Keeling v. McCaskill
| Decision Date | 28 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-20-51,CV-20-51 |
| Citation | 2020 Ark. App. 497,612 S.W.3d 744 |
| Parties | William KEELING, Appellant v. Linda MCCASKILL, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Ashcraft & Associates, by: Cecilia Ashcraft, Malvern, for appellant.
Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., Little Rock, by: Andrew M. Taylor, Tasha C. Taylor, and Tory H. Lewis, for appellee.
William Keeling appeals a Clark County Circuit Court order denying his request for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land owned by Linda McCaskill. The circuit court found that the contract was unenforceable because it did not include two essential terms: (1) an adequate description of the property and (2) a provision for a life estate in McCaskill. We affirm, holding the property description in the contract at issue does not satisfy the statute of frauds.
Keeling and McCaskill are neighbors with adjoining property on Posey Road in Sparkman, Arkansas. McCaskill owns a mobile home and 4.75 acres along the Ouachita River. Keeling initially expressed an interest in purchasing 3.5 acres from McCaskill. In subsequent conversations, the parties discussed terms of Keeling's purchasing more than just the initial 3.5 five acres.1 On the basis of these discussions, Keeling drafted a handwritten document that was signed by McCaskill:
The next day, McCaskill rejected Keeling's "offer" and attempted to return the $2,000 he had given her. She also refused to accept the $300 when it became due.
Keeling filed a complaint for specific performance alleging that he offered to purchase 4.5 acres of land and a home from McCaskill for $15,000, that she accepted the offer, and that she ultimately refused to perform under the contract. McCaskill answered and, among other things, denied the existence of a contract and asserted a statute-of-frauds defense. The parties proceeded to a bench trial where the court heard testimony and received evidence from Keeling; his wife, Madeline; and McCaskill. After considering all the evidence before it, the circuit court found that the contract was unenforceable and denied Keeling's request for specific performance. Keeling appealed.
The court, here, denied Keeling's request for specific performance. Specific performance is an equitable remedy that compels performance of a contract on the precise terms agreed upon by the parties or such a substantial performance as will do justice between the parties under the circumstances. Dossey v. Hanover, Inc. , 48 Ark. App. 108, 891 S.W.2d 67 (1995). Because it is an equitable remedy, courts are allowed some latitude in granting or withholding that relief, depending on the equities of a particular case. Id.
After conducting a bench trial, the circuit court specifically found that the purported contract at issue was missing several essential elements and was therefore not enforceable. Our standard of review on appeal from a civil bench trial is "whether the circuit court's findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against a preponderance of the evidence." Peregrine Trading, LLC v. Rowe , 2018 Ark. App. 176, at 1, 546 S.W.3d 518, 520. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 1–2, 546 S.W.3d at 520. Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility are solely within the province of the fact-finder. Id.
Having reviewed the contents of the purported contract in this case, we are not left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Here, the court found that the contract at issue was missing two essential terms: a proper description of the property and the provision of a life estate in McCaskill. Looking to the court's determination that the description of the property in the purported contract was not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, we agree.
Our supreme court has held that a contract for the sale of land must comply with the statute of frauds in order to be enforceable. Boensch v. Cornett , 267 Ark. 671, 590 S.W.2d 55 (Ark. App. 1979). Specifically, the contract must contain, either in itself or by reference to another writing, all essential terms including (1) the terms and conditions of the sale, (2) the price to be paid, (3) the time for payment, and (4) the land to be sold. Van Dyke v. Glover , 326 Ark. 736, 934 S.W.2d 204 (1996). Pertaining to the essential element of the land to be sold, the writing itself must furnish the "keys" to locating the property. See id. Unless the essential terms of the sale can be ascertained from the writing itself, or by reference in it to something else, the writing does not comply with the statute of frauds, and parol evidence cannot supply the missing terms. Id.
Our appellate case law is clear that a sufficient description of the land to be sold is an essential term of the contract for purposes of the statute of frauds. If a writing furnishes a means by which the realty can be identified, it need not describe the property with the particularity required for deeds. Boensch , 267 Ark. at 674, 590 S.W.2d at 57. If a conveyance, however, does not describe the land with such particularity as to render identification possible, the conveyance is nugatory, unless the deed contains a reference to another instrument that does include a sufficient description. Sorrells v. Bailey Cattle Co. , 268 Ark. 800, 595 S.W.2d 950 (Ark. App. 1980) ; see also James v. Medford , 256 Ark. 1002, 512 S.W.2d 545 (1974) ; Turrentine v. Thompson , 193 Ark. 253, 99 S.W.2d 585 (1936) ; Richardson v. Stuberfield , 168 Ark. 713, 271 S.W. 345 (1925). Oral evidence may be resorted to only for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writings but not for the purpose of locating the land and supplying the description that the parties have omitted from the writings. Creighton v. Huggins , 227 Ark. 1096, 303 S.W.2d 893 (1957) ; Moore v. Exelby , 170 Ark. 908, 281 S.W. 671 (1926) ; Richardson , 168 Ark. 713, 271 S.W. 345 ; Dev. & Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. N. Little Rock , 83 Ark. App. 165, 119 S.W.3d 77 (2003).
Here, McCaskill owns 4.75 acres of property that is divided into three separate tracts. The court received into evidence a warranty deed describing the three separate tracts. One parcel comprises approximately .25 acres; another comprises approximately 4 acres; and the last parcel comprises approximately .5 acres. Despite this division of her property into three separate parcels, the handwritten document between McCaskill and Keeling...
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