Keen v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 17 May 1946
• Docket Number: 146.
• Citation: 47 A.2d 67,186 Md. 543
• Parties: KEEN et al. v. BROOKS et ux.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

47 A.2d 67

186 Md. 543

KEEN et al. v. BROOKS et ux.

No. 146.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 17, 1946

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cecil County; William R. Horney, Judge.

Suit in equity by Sue E. M. Keen and husband against William I Brooks and wife for specific performance of a contract to purchase land. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

James F. Evans, of Elkton, for appellants.

No brief and no appearance for appellees.

Submitted to MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON and HENDERSON, JJ.

OPINION

Henderson J.

W Atwood Montgomery, of Cecil County, Maryland, died September 23, 1931, leaving a will disposing of the residue of his estate in trust 'to invest, reinvest, collect the rents issues and profits therefrom and to pay the net annual income therefrom to my daughter, Suie E. N. Keen, * * * for and during the term of her natural life. At the death of the said Suie E. N. Keen, I direct that the principal sum aforesaid shall be equally divided between my grandchildren, Genevieve Keen and Elizabeth P. Keen, share and share alike. In the event that either of said grandchildren should be deceased at that time without issue, I then direct the whole of said principal fund shall be paid to the survivor. In the event that either of said grandchildren should die leaving issue, I direct that the issue of said deceased grandchild * * * shall take the share which their parent would have taken if living, per stirpes, not per capita.' The daughter and both granddaughters survived the testator.

On December 31, 1932, the life tenant filed a renunciation of the life-estate, and the Orphans' Court of Cecil County ordered the executor and trustee to distribute the residue to Genevieve Keen and Elizabeth Keen. Thereupon, on January 20, 1933, the executor and trustee executed a deed conveying the principal asset, a tract of 8 1/2 acres of land, to said grandchildren, in fee simple. They, in turn, on February 10, 1933, deeded the property to Sue E. M. Keen. On October 15, 1945, the appellant and her husband entered into a contract of sale with the appellees, covering the said tract. The appellees raised a question as to the title, and on November 27, 1945, a special case stated was brought in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, in Equity, praying specific performance. The chancellor denied relief, and appeal to this court followed. Mrs. Keen is now 68 years of age; one of her daughters is 43 and unmarried, the other is 35 and now married, but has no children.

The question presented is whether the renunciation by the life tenant accelerated the remainder, so as to vest the title and right to possession in the grandchildren as of the date of the renunciation, to the exclusion of their possible issue, or other persons, who might have been entitled thereto at the death of the life tenant in the event that one or both of the grandchildren predeceased the life tenant, had she not renounced.

The rules applicable to the solution of problems growing out of renunciation are clearly set out in the Restatement, Property. Section 231 declares: 'When an attempted prior interest fails because the person to whom it is limited renounces it, succeeding interests are accelerated except when (a) the terms and circumstances of the limitation manifest a contrary intent * * *.' We are not here concerned with situations where the person renouncing claims an interest in derogation of the dispositions sought to be made, as for example, a renouncing spouse. Comment (a) points out that 'whenever an attempted prior interest is renounced, some disturbance of the desired plan of disposition is inevitable. The extent of this disturbance normally is kept at a minimum by accelerating the succeeding interests. This occurs in accordance with what is normally to be inferred as the intent of the conveyor, namely, that as each of the successive interests sought to be created by him ends or becomes impossible, the next in order in the limitation should move up. * * * Since acceleration occurs pursuant to an inferred intent it is prevented by a manifestation of an intent contrary to that normally to be inferred.' Comment (e) states that 'when the renounced interest is the only hinderance to the succeeding interest becoming forthwith a present interest, then acceleration which occurs in accordance with the rule stated in this section causes such succeeding interest to become forthwith a present interest. The fact that such interest has become a present interest may end the time during which it continues to be defeasible * * *.' Comment (h) states that 'when the renounced interest is the only hindrance to the succeeding interest becoming forthwith a present interest and such succeeding interest is limited with a provision that if a designated event shall occur during the stipulated period of the renounced interest then another interest in another person shall be substituted therefor, such substitution is to be construed as having been intended to occur only if the designated event occurs during the actual continuance of the attempted prior interest.

The renunciation of such attempted prior interest prevents the period within which such substitution was intended to be possible from ever existing. The accelerated interest is not defeasible upon the subsequent occurrence of the designated event. This rule of construction is required by the intent normally to be inferred from a limitation of the type described * * *. The rule stated in this comment applies to limitations made in favor of a class where, in the absence of renunciation, existing persons would be construed to have interests vested subject to complete defeasance in favor of such persons as remain in the class at the end of the stipulated duration of the renounced interest.' The illustrations make it clear that where there is a devise to a life tenant and a named remainderman C, the mere fact that it is provided that if C predeceases the life tenant the property shall go to C's descendants alive at the life tenant's death, and if none to a third party, will not prevent C from taking an indefeasible estate upon renunciation.

In further comment on clause (a) it is said: 'A construction that the 'term; and circumstances of the limitation manifest a contrary intent' is not justified solely by the fact that after limiting a life interest (the renounced interest) it is provided that the gift over shall take effect 'at the death of' the life tenant * * *. Such language is to be construed as referring to the ending of such life interest either in the manner stated or by its renunciation.'

Two commonly occurring varieties of limitation which manifest a contrary intent are embodied in the rules stated in sections 232 and 233. These rules deal with situations where a continuation of a trust beyond the initial life estate is indicated, or where the succeeding interest continues subject to an unfulfilled condition precedent. Examples of the latter may be found in situations where elimination of the time for fulfillment would cause an enlargement of the interest subject to such condition precedent, or where 'the stipulated duration of the attempted prior interest must elapse before a person can show himself qualified to take the succeeding interest.'

Under the rules laid down in the Restatement it seems perfectly clear that there is nothing to prevent the...