Keefe v. Keefe

• Decision Date: 09 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 53398,No. 2,53398,2
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: James E. KEEFE, Appellant, v. Eleanore KEEFE, Respondent

Page 313

435 S.W.2d 313

James E. KEEFE, Appellant, v. Eleanore KEEFE, Respondent.

No. 53398.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Dec. 9, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1968.

Samuel Richeson, Roland A. Wegmann, Dearing Richeson, Weier, Roberts & Wegmann, Hillsboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thurman, Nixon, Smith & Howald, Jeremiah Nixon and James E. Bowles, Hillsboro, for defendant (respondent).

DONNELLY, Judge.

In this suit, plaintiff James E. Keefe sought and was granted a divorce from defendant Eleanore Keefe. Defendant Eleanore Keefe counterclaimed to establish a resulting trust in certain real estate, sought an accounting as to certain other real estate, and sought partition. Plaintiff appeals from that part of the decree of the trial court which granted defendant equitable relief and attorney's fee.

There are several tracts of real estate involved. Tracts I through IX were in controversy in the trial court. Tracts IV, V, VI, VIII and IX are in controversy on appeal.

Plaintiff and defendant were married July 5, 1949. During the marriage, land was purchased, buildings were built on the land, and the land and improvements were then sold. Plaintiff, a carpenter, built the houses with the help of one man and managed the business. Defendant helped write contracts and agreements, helped write checks, made some business calls, ordered material on occasion, and received many payments from purchasers. They lived together as husband and wife until October 22, 1966, when they separated. The disputes involved in this case followed.

Plaintiff first contends the trial court erred in impressing Tracts V, VI and VIII with a resulting trust in favor of defendant to the extent of an undivided one-half interest. Plaintiff also contends that Tract IX should be impressed with a resulting trust in favor of plaintiff.

Plaintiff admits that prior to the purchase of Tract V, plaintiff and defendant owned certain real property as tenants by entireties, that they sold said entirety property, and that proceeds from said sale were used to purchase Tract V. The legal title to this tract is now in James E. Keefe.

Plaintiff admits that prior to the purcase of Tract VI, plaintiff and defendant owned a checking account, which was held as tenants by entireties, and that funds from said entirety account were used to the extent of $800 to purchase Tract VI. The legal title to this tract is now in James E. Keefe.

Plaintiff admits that prior to the purchase of Tract VIII, plaintiff and defendant owned certain real property as tenants by entireties, and that they exchanged said entirety property for Tact VIII. The legal title to this tract is now in James E. Keefe.

Plaintiff admits that legal title to Tract IX is now in James E. Keefe and Eleanore Keefe, his wife, as tenants by entireties.

The law is well settled that '* * * if the husband takes the proceeds of property that belonged to him and his wife in entirety and invests the same in other land taking the title to himself alone, a court of equity, at the suit of the wife, will raise a resulting trust in her favor, and decree that the husband holds the title in trust for his wife and himself as an estate in entirety.' Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 484, 98 S.W. 527, 529.

The law is also well settled that if the husband pays the consideration for property and has the conveyance made to himself and his wife, as tenants by entireties, '* * * it will be presumed that he intended it as a settlement upon his wife. But this is a rebuttable presumption and, if all the facts and circumstances show that no such settlement was intended, then the presumption of a settlement in favor of the wife is rebutted, and she will hold the property in trust for her husband, if he has paid for the same, just as if she were a third party.' Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 45, 249 S.W. 946, 952.

We reach the following preliminary conclusions:

(1) As to Tracts V, VI and VIII: It is conceded that entirety property was used as consideration for the conveyances made to James E. Keefe. If plaintiff, when the entirety estates were created, intended gifts to his wife to the extent of the beneficial interests created, the trial court did not err in establishing a resulting trust in favor of defendant. Frost v. Frost, supra; Thierry v. Thierry, supra.

(2) As to Tract IX: It is conceded that legal title is in plaintiff and defendant as tenants by entireties. If plaintiff, when the entirety estate was created, intended a gift to defendant to the extent of the beneficial interest created, a resulting trust should not be established in favor of plaintiff. Thierry v. Thierry, supra.

The essential question, therefore, as to Tracts V, VI, VIII and IX, is whether, under the evidence, gifts were intended by plaintiff to defendant when the entirety estates were created. It will be presumed that he intended 'a settlement upon his wife. But this is a rebuttable presumption, and, if all the facts and circumstances show that no such settlement was intended, then the presumption of a settlement in favor of the wife is rebutted, * * *.' Thierry v. Thierry, supra.

There is little direct evidence on the question of plaintiff's intent in this regard. Defendant testified as follows:

'Q. At the time the property was purchased, was it your understanding at that time, that the property was purchased in joint names? A. Yes.

'Q. When did you first find that the property wasn't in joint names? A. About a year before our separation.

'Q. And under what circumstances did you find that out? A. Well, we have a metal box that we kept a lot of our papers in, deeds and things, and I was hunting for a deed for him one day, or some paper that he needed, and I ran across this deed, and I guess out of curiosity, I looked at it to see if my name was on it, and when I confronted him with it, he said, 'Well it was an oversight', he didn't know it either, and that it really didn't make any difference because all the property we owned was jointly owned.

'Q. And you discovered this over 10 years after the purchase? A. Yes.'

Plaintiff testified as follows:

'Q. Mr. Keefe, during some of the time that deposits were being made of your business funds in the two-name account, were there periods when you did not have any other account in operation at that time? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And what was your intention in establishing this two-name account? A. So my wife could have money, periodically, to run the house, buy groceries and clothes.

'Q. Did you have any intention of making any gift to her of a ownership interest in the account? A. Certainly not.'

In State ex rel. Taylor v. Anderson et al., 363 Mo. 884, 893, 254 S.W.2d 609, at 615, appears a statement particularly appropriate here: 'This being a suit in equity, we review the case de novo, weight the evidence, and determine on the whole record what relief, if any, should be granted. Where, as here, however, there exists an irreconcilable conflict in the evidence on the essential fact issue involved, depending for determination on the credibility of witnesses, a situation prevails wherein the application of the rule of deference to the findings and conclusions of the trial chancellor is especially appropriate and necessary. (Citing cases.) The trial chancellor's opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear them testify affords him a basis for determining the credibility of testimony which we do not have. A review of the entire record in this case convinces us we should defer to the trial court's conclusion that the testimony of * * * (Eleanore Keefe) was true.'

We recognize that defendant contributed much less than did plaintiff to the business, and that a 'business' pattern, existing over a period of many years, runs through the entire case. However, the trial court, on the basis of the evidence adduced, believed that plaintiff intended to share the fruits of his labor with his wife. We agree. We are of the opinion that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden to prove that at the time he caused the properties to be placed in both names, he did not intend to make a gift to her to the extent of the beneficial interests created. We hold that:

(1) The trial court did not err in impressing Tract V with a resulting trust in favor of defendant.

(2) The trial court did not err in impressing Tract VI with a resulting trust in favor of defendant. However, a resulting trust may be impressed only to the extent of the interest shown. There is no substantial evidence to support a finding that more than $800 was used from the entirety checking account to purchase Tract VI. To the extent that $800 represents the purchase price of Tract VI, plaintiff 'was in duty bound to have taken the title in the name of himself and wife as an estate in entirety, and to that extent he will be decreed now to hold the title in trust.' Frost v. Frost, supra, 200 Mo. 474, 485, 98 S.W. 527, 529.

(3) The trial court did not err in impressing Tract VIII with a resulting trust in favor of defendant.

(4) We should not impress Tract IX with a resulting trust in favor of plaintiff.

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by entering allegedly conflicting findings in its decree. In Count III of the decree, the trial court impressed Tracts V, VI and VIII with a resulting trust. In Count IV of the decree, the trial court declared plaintiff and defe...