Clay v. Yates

• Decision Date: 15 December 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-741-N.
• Citation: 809 F. Supp. 417
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Albert Russell CLAY, Plaintiff, v. George YATES, et al., Defendants.

809 F. Supp. 417

Albert Russell CLAY, Plaintiff, v. George YATES, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91-741-N.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

December 15, 1992.

Albert Russell Clay, pro se.

George Holton Yates, pro se.

Conrad Moss Shumadine, John Steven Wilson, Willcox & Savage, Norfolk, VA, for Rosemary Mann.

Paul Henderson Ray, pro se.

Lawrence Steven Emmert, Office of the City Atty., Virginia Beach, VA, for Frank LaPorta.

William Mark Dunn, Office of the Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for Honorable Calvin Spain.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAYNE, District Judge.

Albert Russell Clay ("Clay"), an inmate at the Greensville Correctional Center, filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 25, 1991.¹ Clay alleges that George Yates ("Yates"), the Honorable Calvin Spain ("Judge Spain"), Rosemary Mann ("Mann"), Paul Ray ("Ray"), and Frank LaPorta ("LaPorta"), acting individually and as co-conspirators, violated his constitutional rights.

Clay previously has commenced in this court seven other actions seeking damages or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,² and seven actions seeking of a writ of habeas corpus.³ Like most of its predecessors, this action arises out of Clay's two convictions in 1987, both pursuant to pleas of guilty, in the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake for malicious wounding and in the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach for assault and conspiracy to commit a felony.

The defendants in this action played various official roles in Clay's conviction in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach or in subsequent related and unrelated proceedings. LaPorta was a police detective with the City of Virginia Beach who investigated the offenses of which Clay was convicted. Yates was the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney who prosecuted Clay. Ray, a private attorney, represented Clay only during the sentencing phase of the proceedings. Judge Spain was the judge who accepted Clay's plea of guilty and sentenced him. Mann is a deputy clerk of court in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach who, pursuant to law, court procedures or court orders took, or refrained from taking, certain actions following Clay's conviction.

Clay's voluminous pleadings in this action are exceedingly difficult to understand and, in fact, are often incoherent. At one point in his complaint, Clay contends that the purpose of this action is to redress his alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, denial of access to the courts, intentional deprivation of property without due process and violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 2). Elsewhere Clay alleges that the defendants conspired together to commit the acts complained of above. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3). Clay also charges (and then never again mentions) the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants to cover up another alleged conspiracy between Clay's former wife and a person named Hewitt to murder Clay in order to secure his business and insurance.

Clay seeks a declaration that his constitutional rights have been violated, an injunction requiring the defendants to remove all information in his prison file relating to the "action taken in Virginia Beach Court" and an injunction requiring the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach to docket and issue unspecified orders. Finally, Clay seeks compensatory and punitive damages from all defendants except Judge Spain.⁴

All five defendants filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Clay also filed a motion for summary judgment, along with supporting documents. On April 20, 1992, Judge Doumar entered an order advising that all of the motions would be treated as motions for summary judgment, and allowing the parties to submit additional supporting pleadings.⁵ Subsequently, on July 28, 1992, the case was reassigned to the undersigned because of a complaint made by Clay that Judge Doumar was acquainted with a lawyer whom Clay proposed to add as a defendant.

Notwithstanding that Clay has submitted an enormous volume of paper and mindful of the rule that a pro se litigant's pleadings should be construed liberally in his favor, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905, 87 S.Ct. 216, 17 L.Ed.2d 135 (1966), the court is of the opinion that Yates, Mann, Ray and Judge Spain are entitled to summary judgment; that Clay's motion for summary judgment should be denied as to all defendants; and that Clay's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add additional defendants should be denied. The pleadings respecting Clay's claims against LaPorta must be supplemented before a decision can be made on those claims.

The Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment the court is not to weigh the evidence, but rather must "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In so doing, the court must view the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1338 (4th Cir.1992). Once this initial showing under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the non-moving party. The non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Catawba Indian Tribe, 978 F.2d at 1338.

In meeting this burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. There is no genuine issue for trial "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

Discussion

On June 10, 1987, Clay entered a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake to a charge of conspiracy to commit malicious wounding. On September 7, 1988, Clay was sentenced by that court to imprisonment for ten years. On June 24, 1987, Clay entered a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach to charges of assault and conspiracy to commit the felony of malicious wounding. On October 11, 1988, Clay was sentenced by that court to imprisonment for ten years. That sentence was to run consecutively to the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake. Clay was represented by counsel in each of these proceedings.

In an effort to determine the basis of Clay's claims which might be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court has reviewed carefully all of the pleadings Clay has filed and has taken instruction from the defendants' pleadings to discern how they understand the charges being made against them. It appears that the charges Clay intends to assert against the defendants under § 1983 are most concisely described in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the Complaint. When read in conjunction with the rest of the Complaint and Clay's opposition to the defendants' motions, those paragraphs best summarize what Clay considers to be the essence of his perceived grievances against each of the five defendants.

I. The Claims Against George Yates

Yates was the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Virginia Beach who prosecuted Clay for assault and for conspiracy to have Clay's wife's legs broken in an attempt to end her career as a go-go dancer. Clay alleges that the acts of prosecution in which Yates engaged were without probable cause and in the absence of jurisdiction:

Defendant, George Yates was the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney for Virginia Beach and at all times mentioned herein was a citizen of the United States, furthermore, at all times mentioned herein was acting in clear absence of jurisdiction and prosecuting plaintiff in the absence of probable cause, whereby defendant instructed defendant LaPorta to arrest plaintiff "on the sceen Police" refused to arrest Plaintiff, and Defendant prosecuted Plaintiff in Clear asence of jurisdiction, when he knew plaintiff had pleaded Guilty to the "Same offence" same Conduct and such is listed as a single charge the same entire evidence in two venues, therefore, defendants "want of jurisdiction and absence of deprives him of immunity:

(Complaint, ¶ 6).

Clay's basic contention seems to be that Yates is liable for prosecuting Clay in the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach which was without jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea or to sentence him because, pursuant to a prior plea of guilty, he already had been convicted of malicious wounding by the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake. Clay...