Keith v. Mills

• Decision Date: 24 December 1878
• Citation: 126 Mass. 90
• Parties: William H. Keith, administrator, v. Granite Mills
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

126 Mass. 90

William H. Keith, administrator, v. Granite Mills

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

December 24, 1878

Argued January 3, 1877

Bristol. Tort by the administrator of the estate of Arabella Keith for personal injuries sustained by the intestate, while in the employ of the defendant, a manufacturing corporation, by the burning of its mill.

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Rockwell, J., the plaintiff put in evidence tending to show that the intestate was injured in endeavoring to escape from the same fire in the defendant's mill, which was the subject of the preceding case; and put in similar evidence to show the cause of the fire, the mode in which the building was constructed and the failure of the water to run. It also appeared that the intestate at that time was twenty years and seven months old, and there was no evidence that she was in any way a deficient or inferior person.

The plaintiff sought to maintain the action on account of the great liability of the mill to take fire, and for want of proper and suitable means and ways of escape therefrom in case of fire, and the want of proper means of extinguishing fire and giving alarm to the help in case of fire; and asked the judge to instruct the jury as follows; "It was the duty of the defendant to provide proper, suitable and sufficient means of extinguishing fire in its mill, and giving alarm thereof, and to have proper, suitable and sufficient ways and means of escape from the mill in case of fire; and, if the defendant failed therein, it is liable. If the intestate was injured in consequence of the insufficiency of the means of escape or the want of suitable appliances and apparatus for the extinguishment of fire, and giving alarm thereof, the plaintiff can maintain this action; and it matters not that the negligence of the other operatives or servants at work in the mill may have contributed to her injury. That would not prevent a recovery in this action, if she was not negligent in her acts or doings. It was the duty of the defendant to know that the place was unsafe, it having greater means of knowing the great risks of fire in such mills."

The judge declined to give these instructions in the form in which they were presented, but instructed the jury as follows: "If the plaintiff's intestate was at the time of the fire at work for the defendant, and if she and the defendant were equally capable of observing and understanding the means provided for the extinguishment of fire, and of egress from the burning building and of the risks from fire, there could be no recovery in this action for these risks were assumed by her, and were a part of the consideration of her wages. This is the law, unless the plaintiff has shown, upon the evidence, affirmatively, the burden of proof being on the plaintiff, that his intestate was of less capacity than adult persons usually engaged in the same business; whether that is proved is a question for the jury. If the jury are satisfied that her capacity was thus deficient, then it is...