Keith v. Aldridge
| Citation | 900 F.2d 736 |
| Decision Date | 09 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2397,89-2397 |
| Parties | 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1052, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,935 Ronald F. KEITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward C. ALDRIDGE, Jr., in his official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
George Michael Chuzi, Kalijarvi, Chuzi & Stetina, P.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lt. Col. Morris Adams Tanner, Jr., USAF, General Litigation Div., Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and YOUNG, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Ronald J. Keith appeals from the order of the district court dismissing his civil action against appellee (the Air Force) on res judicata grounds. Keith had filed a civil action in March 1987 alleging Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3, and Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a, violations after the Air Force terminated his employment (Keith I ). That action was settled by agreement and dismissed with prejudice by the district court. Keith filed this second action (Keith II ) in August 1988, alleging that the Air Force's failure to provide him with certain personnel notes violated his fifth amendment due process right. We agree with the district court that the judgment in Keith I precludes Keith from bringing this second action against the Air Force and therefore affirm.
Keith was employed as a civilian computer specialist by the Air Force from 1974-1986. The Air Force provided notice on May 16, 1986, that it intended to terminate him for disruptive misconduct in the workplace. 1 On May 18, Keith filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act requests to obtain all records relating to his proposed dismissal. Keith specifically sought personal data and notes collected as part of the investigation that led to the decision to terminate his employment. The Air Force responded that personal notes kept by supervisors and remaining under the control of the originator were not subject to the Privacy Act. Pursuant to FOIA, the Air Force indicated that it had provided Keith with a copy of personal data collected as part of the investigation; it had no other personal notes in its records subject to FOIA disclosure.
On June 13, the Air Force terminated Keith. He filed an administrative appeal on June 16, challenging the Air Force's failure to disclose all requested personal and investigative notes. The appeal was returned without action on the ground that no such records existed. Keith then appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 2; both an administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Board on review upheld the dismissal.
Keith I was filed on March 4, 1987. Keith charged that reprisals culminating in his dismissal were motivated by activity protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 He also alleged that the Air Force had violated the Privacy Act by failing to provide him with his supervisors' personal notes compiled and maintained as part of the investigation that led to his termination. 4 This failure allegedly deprived him of the opportunity to prepare a defense before the MSPB. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief respecting the challenged Air Force practices, release of the investigative records, general damages, reinstatement, back pay, costs, and attorney's fees. Keith eventually deposed Lt. Colonel Jack Stratford, his immediate supervisor, determined that Stratford had kept personal notes, and obtained a copy of the notes (Stratford notes) pursuant to a discovery request during the last week of scheduled discovery.
Serious settlement discussions ensued at this point, and the district court removed the case from the trial calendar. On December 1, 1987, the Air Force presented a draft settlement agreement. The agreement proposed would have released the Air Force from liability for all claims, except attorney's fees, "that were brought or could have been brought against the [Air Force] pursuant to Title VII, the provisions of the Privacy Act, the United States Constitution and relevant federal statutes and regulations." J.A. at 38. Similarly, the agreement was proposed as a "full and complete disposition of all allegations filed or that could have been filed" under Title VII, the Privacy Act, the Constitution, and federal statutes and regulations; it was not to be used otherwise than to establish settlement of such claims. Id. at 41, 42. Under the draft agreement, Keith would have agreed not to "seek to obtain further employment" with the Air Force, and the Air Force would not be required to consider him for hire, transfer, or reassignment. Id. at 40-41.
Keith apparently objected to the draft settlement agreement, and the agreement ultimately signed in January 1988 was more narrowly drawn. The Air Force was released from, and the agreement recognized as a full and complete disposition of, those claims "that were filed or that could have been filed (except attorney's fees) and that were brought or could have been brought against the [Air Force] pursuant to Title VII and the provisions of the Privacy Act." Id. at 77, 80. The agreement was not to be used except to establish "settlement of all matters related to [Keith's] claims and release of the [Air Force] from all claims filed or that could have been filed by [Keith] concerning this action, pursuant to Title VII and the Privacy Act." Id. at 80. Keith agreed not to "apply for further employment" with the Air Force and to dismissal of the suit with prejudice. Id. at 79, 80. The Air Force agreed to remit to Keith back pay, expunge his record, and pay reasonable attorney's fees. The district court, noting the settlement pursuant to agreement of the parties, dismissed Keith I in an order dated February 4, 1988, specifically reserving Keith's claim for attorney's fees.
Keith filed his second action on August 9, 1988. His amended complaint alleged that the Air Force's failure to provide him with the Stratford notes effectively denied him the right to respond and to raise defenses to the termination proceedings, thereby violating his fifth amendment due process right. Keith requested declaratory and injunctive relief respecting the Air Force's challenged conduct and "equitable relief" in the form of reinstatement, back pay, expungement of his record, costs, and attorney's fees. Id. at 109. The Air Force moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment; Keith responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of a hearing on the motions, the court granted the Air Force's motion and entered an order dismissing Keith's suit. The court held that res judicata precluded Keith from bringing the second action. Analyzing the case under traditional res judicata principles, the court found identity of the parties and a final judgment on the merits in the earlier action, Keith I. The court also found, under Nash City Board of Education v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.1981), identity of the claims in the two actions.
This appeal followed. As an initial matter, Keith argues that there is not identity of claims in his two actions, making res judicata inapplicable. Keith's principal contention, however, is that, even if the technical requirements of res judicata are met, it should not apply to preclude the second action because the parties' settlement agreement and the judgment in Keith I were limited to his Title VII and Privacy Act claims. We address each of these contentions in turn.
On this appeal we are reviewing the grant of summary judgment on res judicata grounds. In doing so, we apply the same summary judgment principles applicable in the district court, but are not bound to particular theories relied upon by that court. See generally 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil Sec. 2716 (1983). Our review therefore is essentially a plenary one on the summary judgment record before the district court. We observe at the outset that federal law controls our assessment of the preclusive effect of the earlier federal judgment in Keith I. See Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (4th Cir.1986).
The requirements for invoking res judicata to preclude a subsequent lawsuit by bar or merger (claim preclusion) are familiar ones. "As applied, the essential elements of the doctrine are generally stated to be (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits." Nash City Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d at 486. The critical element here is the second, identity of the causes of action in the two suits. There is no question that the judgment in Keith I, though a consent judgment, was, for claim preclusion purposes, a final one on the merits. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction Sec. 4443 at 385 (1981) [hereinafter Wright, Miller, & Cooper].
Consistent with the modern trend, see 18 Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Sec. 4407; Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 24 (1982), we have adopted a transactional approach to the identity of claims question--"the appropriate inquiry is whether the new claim arises out of same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment." See, e.g., Harnett, 800 F.2d at 1313. Applying this test, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the causes of action in the two actions are identical. The same series of connected transactions is involved in both actions: Keith's disruptive workplace behavior led to an internal investigation, Lt. Colonel Stratford kept notes to document Keith's behavior, the Air Force...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chao v. Virginia Dept. of Transp.
...new claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.'" Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir.1990). There is no identity of claims between those asserted by the Secretary and those of the 40 inspectors tried in Griffin i......
-
Clay v. Yates
...in an earlier suit; (2) identity of cause of action in the two suits; and (3) identity of parties in the two suits. See Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 257, 112 L.Ed.2d 215 (1990). All these elements are satisfied in this case, and Clay cann......
-
In re General Rights of Gila River System, WC-02-0003-IR.
...to a future action . . . can reserve that right" by agreement, and referring to Wright & Miller, supra, § 4443); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740-41 (4th Cir.1990) (citing Wright & Miller, supra, § 4443 for the proposition that "[w]hen a consent judgment entered upon settlement by the p......
-
Davis v. Durham Mental Health Dev. Disabilities
...claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment." See Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir.1990). Under this broad test, claim preclusion prevents the "litigation by the plaintiff in a subsequent action of claims `with ......
-
Contemplating the successive prosecution phenomenon in the federal system.
...v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963-64 (3d Cir. 1991) (adhering to "the present trend" of the transactional approach); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of judgments as consistent with the modem trend); Agrile......