Keenan v. Vose

Decision Date10 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 93-310-M,93-310-M
Citation634 A.2d 866
PartiesKenneth KEENAN v. George VOSE. P.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case came before us pursuant to a question certified to this court by a judge of the United States District Court pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, which authorizes this court to answer questions of law certified to it by inter alia the United States District Court. The certified question is as follows: "Does Rhode Island General Law § 42-56-22 prohibit a person committed to the adult correctional institutions the use of those funds, during the person's incarceration, which are payable only 'at the time of his or her release from the institution' in order to retain an attorney to pursue a collateral post-conviction appeal of his conviction?"

The certified question requires us to construe G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-56-22. The statute reads in its entirety as follows:

"Labor by persons committed on mesne process or to answer criminal charge.--(a) Every person who shall be committed to the adult correctional institutions to answer for any criminal offense, whether convicted or awaiting trial, or on mesne process in any qui tam or penal action, or on mesne process or execution in any civil action, may be permitted to labor as aforesaid, in the discretion of the director or his or her designee for the state, and in that case may be paid not more than three dollars ($3.00) a day for every day he or she shall labor with the express consent of the director or his or her designee of the department, to be credited to the prisoner's account by the assistant director of administration or his or her designee and to be disbursed to the prisoner in accordance with rules and regulations of the institutions; provided, further, however, there shall be maintained on account at all times at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the earnings of each prisoner up to a maximum of one hundred dollars ($100) for those persons serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole under §§ 11-23-2, 12-19.2-1 et seq., and up to a maximum of five hundred dollars ($500) for all other prisoners; those funds to be turned over to the prisoner at the time of his or her release from the institution, the funds being his or her property; the moneys to be paid to the prisoner by order of the assistant director of management services upon the general treasurer.

(b) Nothing herein shall prevent the use of the funds in the account for the payment of any court fees and court costs required to be paid for the filing, prosecution, and defense of any action." (Emphasis added.)

Particular attention should be given to § 42-56-22(b), which has been italicized for emphasis. The specific issue raised by this certified question is whether the authorization set forth in § 42-56-22(b) to use the funds in the account for the payment of any "court fees" and "court costs" would include the use of the funds as attorneys' fees.

Our decisions have consistently held that the term "court costs" without more will not be interpreted to include counsel fees. Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I.1985); Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross, Co., 477 A.2d 939, 943 (R.I.1984). See also R.A. Beaufort & Sons, Inc. v. Trivisonno, 121 R.I. 835, 843, 403 A.2d 664, 668 (1979); Malinou v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 116 R.I 548, 550-51, 359 A.2d 43, 44 (1976); Di Iorio v. Cantone, 49 R.I. 452, 454, 144 A. 148, 149 (1929).

These cases comport with the general rule on the definition of "costs" as set forth in Black's Law Dictionary 346 (6th ed.1990), which sets forth in pertinent part:

"Generally, 'costs' do not include attorney fees unless such fees are by a statute denominated costs or are by statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case.

"Fees and charges required by law to be paid to the courts or some of their officers, the amount of which is fixed by statute or court rule; e.g. filing and service fees."

Under the facts set forth in the complaint filed in the United States District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff seeks to use the approximate sum of $500, which has been accumulated in his account, in order to pay counsel fees to an attorney in order to secure representation in a collateral attack upon his conviction. His request for the release of such funds was denied by the warden, and this litigation ensued.

It is not the function of this court to determine the...

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3 cases
  • La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 29 Junio 1994
    ...law that "[i]n the event that a statute is unambiguous, it is necessary for this court to apply its terms literally." Keenan v. Vose, 634 A.2d 866, 868 (R.I.1993); see also Costello v. American Univ. Ins. Co., 633 A.2d 260 (R.I.1993) (where statute "has a plain and unambiguous meaning ... t......
  • Young v. Wall
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • 5 Marzo 2005
    ...prisoners may spend their earnings, how their earnings are to be invested, and how the interest is to be distributed.8 Cf. Keenan v. Vose, 634 A.2d 866, 868 (R.I.1993) (reasoning that set-aside account created by § 42-56-22 could not be used at discretion of convicted persons, but rather re......
  • Aponik v. Lauricella
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 29 Marzo 2004
    ...fees unless such fees are by a statute denominated costs or are by statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case." Keenan v. Vose, 634 A.2d 866, 868 (R.I.1993) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 346 (6th ed.1990)). If the arbitrator had meant to preserve the original award of costs unde......

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