Keeler v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 07 January 1867
• Citation: 53 Pa. 467
• Parties: Keeler <I>versus</I> Taylor.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

53 Pa. 467

Keeler versus Taylor.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 7, 1867.

APPEAL from the decree of the District Court of Allegheny county. In Equity.

S. Harper, J. Veech and C. B. M. Smith, for appellant, cited Smith v. Dickenson, 3 Bos. & Pull. 630; Cheesman v. Nainby, 2 Strange 739; Hitchcock v. Coker, 1 Nev. & Per. 796; s. c. 6 A. & E. 438; Leighton v. Wales, 3 M. & W. 545; Chitty on Contr. 665; Rolfe v. Peterson, 2 Bro. P. C. 436; Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pull. 346; Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225.

W. B. Rodgers, for appellee, cited Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181; Sedgwick on Dam. 441; Beale v. Hayes, 5 Sanf. 640; Watts v. Shepherd, 2 Ala. 425; Hare on Discov. 131, 132.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 7th 1867, by WOODWARD, C. J.

We agree with the plaintiff's counsel in the construction of the contract upon which this suit is founded. Keeler being a manufacturer of platform scales, and Taylor a mechanic, but not skilled in the mysteries of that particular manufacture, came together in a written agreement, whereby Keeler agreed to instruct Taylor in the art of making platform scales, and to employ him in that business at $1.75 per day.

Taylor on his part engaged to attend faithfully to Keeler's interests whilst so employed, and to pay Keeler, or his legal representatives, $50 for each and every of said scales which he, Taylor, should thereafter make for any other person than Keeler, except with Keeler's written consent, or which shall be so made in consequence of Taylor's imparting information to others.

Taylor worked with Keeler seven years, and then set up for himself in the manufacture of scales, and this bill in equity is brought to compel him to account to Keeler at the rate of $50 for every pair of scales he has manufactured on his own account. Not only is the plaintiff's case within the terms of the contract, but he, and his personal representatives, will have a right to call on Taylor for all his lifetime to account for every pair of scales he makes himself, or which shall be made by any person instructed by him. It is a tax or duty levied upon Taylor, not merely for his own industry for life, but for the industry of all who may derive their information from him. Such is the import of the agreement.

The plaintiff's bill is virtually for the specific execution of this agreement. The District Court dismissed the bill without giving any reasons, and on appeal we are asked to restore it, and to decree an account in favor of the plaintiff.

We are of opinion that the contract was in restraint of trade and industry, and therefore that the bill was properly dismissed.

The general rule is, that all restraints of trade, if nothing more appear, are bad. This was the rule laid down in the famous case of Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181. But to this general rule there are some exceptions, as, if the restraint be only particular in respect to time or place, and there be a good consideration given to the party restrained. Such, indeed, was the case of Mitchell v. Reynolds. It was debt on bond, the condition of which bound the defendant not to exercise the trade of a baker within the parish of St. Andrew's, Holborn, for the term of five years, and this was held to be partial in respect both of time and place. Such partial restraints were upheld in Cheesman v. Nainby, 2 Strange 739; Clark v. Comer, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 53, where a bond was conditioned not to carry on trade in the city of...