Dixon v. University of Toledo
| Decision Date | 31 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:08 CV 2806.,3:08 CV 2806. |
| Citation | 638 F.Supp.2d 847 |
| Parties | Crystal DIXON, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Thomas A. Sobecki, Toledo, OH, Brandon M. Bolling, Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, Livonia, MI, for Plaintiff.
Donald C. Brey, Elizabeth McCool Stanton, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Crystal Dixon's motion to amend the Amended Complaint and file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 25) which Defendants oppose (Doc. No. 28). This matter is also before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc No. 12, 20) to which Plaintiff has filed oppositions (Doc. No. 19, 22) and Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 23). The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA").
Defendants consist of the University of Toledo ("University"); Lloyd Jacobs, individually and in his official capacity as President of the University; and, William Logie, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President for Human Resources and Campus Safety.
On December 1, 2008, Dixon filed her original Complaint. (Doc No. 1). The Complaint requested relief on the basis of the following two claims: (1) Defendants violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights, and (2) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendments rights protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 15, 2009, Defendants filed their Answer as well their first motion to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc No. 12, 13). In the motion, Defendants expressed that all claims must be dismissed against the University and Jacobs and Logie in their official capacities. (Doc. No. 12). Defendants believed that the University, as a state instrumentality, is immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, and that the University is not a "person" under the statute. Furthermore, Defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment precludes an award of monetary damages on Plaintiff's claims against the University and against Jacobs and Logie acting in their official capacity for the state. (Id.).
On March 6, 2009, Dixon amended the Complaint and, in doing so, mooted Defendants' first motion to dismiss. (Doc No. 14, 18). The Amended Complaint does not bring any claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the University. (Doc No. 19). Moreover, the Amended Complaint no longer seeks monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jacobs and Logie in their official capacities. (Id.). Both parties note that the Amended Complaint effectively mooted Defendants' first motion to dismiss. (Doc No. 19 at 2; 20 at 2). However, the Amended Complaint adds an EPA claim against all Defendants. On March 20, 2009, Defendants filed their second motion to dismiss, this time arguing against Plaintiff's EPA claim. (Doc. No. 20). The Court shall address Defendants' second motion to dismiss in Part III of this opinion.
At this stage, the Court views the Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepts all of its factual allegations as true, and resolves every doubt in Plaintiff's favor. The facts as alleged by Plaintiff Dixon are summarized below.
Prior to the events leading to the present case, Plaintiff Crystal Dixon was working full-time as the Acting Administrator for Human Resources at the Medical University of Ohio. In the summer of 2006, The University of Toledo merged with The Medical University of Ohio. Dixon's employment continued with the University as the Associate Vice President for Human Resources for the Medical University's campus. In July 2007, Dixon was promoted to Interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources for the entire University.
In April 2008, Michael Miller published an article in the Toledo Free Press. Michael Miller, Lighting the Fuse: Gay Rights and Wrongs, Toledo Free Press (April 4, 2008), available online at: http:// www.toledo freepress.com/2008/04/04/gay-rights-and-wrongs/. Miller's article compared the plight of African-Americans during the Civil Rights movement to that of homosexuals fighting for equal rights today. Plaintiff Dixon felt compelled to respond for religious and other personal reasons. Dixon's article was also published by the Toledo Free Press and took the opposing view of Miller's article. Crystal Dixon, Gay Rights and Wrongs: Another Perspective, Toledo Free Press (April 18, 2008), available online at: http://www. toledofreepress.com/2008/04/18/ gay-rights-and-wrongs-another-perspective/. Dixon claims that she wrote this article as a private citizen and it was not at all associated with her life as an employee of the University.
The University took umbrage with Dixon's article and conducted an investigation that ultimately led to Dixon's termination from the University. On May 8, 2008, the University held a hearing and, several days later, Dixon learned by mail that she was fired. The termination letter from the University allegedly stated that the reasons for Dixon's termination was that her article's underlying message was in direct conflict with the "University's policies and procedures as well as its Core Values of the Strategic Plan which is mission critical." As a result of the termination, Dixon brought this suit.
In their most recent motion, Defendants ask only for dismissal of the EPA claim (Doc No. 20), and thus the Court will not consider the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Dixon alleges that when she was terminated, a man who was grossly under qualified for her job replaced her. (Doc No. 20, ¶ 33). Dixon alleges that her successor is a "deposed Dean" who resigned after the University's faculty publicly voiced concerns about his leadership and responsibility for carrying out Dixon's former duties. (Id.). Dixon alleges that her successor's annual salary was $40,000 more than her former salary and that he preformed substantially similar work, which required substantially equal skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. (Id.). Furthermore, Dixon alleges that Defendants' culture of unequal pay is further evidenced by the fact that no downward pay adjustment occurred when Defendant Logie was demoted from Interim Sr. Vice President for Finance and Administration to Vice President for Human Resources and Campus Safety, a lesser role in the University. (Id.).
Before turning to Defendants' second motion to dismiss, the Court shall address Plaintiff Dixon's July 1, 2009 motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. (Doc. No. 25). Dixon seeks to add a claim for relief pursuant to the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 ("FPA"). Plaintiff was "unaware of the Fair Pay Act when she filed her First Amended Complaint but subsequently discovered its existence while conducting continuing legal education." (Id. at 2). Notably, the FPA became effective on January 29, 2009, before Plaintiff moved to amend the original Complaint, and before the Amended Complaint was filed.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007), involved a woman who allegedly had been paid unequally for equal work for several years based on a discriminatory pay decision made twenty years earlier. The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to mean that the unlawful employment practice occurred twenty years earlier when the initial pay decision was made and, thus, that Ms. Ledbetter's Title VII claim was time barred.
Congress disagreed and enacted the FPA to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; or (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.
Plaintiff's proposed FPA claim is a not proper cause of action. The FPA simply specifies when charges may be filed for violations of Acts other than the EPA. Even if the FPA did relate to the EPA, Plaintiff would not need to state a separate cause of action under the FPA. A cause of action under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA would automatically incorporate the protections of the FPA. For these reasons, and specifically because the FPA does not create a new cause of action, Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint is denied. (Doc. No. 25).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's new EPA claim should be dismissed because (1) an EPA claim cannot be based on a successor's pay rate, and (2) individuals are not "employers" under the EPA, and, thus are not proper parties to an EPA claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a lawsuit for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Courts must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Thurman v. Pfizer, Inc., 484 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir.2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "even though a complaint need not contain `detailed' factual allegations, its `factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.'" Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (...
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