Keigan v. Board of Registration in Medicine

• Decision Date: 23 April 1987
• Citation: 506 N.E.2d 866,399 Mass. 719
• Parties: Archie G. KEIGAN v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 866

506 N.E.2d 866

399 Mass. 719

Archie G. KEIGAN v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 7, 1987.

Decided April 23, 1987.

Nicholas B. Soutter, Wellesley (Deborah Thaxter, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Suzanne E. Durrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, and ABRAMS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Dr. Archie G. Keigan, appeals from an order of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) suspending his license to practice medicine in the Commonwealth for one year and requiring that he enter into a probation agreement, acceptable to the board, to be in effect for four years thereafter. G.L. c. 112, § 64 (1984 ed.). The board adopted the findings of the hearing officer, who concluded that the plaintiff violated G.L. c. 94C governing controlled substances, G.L. c. 112, §§ 5 and 61, and regulations promulgated by the board. A single justice of this court stayed the execution of the board's order until final disposition of the appeal or until further order and reserved and reported the case to the full bench of this court. ¹ We affirm the decision of the board.

By an order to show cause dated December 8, 1981, the board alleged that the plaintiff had failed to adhere to good and accepted standards in the practice of medicine in violation of G.L. c. 94C, §§ 19(a ), 24(a ), and 32; G.L. c. 112, § 5(b ) and (h ); G.L. c. 112, § 61; and 243 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 1.03(5)(a)(2) and (11), and 2.06(5) and (13) (1979). ² The plaintiff filed an answer on June 11, 1982, denying these allegations. A hearing was held on December 9, 1985, before a hearing officer, during which the parties submitted a stipulation of facts. The hearing officer determined that between the dates of September 15 and October 28, 1980, the plaintiff issued prescriptions for six controlled substances to thirteen individuals for the purpose of treating their drug dependencies. ³ The plaintiff did not report the names and addresses of such drug dependent persons, or the name, dosage or strength per dosage unit of the controlled substances to the Commissioner of Mental Health for any of the prescriptions as required by G.L. c. 94C, § 24(a ). Furthermore, the hearing officer determined that the plaintiff failed to maintain medical records for any of the thirteen individuals adequate to enable the plaintiff to provide proper diagnosis and treatment. Consequently, the hearing officer found violations of each of the statutory and regulatory provisions cited in the order to show cause. On April 3, 1986, the board accepted the findings of the hearing officer and the recommended sanction of a one-year suspension of the plaintiff's license and four years' probation thereafter, modified only to the extent that the probation agreement be acceptable to the board.

The plaintiff then filed with the board a motion for a rehearing, a motion for stay of execution pending appeal, a motion to stay the board's order, and a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions imposed. As grounds for the motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff argued that there "appears to be a shortage of doctors able to assume the care of his patients" and that "a one year suspension at age 66 is the equivalent to a 3 to 4 year suspension for a doctor half his age." These latter two arguments were the only ones presented to the board. On April 30, 1986, the board denied these motions after considering in detail the arguments advanced by the plaintiff. On appeal to a single justice of this court, the plaintiff reiterated his arguments before the board that the punishment and its implementation after over five years of delay were excessive, as well as arbitrary and capricious. He also presents an argument, first raised before the hearing officer, that the board consider the plaintiff's motivations in prescribing the drugs to the thirteen individuals which, he contends, were solely in the best interests of the patients. ⁴

Each of the plaintiff's arguments is relevant only to the board's determination of the sanction to be imposed in this case. No persuasive argument can be made that there was not sufficient evidence on the record to find violations of the statutory and regulatory provisions cited above, particularly given the plaintiff's stipulation of fact before the hearing officer in which he admitted all of the factual allegations contained in the order to show cause. Furthermore, after a review of the record, we have no doubt that the hearing officer and the board adequately considered the mitigating factors presented by the plaintiff.

While we have stated that suspension or revocation of a license to practice medicine is not designed to punish the physician involved, we have recognized that the Legislature through the board has provided for the imposition of sanctions "to protect the life, health and welfare of the people at large and to set up a plan whereby those who practice medicine will have the qualifications which will prevent, as far as possible, the evils which could result from ignorance or incompetency or a lack of honesty and integrity." Levy v. Board of Registration and Discipline in Medicine, 378 Mass. 519, 527-528, 392 N.E.2d 1036 (1979), quoting Matanky v. Medical Examiners, 79 Cal.App.3d 293, 306, 144 Cal.Rptr. 826 (1978). Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 383 Mass. 299, 317, 418 N.E.2d 1236 (1981). The plaintiff argues, however, that the board failed to consider adequately the effect of the suspension on his patients, many of whom are indigent or marginally indigent and for whom alternative medical service is not available. Thus, he contends that the board's action does not properly ...