Keir v. State
| Decision Date | 12 February 1943 |
| Citation | 152 Fla. 389,11 So.2d 886 |
| Parties | KEIR et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Criminal Court of Record, Hillsborough County; John R. Himes, Judge.
R. G Tittsworth, of Tampa, for appellants.
J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and Woodrow M. Melvin, and John C. Wynn Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Viola Mae Keir and Anna A. Cramer were convicted of perjury. They are charged with giving false testimony in a divorce suit, to the effect that Viola Mae Keir had been a continuous, bona fide resident of the State of Florida since June 12, 1942. The divorce suit referred to was instituted in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County on September 18, 1942. Viola Mae Keir was plaintiff in that suit and Alexander Keir her husband, was defendant.
A certified copy of the court record was a part of the evidence in the perjury trial. The bill of complaint alleged that Viola Mae Keir was a resident and citizen of the State of Florida and had been such resident for more than 90 days continuously preceding and prior to the filing of suit. Alexander Keir answered admiting the residence as alleged. At the trial of the divorce suit, on September 29, 1942, Viola Mae Keir and Anna A. Cramer testified under oath to the statements attributed to them in the criminal charge.
The principal questions raised by Anna A. Cramer on her appeal concern the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment, and the propriety of admitting an extrajudicial confession in evidence against her. Viola Mae Keir raises the same questions; and also the question whether certain letters admitted at the trial should not have been excluded, as privileged communications.
The testimony is meagre. Mrs. Rufus Riggsbee testified for the prosecution that on June 12, 1942, she had rented some rooms in her home at Tampa, Florida, to Anna A. Cramer. Mrs. Cramer took possession and moved in immediately thereafter. Viola Mae Keir came to live with Mrs. Cramer at the residence about September 1, 1942. Mrs. Keir told Mrs. Riggsbee that she was from New Jersey; although she did not say that she had come directly from there.
This is all of the pertinent evidence against Mrs. Cramer, with the exception of an extrajudicial confession made by her to the arresting officer shortly after she had been taken into custody on the perjury charge.
In addition to the court record, and Mrs. Riggsbee's testimony, the only testimony against Viola Mae Keir was an extra judicial confession made by her to the arresting officer at the same time that Mrs. Cramer's confession was made; and the testimony of Mr. C. J. Hardee, a Tampa attorney, who identified, and testified about, certain letters exchanged between him and Mrs. Keir, prior to the time that she began her divorce suit in Hillsborough County.
The letters from Mrs. Keir to Mr. Hardee were all postmarked 'Maple Shade, New Jersey', and were mailed from that place during the month of July, 1942. One of the letters stated that she was a resident of New Jersey, and had been such a resident for the past twenty years. From the correspondence, it appeared that she was considering coming to Florida to institute a divorce suit against her husband. Mr. Hardee had been recommended to her as an attorney. She would give him the case to handle, if he did not ask too much for his professional services. Such fee as was paid, would have to be taken care of by her out of her own funds. How much would the fee be? What grounds for divorce were recognized in Florida? How long would she be required to live in Florida before she could lawfully institute suit? Such was the gist of her letters.
Mr. Hardee promptly answered, giving full and correct information concerning residence requirements and recognized grounds for divorce in Florida. A minimum attorney's fee was named, with the suggestion that the matter of fee would be gone into more fully upon Mrs. Keir's arrival in Florida.
Mr. Hardee heard nothing further from Mrs. Keir after this exchange of letters. He considered the letters as inquiries from someone who wanted to employ him as an attorney. He never saw, or knew, the person who wrote the letters. He was never employed by her.
On September 18, 1942, Viola Mae Keir instituted suit for divorce in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, through another attorney.
Over objection of defendants' counsel, the letters were allowed to come in as evidence against Viola Mae Keir, but not as evidence against Anna A. Cramer; the trial judge instructing the jury that they were not to consider the letters as evidence against the latter defendant. The ground of objection to the reception of the letters, and to the testimony of Mr. Hardee concerning them, was that they were privileged communications between attorney and client.
On the evidence submitted, the jury found both defendants guilty of perjury, as charged. Motion for new trial was denied. Judgment was entered.
In order to sustain a conviction for perjury, not only must the substance of the...
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