Keefner v. Porter

• Decision Date: 06 August 1940
• Docket Number: 45307.
• Citation: 293 N.W. 501,228 Iowa 844
• Parties: KEEFNER v. PORTER, State Comptroller, et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

293 N.W. 501

228 Iowa 844

KEEFNER v. PORTER, State Comptroller, et al.

No. 45307.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

August 6, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; John J. Halloran, Judge.

This is a suit seeking to enjoin public officers from carrying out the provisions of Chapter 109, Acts of the 48th General Assembly, known as the Agricultural Land Credit Act, on the ground that said Act is in violation of the Constitution of the State of Iowa. The trial court held the Act unconstitutional. Defendants have appealed. Opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.

Fred D. Everett, Atty. Gen., Floyd Philbrick, Asst. Atty. Gen and Stephens & Wisdom, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Stipp Perry, Bannister & Starzinger, of Des Moines, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is a suit in equity to enjoin the State Comptroller and the State Treasurer from performing their duties and carrying out the provisions of Chapter 109, Laws of the Forty-Eighth General Assembly, known as the Agricultural Land Credit Act on the grounds that said Act is in violation of Section 31 of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Iowa, in that it is alleged that the appropriation of $500,000 under the provisions of the Act is for a local and private purpose, and not a public purpose; and that said chapter is in violation of the provisions of Section 6 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa in that it is alleged that the Act does not have uniform operation; and in violation of the provisions of Section 30, Article III, of the Constitution of the State of Iowa, in that the classification of agricultural lands in independent school districts excluding consolidated school districts, and not applying to rural township school districts, is unreasonable, whimsical capricious, and lacking in uniformity.

The defense was that the Act in question is not unconstitutional for the reasons that the appropriation is made directly to the school districts, even though owners of agricultural land therein are relieved of a portion of their burden of taxation; that the classification of agricultural lands within school districts containing an incorporated city or town is a reasonable classification; that there is a reasonable basis for differentiating agricultural lands located in consolidated school districts from agricultural lands located in other school districts containing an incorporated city or town; and that while uniformity of taxation may be required by the Constitution, uniformity of appropriation, or the distribution of the proceeds, is not required.

The trial court held the Act unconstitutional on the grounds that the appropriation was not for a public purpose, but for the private interests of the taxpayers in the districts to which it applies; and that the classification of agricultural lands located in school districts containing an incorporated city or town exclusive of consolidated school districts, was such an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that the Act lacked uniformity.

The defendants, being dissatisfied, have appealed to this court.

The facts were stipulated. The legislative enactment challenged in this case (Chapter 109, Laws of the Forty-Eighth General Assembly), appropriates $500,000 for the year 1940, and the same amount annually thereafter, to be paid to the county treasurers, and by them apportioned to the various school districts of the county, upon a ratio basis, determined by the certificates of the various county treasurers as to the deficiencies in those school treasuries due to the limitation of 15 mills on agricultural lands which meet certain qualifications. The qualifications for agricultural lands required to meet these specifications are that the school tax rate for general purposes exceed 15 mills, and that the tracts of agricultural land shall exceed ten acres. The lands are not qualified for the limitation to 15 mills, unless the landowner makes application for the qualification. The further qualification is that the agricultural land shall lie in Independent School Districts containing an incorporated city or town. Consolidated school districts are excluded from the benefits of the act. Said land need not be in one tract, but may be in any number of tracts which aggregate more than ten acres.

The appellee is the owner of agricultural land located in Johnson Consolidated School District, Webster Township, Polk County, Iowa.

The act in question grants tax benefits only to agricultural lands located in independent school districts, and it is the claim of the appellee, who is the owner of agricultural lands in a consolidated school district, that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, in that it authorizes the State of Iowa to pay the school taxes, above 15 mills, on a part only of the agricultural lands located within the State.

We are confronted here with an attack upon the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature. This court has time and again said that it will not declare such an act invalid as in violation of the Constitution, unless the Act clearly, plainly, palpably, and without doubt infringes the paramount law.

In the case of Kimball v. Board of Supervisors, 190 Iowa 783, 180 N.W. 988, 994, the court said: " It is with much hesitancy that courts set aside legislative enactments. It is only when such enactments clearly and plainly infringe upon constitutional provisions that the courts should interfere with the established prerogatives of a coordinate branch of the government. We have always recognized and adhered to this salutary rule. Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 63 Am.Dec. 487; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 133 N.W. 895, 42 L.R.A.N.S., 821; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N.W. 1037, 157 N.W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann.Cas.1917E, 803.But when such legislative enactments do violence to constitutional provisions, it is our bounden duty to so declare."

The burden is on the appellee to overcome the presumption in favor of the Act. With these rules in mind, we consider this case. The Act in question benefits only the agricultural lands located in independent school districts.

It is stipulated that the agricultural lands located within independent school districts in the State of Iowa are of the same character and type and are devoted to the same uses as agricultural lands located outside of independent school districts. There are in Iowa 4,871 school districts, there are only 642 independent school districts which receive benefits under this Act. The owners of agricultural land in 4,229 school districts receive no benefits.

It is the claim of the appellant that the Act, because it specifies agricultural lands in independent school districts, sets up a class, and that the Legislature had the power to make the classification of these districts, and to select the class which would be made the beneficiary of the appropriation provided in the Act.

That classification may be adopted by the legislative branch of the government is conceded. But it is well established that a classification may not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and must be calculated to further some proper public purpose. The classification must provide for a basis which will effectually single into a separate class the persons or objects with...