Keenan v. Vose
Decision Date | 10 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 93-310-M,93-310-M |
Citation | 634 A.2d 866 |
Parties | Kenneth KEENAN v. George VOSE. P. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case came before us pursuant to a question certified to this court by a judge of the United States District Court pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, which authorizes this court to answer questions of law certified to it by inter alia the United States District Court. The certified question is as follows: "Does Rhode Island General Law § 42-56-22 prohibit a person committed to the adult correctional institutions the use of those funds, during the person's incarceration, which are payable only 'at the time of his or her release from the institution' in order to retain an attorney to pursue a collateral post-conviction appeal of his conviction?"
The certified question requires us to construe G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-56-22. The statute reads in its entirety as follows:
Particular attention should be given to § 42-56-22(b), which has been italicized for emphasis. The specific issue raised by this certified question is whether the authorization set forth in § 42-56-22(b) to use the funds in the account for the payment of any "court fees" and "court costs" would include the use of the funds as attorneys' fees.
Our decisions have consistently held that the term "court costs" without more will not be interpreted to include counsel fees. Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I.1985); Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross, Co., 477 A.2d 939, 943 (R.I.1984). See also R.A. Beaufort & Sons, Inc. v. Trivisonno, 121 R.I. 835, 843, 403 A.2d 664, 668 (1979); Malinou v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 116 R.I 548, 550-51, 359 A.2d 43, 44 (1976); Di Iorio v. Cantone, 49 R.I. 452, 454, 144 A. 148, 149 (1929).
These cases comport with the general rule on the definition of "costs" as set forth in Black's Law Dictionary 346 (6th ed.1990), which sets forth in pertinent part:
Under the facts set forth in the complaint filed in the United States District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff seeks to use the approximate sum of $500, which has been accumulated in his account, in order to pay counsel fees to an attorney in order to secure representation in a collateral attack upon his conviction. His request for the release of such funds was denied by the warden, and this litigation ensued.
It is not the function of this court to determine the...
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