Keene v. Rinaldi

• Decision Date: 27 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1:99CV00154.,1:99CV00154.
• Citation: 127 F.Supp.2d 770
• Parties: Nicki J. KEENE, Plaintiff, v. Nicholas RINALDI, Individually, and in his official capacity as Manager, Postal Distribution Center, U.S. Postal Service, Michael E. Ellis, Individually and in his official capacity as Senior Labor Relations Specialist, U.S. Postal Service, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, Allegheny/MidAtlantic area, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

127 F.Supp.2d 770

Nicki J. KEENE, Plaintiff, v. Nicholas RINALDI, Individually, and in his official capacity as Manager, Postal Distribution Center, U.S. Postal Service, Michael E. Ellis, Individually and in his official capacity as Senior Labor Relations Specialist, U.S. Postal Service, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, Allegheny/MidAtlantic area, Defendants.

No. 1:99CV00154.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

October 27, 2000.

Nickie J. Keene, High Point, NC, Pro se.

Lynne P. Klauer, Office of U.S. Attorney, Greensboro, NC, for Nicholas Rinaldi, Michael E. Ellis, Postmaster General, William J. Henderson, Alleghany/Mid-Atlantic area, defendants.

ORDER

BULLOCK, District Judge.

On September 18, 2000, the Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge was filed and notice was served on the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Thereafter, the Court received plaintiff's objections to the Recommendation.

The Court has appropriately reviewed plaintiff's objections de novo and finds they do not change the substance of the United States Magistrate Judge's rulings which are affirmed and adopted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's demand for punitive and emotional distress damages relating to the Family and Medical Leave Act claim (docket no. 17) is granted, that plaintiff's motion to change punitive damages to any judgment awarded by the Court (docket no. 18) is denied, that defendants' motion to dismiss relating to the Family and Medical Leave Act claim (docket no. 25) is granted as to plaintiff's individual capacity claims, and denied as to plaintiff's official capacity claims with the condition that the FMLA official capacity claims against the individual defendants be dismissed upon motion by the U.S. Postal Service to be substituted as defendant for said individuals with respect to the FMLA claims, and finally, that plaintiff's motion for a ruling in his favor due to defendants' default (docket no. 32) is denied.

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ELIASON, United States Magistrate Judge

This case comes before the Court on (1) defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's demand for punitive damages, (2) plaintiff's motion to change punitive damages to any judgment awarded by the Court, (3) defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (4) plaintiff's motion for a ruling in his favor due to defendants' default.

Facts

Only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this action alleging that the United States Postal Service, acting through its supervisory staff, violated his rights in a number of ways. He names as defendants, three individuals, two of whom he sues in both their official and individual capacities, and the third (Henderson), who is sued only in his official capacity. Plaintiff claims that they violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., by refusing to allow him to take time off due to his serious health conditions, including sleep apnea, high blood pressure, stress anxiety, tinnitus, and chronic dislocation of his right shoulder. He also claims that they retaliated against him for his attempts to take that time, another alleged FMLA violation. Plaintiff next contends that the Postal Service violated his rights in various ways under the Privacy Act, Inspector General's Act, Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff requests both punitive and compensatory damages as a result of these alleged violations.

Overall, plaintiff's complaint can be described as rambling and confusing. It is not clear which specific allegations are claimed to violate which law, and no dates are given for most of the alleged violations. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the complaint must be read broadly, given plaintiff's pro se status.

Defendants' Motion to Strike

The first motion before the Court is defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's demand for punitive damages under the FMLA. The damages available under the FMLA are set out in that act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). That statutory provision states that an employer who commits a FMLA violation shall be liable for lost pay, lost benefits, other actual monetary losses suffered by the aggrieved employee, and equitable relief such as employment, reinstatement, or promotion. It also contains liquidated damages provisions for cases where a violation occurred in bad faith. For the liquidated damages provision, an employer, which has been found to have committed a violation, can only avoid liquidated damages by proving it acted in good faith. Id.

The Court concludes that the FMLA does not allow punitive damages for two reasons. First, the explicit language of the FMLA does not mention punitive damages. Second, the presence of the liquidated damages subsection suggests that the drafters of the Act included that subsection in lieu of allowing punitive damages. Most of the other courts addressing the issue have concluded that punitive damages are not available under the FMLA. Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 53 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1024 (N.D.Ind.1999); Settle v. S.W. Rodgers, Co., Inc., 998 F.Supp. 657, 666 (E.D.Va.1998), aff'd 182 F.3d 909 (4th Cir.1999)(Table). Courts have looked to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., in interpreting the FMLA because it appears that Congress substantially patterned the FMLA on the FLSA. Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 685-86 (11th Cir.1999), Buser v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 556, 561-62 (M.D.N.C.1999). Under the FLSA, courts have also held that liquidated damages are available, but not punitive damages. Bolick v. Brevard County Sheriff's Dept., 937 F.Supp. 1560 (M.D.Fla.1996); Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 782 F.Supp. 86 (E.D.Mo.1991), Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F.Supp. 541 (N.D.Ala.1991). For these reasons, it is concluded that punitive damages are not available under the FMLA. Therefore, defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's request for punitive damages should be granted.¹

Plaintiff's Motion to Change Punitive Damages

In response to defendants' motion to strike punitive damages, plaintiff filed a motion denominated, "MOTION TO CHANGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO ANY JUDGMENT AWARDED BY THE COURT." Plaintiff does not explain his request. To the extent that the motion responds to defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's punitive damages demand, that issue has been fully dealt with above and the motion should be denied for the reasons previously stated.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The third matter before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's FMLA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to defendants, the FMLA claims are not proper because the FMLA does not allow individuals working for public agencies to be named as defendants. Instead, defendants contend that the United States Postal Service is the only possible proper party in this case. Consequently, they argue that the claims against them should be dismissed, and the Postal Service should be substituted as the sole defendant.

A motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) challenges a court's subject matter jurisdiction. In deciding such a motion, the burden will be on the plaintiff to show that subject matter jurisdiction is present. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982). Also, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Id.

Courts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.

Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.1986).

The standards applicable to Rule 12(b)(1) motions have been summarized by the Eleventh Circuit in Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Associates, M.D.'s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (11th Cir.1997):

We begin by observing that it is extremely difficult to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir.1986). Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms: "facial attacks" and "factual attacks." Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir.1990). Facial attacks on the complaint "require[] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980)) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977)). "`Factual attacks', on the other hand, challenge `the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.'" Id.

... On a factual attack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court's power to make findings of facts and to weigh the evidence depends on whether the factual attack on jurisdiction also implicates the merits of plaintiff's cause of action. Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. If the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action, then:

[T]he trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction — its very power to hear the case — there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In...