Keister v. Park Centre Lanes
Decision Date | 09 December 1981 |
Citation | 3 Ohio App.3d 19,443 N.E.2d 532,3 OBR 20 |
Parties | , 3 O.B.R. 20 KEISTER et al., Appellants, v. PARK CENTRE LANES, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
To defeat a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant in a negligence action, plaintiff must identify a duty, or duties, owed him by the defendant, and the evidence must be sufficient, considered most favorably to the plaintiff, to allow reasonable minds to infer that a specific duty was breached, that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and that plaintiff was injured.
Richard G. Reichel, Canton, for appellants.
Vogelgesang, Howes, Lindamood, Zawaly & Brunn and Douglas N. Godshall, Canton, for appellee.
This is a customer's slip-and-fall case. The accident occurred on the sidewalk/parking lot of the defendant-appellee bowling alley. Motions for summary judgment (Civ.R. 56) were sustained as to officers and employees of the defendant corporation. These judgments were made final by recitals that there was no just reason for delay, and they were not appealed. Thereupon the defendant bowling alley filed its motion for summary judgment which was granted by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
The plaintiff-appellant assigns three errors:
The judgment of the trial court is general. It is impossible to determine the specific grounds upon which the trial court ruled. 1
Three possible explanations for the court's judgment exist: (1) the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law; (2) the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; or (3) the plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law. An affirmative conclusion as to any of these options results in an affirmance of the trial court.
The current glut of summary judgment cases involving negligence actions in this court and other courts of appeals throughout the state of Ohio justifies a fresh examination of the procedure.
In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that she was a business invitee of the defendants and that
The second cause of action is a complaint by the husband of the injured plaintiff for loss of services.
In its answer the defendant denies negligence and says
The defendant filed with its motion for summary judgment a brief and deposition of the plaintiff taken as upon cross-examination. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the motion for summary judgment and a brief. The defendant filed a reply brief.
The plaintiff filed no affidavits, depositions, or other testimonial assertions. Thus, the entire body of testimony lies within the deposition of the plaintiff taken upon cross-examination.
On February 18, 1978, the plaintiff went to the defendant-bowling alley to bowl. The accident happened as she left the bowling alley and sidewalk in front of the alley, slipping on a "big chunk of ice." Additional undisputed facts are derived from the testimony of the plaintiff.
There is no other testimony, ergo there are no other facts. The case is ripe for summary judgment consideration. There are no material, operative facts in dispute.
The Summary Judgment Rule in Ohio, Civ.R. 56, effective July 1, 1970, is substantially the same as the statute it replaced, R.C. 2311.041. Both were patterned after Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.10 West's Ohio Practice 268.
Federal Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 56, cited at 10 West's Ohio Practice 270.
The pretrial decision the court must make is comparable to that made upon a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the trial testimony. The trial court may reason, "If this were all of the evidence presented in the trial, both sides having rested, should I arrest the case from the jury?" If his answer is "yes," Rule 56 says, "Do it now! "
"It is frequently declared that a summary judgment will be granted where the weight of the evidence introduced on the motion corresponds with the weight of evidence which at the end of a trial would warrant a directed verdict." Factors Affecting The Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment, 48 Colum.L.Rev. 780 (1948), cited at 10 West's Ohio Practice 283.
The Ohio Supreme Court added its encouragement to the time-saving procedure in 1967:
North v. Penna. Rd. Co. (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 169, 171, 224 N.E.2d 757 .
In unusually strong language the court went further, (1) inviting appeal to the Supreme Court where summary judgments are reversed by courts of appeals, and (2) placing clear burdens upon an appellant.
"With this in mind, appellate courts reviewing orders allowing motions for summary judgment should require the appellant, upon whom the duty of demonstrating prejudicial error rests, to define with great specificity the area in which a factual dispute exists, and this court should review as of public or great general interest doubtful reversals in this area. * * * " Id.
The frequent application of summary judgment procedure to negligence cases is a recent phenomenon. Earlier commentators suggested that "[n]egligence cases in which summary judgment may properly be granted are exceptional." Wills, Procedure Under the Ohio Summary Statute, 20 Ohio St.L.J. 613, 615 (1959).
Suffice it to point out that (1) North, supra, involves a negligence claim, and (2) the attempted application of summary judgment to negligence proceedings is proliferating in fact around the state of Ohio.
As appropriate to the merits of this case, Civ.R. 56 provides:
This case does not involve "comparative negligence."
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