Keidel v. Rask
Decision Date | 25 March 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 9690-A,9690-A |
Citation | 304 N.W.2d 402 |
Parties | Carl G. KEIDEL and Keith C. Keidel, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. James Clifford RASK, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Fleck, Mather, Strutz & Mayer, Bismarck, for plaintiffs and appellees; argued by Russell R. Mather, Bismarck.
Benjamin C. Pulkrabek, Mandan, for defendant and appellant.
This is James Rask's second appeal to this court seeking relief from a trial court judgment declaring the width of a prescriptive road which crosses his land. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In the previous case, the trial court found that the width of the road was 40 feet. In Keidel v. Rask, 290 N.W.2d 255 (N.D.1980), which contains the facts which we will not here repeat, we set aside that finding because it was not supported by the evidence and we sent the case back to be re-tried. In that opinion we noted that the evidence needed for an accurate determination of the width of Keidel Road was absent from the record:
After the case was re-tried, the trial court found as a fact that the road was 60 feet wide. Rask again appealed, stating as the issue:
"Whether or not Exhibit Number 27 (Mandan City Ordinance Number 14-0406) should have been admitted into evidence, and even if it should have been admitted, whether or not this determines the width of all roads within the City of Mandan, no matter how acquired."
We have said that "a trial judge, in a nonjury case, should ordinarily admit all evidence which is not clearly inadmissible." Schuh v. Allery, 210 N.W.2d 96, 99 (N.D.1973). We are not persuaded by Rask's argument that Mandan City Ordinance No. 14-0406 should not have been admitted. Rask also contests the trial court's decision to treat the city ordinance as controlling. In Keidel we alluded to the importance of official standards in ascertaining the dimensions of a prescriptive public road. However, prefacing Section 14-0406 of the city ordinance are the following words:
"The following standards shall be observed in preparing any plat of a subdivision of the city: ..."
Keidel Road is within the city limits, but the land on which it lies has not been platted. Thus we do not have the circumstances we had in Kritzberger v. Traill County, 62 N.D. 208, 242 N.W. 913 (1932), where a minimum width was, by statute, required for all public roads however acquired. We believe the court erred when it applied the ordinance in determining the width of the prescriptive right. But, if a judgment is supported by other findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous and which were not induced by an erroneous view of the law, that would not result in a reversal of the judgment. Stee v. "L" Monte Industries, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D.1976). The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
(Centerline description omitted.)
This road has been in existence for over twenty (20) successive years and qualifies as a public prescriptive road under the provisions of Section 24-07-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.
Thus the trial court found as fact: that the Keidel-Rask road qualifies as a public prescriptive road; that the actual traveled portion, exclusive of ditches, shoulders, and slopes, varies from 10 to 15 feet on each side of the centerline; that requirements for the maintenance of the traveled way is a right-of-way of 30 feet on each side of the centerline; and that barricades placed within that 60-foot right-of-way interfere with the public use of the road. The trial court, in finding of fact No. 5, found that the roadway is a "Minor Class" street under the provisions of the city ordinance.
In its conclusions of law the trial court determined that the 60-foot right-of-way is necessary for the maintenance of the road as a public road. It further determined that a 60-foot right-of-way is the right-of-way prescribed by and in accordance with the city ordinance. If the trial court relied solely upon the city ordinance in determining that the width of the road in question was 60 feet, that determination would be in error because, as we have already noted, the ordinance applies standards to be observed only when a plat is prepared for a subdivision in the city. There is,...
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