Keene v. Edie
| Decision Date | 24 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 63785-7,64065-3,s. 63785-7 |
| Citation | 131 Wn.2d 822,935 P.2d 588 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Sharon KEENE, Petitioner, v. Ronald EDIE, Defendant, Judith R. Evans, Respondent, James E. Montgomery, Sheriff-Director, King County, Additional Defendant. Angela SCAPPINI, Respondent, v. Joseph WARREN, Margaret Warren, and the marital community composed thereof, Appellants. |
Debra Stephens, Bryan Harneitaux, Spokane, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Association.
Gregory M. Miller and Donald B. Kronenberg, Seattle, for respondent Scappini.
Willard G. Smith, Jr. and Seligmann & Beckerman and Thomas R. Dreiling, Seattle, for petitioner Keene.
David Tracy, Renton, for appellants Warrens.
Daniel P. Brink and Brink & Todd, Seattle, for respondent Evans.
We consolidated Keene v. Edie and Scappini v. Warren, two appeals presenting an identical issue: may the victim of a tort, which was committed by a married person in his separate capacity, execute a judgment based on the tort claim against the tort-feasor's interest in community real property? We answer yes to that question and, consequently, reverse the Court of Appeals in Keene v. Edie and affirm the superior court in Scappini v. Warren.
In 1991, Sharon Keene brought suit in King County Superior Court against Ronald Edie and Edie's spouse, Judith Evans. Keene alleged in her suit that Edie had molested her when she was a child and that Evans had negligently permitted the molestation.
Contemporaneous with the initiation of her lawsuit, Keene obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment against a parcel of community real property owned by Edie and Evans. Evans then brought several motions to quash the writ of attachment, but each was denied. Several months before trial, the trial court granted Evans's motion to dismiss Keene's complaint against her.
Prior to the conclusion of the trial on Keene's remaining claim against Edie, Evans obtained a divorce from Edie in the state of Idaho. Pursuant to a provision in the divorce decree, Edie executed a quit claim deed in favor of Evans, ostensibly conveying his entire interest in the community property that was the subject of Keene's writ of attachment.
A jury found in favor of Keene. Consistent with that determination, the trial court entered a judgment against Edie in the amount of $313,000. On the day the judgment was entered, Evans recorded a declaration of homestead on the real property described in Keene's writ of attachment. Evans again sought to have the attachment released, but was unsuccessful in that effort.
When Keene found Edie's separate property and interest in community personal property insufficient to satisfy her judgment, she attempted to execute on Edie's interest in the community real property. After Evans was unsuccessful in an effort to quash a sheriff's sale of the property, Keene bid $133,000 of her judgment and obtained an undivided one-half interest in the property. The superior court subsequently entered an order confirming the sale.
Evans appealed the order confirming the sheriff's sale, as well as the order denying her motion to quash the sale. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Keene had no right to execute her judgment against community real property. In doing so, it indicated that "[m]arried tortfeasors whose assets include only real property are effectively immune from judgment for separate torts." Keene v. Edie, 80 Wash.App. 312, 318, 907 P.2d 1217 (1995), review granted, 129 Wash.2d 1010, 917 P.2d 130 (1996). In light of that holding, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to address Evans's additional arguments that the prejudgment attachment was unconstitutional and violative of Washington's homestead statute. We granted review.
Angela Scappini sued Joseph and Margaret Warren in King County Superior Court. She claimed that Joseph Warren had sexually molested her when she was a child. After filing suit, Scappini obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment on a parcel of community real property owned by the Warrens. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Scappini a $100,000 judgment against Joseph Warren in his separate capacity. The Warrens then moved in superior court to quash Scappini's writ of attachment. The superior court issued an order denying the Warrens' motion. The Warrens appealed that order to Division One of the Court of Appeals. We thereafter granted Scappini's motion to transfer the appeal to this court and consolidated it with Keene v. Evans.
Evans and the Warrens each assert that they should prevail on the strength of this court's decision in Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890), in which we held that a tort creditor who had obtained a judgment against a married tort-feasor in his separate capacity was barred from executing the judgment against the tort-feasor's interest in community real property. Scappini and Keene, on the other hand, contend that Brotton no longer has any vitality in light of our more recent decision in deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wash.2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980), and that even if it does, it should be overruled.
Evans and the Warrens are correct in observing that Brotton is directly on point. 1 Indeed, Brotton provided the impetus for the Court of Appeals' ruling in Keene, 80 Wash.App. 312, 907 P.2d 1217. Therefore, if that decision is still viable, we must reverse the trial court's decision in each of these appeals. In reaching our determination, it is necessary for us to examine that case and others from this court that have followed it in time, as well as relevant statutes and the policy implications that would flow from continued adherence to the rule set forth in Brotton.
The Brotton decision is as old as this state, the reported decision appearing in the first volume of Washington Reports. In that case, the plaintiff, Langert, sued a "constable," Brotton, for wrongfully levying upon and selling Langert's personal property. Langert, who did not join Brotton's wife as a defendant, obtained a judgment against the constable in his individual capacity. When Langert attempted to execute his judgment against the Brottons' community real property, Brotton's wife intervened and sought an injunction to prevent its sale. The trial court dismissed her petition and she appealed to this court.
On review, this court observed that because the community is a creature of statute, the statutes relating to community property governed whether Langert could execute on the Brottons' community property in order to satisfy his judgment. Consequently, the court examined section 2410 of the 1881 Code of the Washington Territory, which was still in effect. It provided:
The husband has the management and control of community real property, but he shall not sell, convey or encumber, the community real estate, unless the wife join with him in executing the deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and such deed or other instrument of conveyance must be acknowledged by him and his wife: Provided, however, That all such community real estate shall be subject to the liens of mechanics and others for labor and materials furnished in erecting structures and improvements thereon as provided by law in other cases, to liens of judgments recovered for community debts, and to sale on execution issued thereon.[ 2
Code of 1881 § 2410 (emphasis added). This court determined that section 2410 provided only two methods to alienate community property: (1) voluntary transfer by husband and wife together, and (2) certain specified liens. Because the latter did not include the judgment of a separate tort creditor, the court opined that permitting Langert to execute against Brotton's interest in property of the community would have rendered the proviso in section 2410 superfluous. In making that point, this court asked rhetorically, "If a judgment which is not obtained for a community debt becomes a lien upon community real property without any special proviso, why make a special proviso for a judgment which is obtained for a community debt?" Brotton, 1 Wash. at 81, 23 P. 688. Finally, this court concluded that community real property is exempt from execution where the tort creditor's judgment is against the tort-feasor spouse only.
Almost 30 years after Brotton was decided, this court handed down its decision in Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917). There, we extended the exemption identified in Brotton to personal property, holding that a married tort-feasor's interest in community personal property is immune from a judgment creditor's effort to execute the judgment against that interest if the judgment runs against only the tort-feasor spouse.
Not much changed in this area of the law until this court decided deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wash.2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980). There, the plaintiff, Joan deElche, filed a complaint for damages against Jacobsen, Jacobsen's wife, and the Jacobsens' community, claiming that Jacobsen raped deElche at a social event. The trial court awarded deElche a substantial judgment against Jacobsen in his separate capacity, but dismissed her claims against Jacobsen's wife and the community. Because the Jacobsens had earlier executed an agreement converting all of their property to community property, there were no assets against which deElche could execute her judgment. Consequently, she appealed to this court, "asking us to overturn the rule which immunize[d] Mr. Jacobsen's community property" from the force of her judgment. deElche, 95 Wash.2d at 239, 622 P.2d 835.
We began our analysis in deElche by acknowledging that under the principles established in the Brotton and Schramm cases, community-owned property was "exempt from separate tort judgments," noting that community liability could arise from a tortious...
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