Kehlor v. Municipal Court
Decision Date | 23 March 1953 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | . Civ. 8272. District Court of Appeal, Third District, California |
Sutter & Elledge and Robert D. Carter, Modesto, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Deputy Atty. Gen., T. W. Martz, Dist. Atty., Stanislaus County, Modesto, for respondent.
On April 8, 1952, Kehlor filed his petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County praying for an order of that court directing the respondent Municipal Court of the City of Modesto to dismiss a criminal complaint which was then pending against him in said court. On April 28, following a hearing on the petition, the same was denied and petitioner thereupon appealed to this court.
From the record before us, which consists of the judgment roll alone, it appears that on August 3, 1951, a complaint was filed in the Justice Court of Modesto Township, County of Stanislaus [which court on January 1, 1952, became the Municipal Court of Modesto Judicial District] consisting of seven counts each charging petitioner with a misdemeanor in the operation of a motor vehicle.
On August 9, 1951 defendant, with counsel, appeared in said Justice Court, pleaded not guilty to the violations charged, and was released on bail. The case was set for hearing in October [the record does not disclose the exact date]; however, the trial was continued at the request of defendant until December 5, 1951. On that date the case was again continued to March 20, 1952 at the request of defendant. On the date so set the defendant did not appear in person but he did appear by his counsel, who again moved the court for a further continuance. The motion was denied, whereupon defendant's counsel announced in open court that he was ready to proceed to trial. The court refused to so proceed in the absence of the defendant, ordered that his bail be forfeited and that a bench warrant issue.
It appears from the allegations in the petition, to which no denial or other answer was filed, and from the affidavit of counsel in support thereof, which was made a part of the petition, that the court in making its order announced that its actions were predicated upon the fact that the court was satisfied that the defendant had sufficient knowledge of the time and place of trial, that no just cause had been shown why he was not present, and that the defendant would have to be present in order for the trial to proceed. It also appears from the affidavit that at no time did the district attorney suggest that the presence of the defendant was necessary for any purpose and that at no time did the district attorney offer any reason for his refusal to proceed with the trial other than the absence of the defendant.
Counsel for petitioner thereupon moved for a dismissal and following a submission of the motion the same was denied on March 27, 1952. On the following day, over the objection of counsel who requested an early date, the court reset the case for May 16, 1952 for the reason as stated in the petition 'that in view of the calendars of both counsel for your petitioner and the Court, the 16th day of May, 1952, was the earliest possible date that said trial could be held.'
The order of the Superior Court denying petitioner's motion for a writ of mandate states in part that 'no satisfactory explanation was offered to the Judge by defense counsel as to why the defendant was not present.' That while the Municipal Court could have proceeded to try the defendant in his absence, that court
At the outset, Section 13, Article I of the Constitution of this state provides that: See People v. Molinari, 23 Cal.App.2d Supp. 761, 764, 67 P.2d 767, 768.
'In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy * * * trial.'
The portion of section 1043 pertinent to the questions now reads as follows:
'The defendant must be personally present at the trial; provided, that in case of a misdemeanor charge, if he absents himself with full knowledge that a...
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