec.Laws 1905, p. 660 (New Haven); 19 Spec.Laws 1925, p. 890 (Hartford); 17 Spec.Laws 1917, p. 1119 (New Britain); 17 Spec.Laws 1915, p. 159 (Waterbury); 20 Spec.Laws 1929, p. 607 (East Haven); 19 Spec.Laws 1923, p. 11 (West Hartford); and in still others, the courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of summary process or bastardy proceedings or both, 12 Spec.Laws 1897, p. 931 (Enfield); 17 Spec.Laws 1915, p. 189 (Stratford); 20 Spec.Laws 1927, p. 120 (Windsor Locks). To come somewhat closer to the case before us, it will be found upon an examination of the special laws governing municipal courts that in most instances they give those courts concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace, and that while many of the laws contain provisions for the transfer of actions brought before justices of the peace to municipal courts, many of them do not.
There is no conflict between the provisions of Chapter 281b of the General Statutes and those of any special laws concerning the transfer of actions brought to justices of the peace. Chapter 281b would not, then, have the effect of repealing those provisions unless it was the intent of the legislature that it should completely cover the field of the jurisdiction of municipal courts. Hutchison v. City of Hartford, 129 Conn. 329, 332, 27 A.2d 803. A consideration of the special laws governing municipal courts which have been noted makes it evident that the legislature had no such intent. The chapter at most gives to municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace of cases which under the General Statutes might be brought before the latter. Certainly the legislature could not have intended that after its enactment the exclusive jurisdiction given certain municipal courts by special laws over actions previously cognizable by justices of the peace should be abolished and those courts have only concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace, or that municipal courts should cease to have the jurisdiction given them by special laws over particular proceedings not mentioned in Chapter 281b. While in Lake Garda Co., Inc., v. LeWitt, supra, we approved the conclusion of the trial court that the provisions of Chapter 281b concerning appeals from municipal courts superseded the charter provisions concerning the same matter, further consideration had led us to the conclusion that the trial court was a error in the broad statements contained in its memorandum of decision in that case, to the effect that Chapter 281b superseded all provisions of special laws concerning the jurisdiction of municipal courts. As regards the transfer of cases brought before justices of the peace, it is most significant that Chapter 281b made no provision concerning the matter but left § 5307 of the General Statutes in full force and effect. The only reasonable conclusion is that Chapter 281b did not impliedly repeal the provisions of the charter of New Haven as to cases which might be transferred from justices of the peace to the City Court; that § 5307 is the only general statute in effect which concerns such transfers; and that by reason of the concluding provisions of that section, it does not affect the special law concerning the transfer of cases brought before justices of the peace in New Haven. That law is still in force, and by its express provision an action of summary process pending before a justice of the peace in that city is not transferable to the City Court. The justice was right in not granting the motion and the trial court erred in sustaining the writ of error because of that ruling.
As this conclusion necessitates that the case be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, the...
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