Lampasona v. Jacobs

• Decision Date: 31 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13281,13281
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Blanche E. LAMPASONA v. Steve JACOBS.

Page 175

553 A.2d 175

209 Conn. 724

Blanche E. LAMPASONA v. Steve JACOBS.

No. 13281.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 4, 1988.

Decided Jan. 31, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

The plaintiff sought, by way of a summary process action, to gain possession of a lot occupied by the defendant in a mobile home park. The plaintiff sought possession because the eight day time limit for the defendant to quit possession under the general summary process statute (§ 47a-23) had expired and the defendant remained on the property. From the judgment of the trial court dismissing the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which remanded the matter for the trial court to hear testimony and take evidence before making a finding with respect to jurisdiction. After conducting the proceedings ordered on remand, the trial court again granted the motion to dismiss determining that the defendant was a resident of a mobile home park and that the eight day notice to quit was, therefore, defective under the mobile home summary process statute (§ 21-80), which requires a sixty day notice to quit. On the plaintiff's appeal, held:

1. The trial court did not err in determining that because the defendant owned the mobile home, he was a resident of the plaintiff's mobile home park or in dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the notice to quit requirement of § 21-80 being a jurisdictional prerequisite to a proper summary process action.

2. The trial court's characterization of the defendant as a resident of the plaintiff's park did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's land notwithstanding her claim that the occupation of the lot was without her consent; the plaintiff not having given her reasons for disapproving of the defendant's residency, as required by statute (§ 21-79), she was deemed to have acquiesced to that residency.

Joseph E. Moukawsher, Groton, for appellant (plaintiff).

John C. Driscoll, Norwich, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

In this case, the plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after it had been remanded by the Appellate Court for further proceedings in the trial court. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the case because it looked beyond the question of subject matter jurisdiction and decided the motion to dismiss on the merits of the case. The plaintiff claims further that the court's interpretation of the term "resident," as used in General Statutes § 21-64, in its determination on the motion, violated her constitutional rights.

On April 26, 1984, the plaintiff initiated this action, seeking to gain possession of lot No. 10 in the Briarwood Park mobile home facility in Montville. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was occupying lot No. 10 without "right or privilege" and that the plaintiff had served a notice to quit possession upon the defendant on April 12, 1984. The plaintiff sought possession of the property because the eight day time limit for the defendant to quit possession under General Statutes § 47a-23(a) ¹ had expired and the defendant remained on the property.

On May 7, 1984, the defendant entered an appearance pro se and answered the complaint. The defendant claimed that he was a lawful resident of Briarwood Park and, therefore, could not be evicted. On June 26, 1984, present defense counsel filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant, and on July 11, 1984, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action because the notice to quit was defective. The defendant claimed that the eight day notice to quit was insufficient under the dictates of General Statutes § 21-80, which requires notice of sixty days. ² The defendant argued that § 21-80, rather than § 47a-23, applied because the defendant was a mobile home park resident.

In a memorandum of decision dated July 26, 1984, the trial court, Walsh, J., granted the motion to dismiss that was filed on July 11. From this dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, raising the same issues that are presented in this appeal. The Appellate Court, however, did not reach the substantive issues raised, but set aside the judgment and instructed the lower court to hear testimony and take evidence before making a finding on the court's jurisdiction. Lampasona v. Jacobs, 7 Conn.App. 639, 642-43, 509 A.2d 1089 (1986).

On remand, the defendant again raised his motion to dismiss. The court, O'Connell, J., heard testimony and admitted exhibits of the parties and, on August 13, 1987, again granted the motion to dismiss. In response to a motion to articulate, the court made clear that it dismissed the case because the defendant was a resident of the mobile home park and thus the plaintiff's notice to quit was insufficient under § 21-80. The court ruled that the defective notice to quit deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.

At the center of the plaintiff's appeal to this court is his attack on the Superior Court's finding that the defendant was a resident of the plaintiff's mobile home park. Because of this finding, the trial court concluded that the mobile home statute was applicable and summary process against the defendant was controlled by § 21-80 as opposed to the general summary process statute, § 47a-23. The plaintiff claims that in making its finding the trial court improperly examined the merits of the action and also that its ruling violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. We disagree with the plaintiff's contentions.

The plaintiff's first claim is that the court erred by examining the merits of the case to determine whether the defendant was a resident of the mobile home park and thus whether he was protected by § 21-80. The plaintiff suggests that this analysis by the court exceeded the usual scope of a determination of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In determining whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the inquiry usually does not extend to the merits of the case. GHK Exploration Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir.1988); State v. S & R Sanitation Services, Inc., 202 Conn. 300, 301, 521 A.2d 1017 (1987); Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 92, 513 A.2d 124 (1986); Davis v. Board of Education, 3 Conn.App. 317, 320, 487 A.2d 1114 (1985). In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court must determine that it has the power to hear the "general class [of cases] to which the proceedings in question belong." Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285, 288, 439 A.2d 997 (1981); Davis v. Board of Education, supra. In some cases, however, it is necessary to examine the facts of the case to determine whether it is within a general class that the court has power to hear. See Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 433-35, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988) (discussing subject matter jurisdiction of an agency). Such an examination was necessary in this case.

There is no doubt that the Superior Court is authorized to hear summary process cases; the Superior Court is authorized to hear all cases except those over which the probate courts have original jurisdiction. General Statutes § 51-164s. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court in summary process actions, however, is subject to a condition precedent. Before the court can entertain a summary process action and evict a tenant, the owner of the land must previously have served the tenant with notice to quit. Sandrew v. Pequot Drug, Inc., 4 Conn.App. 627, 631, 495 A.2d 1127 (1985), citing O'Keefe v. Atlantic Refining Co., 132 Conn. 613, 622, 46 A.2d 343 (1946); Abbenante v. Giampietro, 75 R.I. 349, 353, 66 A.2d 501 (1949); 50 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 1205. This is true under both the general summary process statute, General Statutes § 47a-23(a), and under the mobile home summary process provision, General Statutes § 21-80. As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity.

Although this court has not previously addressed the jurisdictional nature of the notice to quit provision in the mobile home statute, we have held other statutory time limitations and notice requirements to be conditions precedent to court actions and thus to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Tucker v. Maher, 192 Conn. 460, 469, 472 A.2d 1261 (1984) (notice to all who could be affected by declaratory judgment is jurisdictional necessity); see Connecticut Steel Co. v. National Amusements, Inc., 166 Conn. 255, 262-63, 348 A.2d 658 (1974) (action to foreclose mechanic's lien must be brought within statutory time limit or court lacks jurisdiction); see also Glenn Chaffer, Inc. v. Kennedy, 37 Conn.Sup. 654, 658, 433 A.2d 1018 (1981) (notice of condominium conversion is jurisdictional necessity for eviction action). ³ The Superior Court has held that the notice requirements of the general summary process statute; General Statutes § 47a-23; are jurisdictional. Windsor Properties, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 35 Conn.Sup. 297 301, 408 A.2d 936 (1979). This is in accord with a number of other states. See, e.g., Lichtentag v. Burns, 258 So.2d 211, 212-13 (La.App.), cert. denied, 261 La. 467, 259 So.2d 916 (1972); Dickens v. Hall, 104 N.M. 173, 175, 718 P.2d 683 (1986); Rosen v. Wade, 99 Misc.2d 1114, 1115, 418 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1979).

Therefore, because proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity, in order to determine whether there was proper notice in this case the court had to determine which summary process provision, §§ 47a-23 or 21-80, controlled. The dispositive question in resolving which summary process...