Keith v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 02-1054(RBW).,CIV.A. 02-1054(RBW). |
| Citation | 284 F.Supp.2d 31 |
| Parties | Geraldine KEITH, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Paul A. Mussenden, Esq., U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for defendants.
Geraldine Keith, Laurel, MD, pro se.
This matter comes before the Court upon the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint ( ).1 The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks: (1) a declaratory judgment setting aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff entered into with her former employer, defendant United States Railroad Retirement Board ("the Board"), or, in the alternative, an order remanding the case back to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and (2) relief under District of Columbia common law declaring the settlement agreement void because the plaintiff allegedly lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute the agreement.2 Complaint ("Compl.") at 1-2, 6-7. The defendants assert that due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to timely raise her mental capacity claim with the EEOC, her complaint should be dismissed. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and for the reasons set forth below, the Court must deny the defendants' motion to dismiss because the Court is unable to conclude that as a matter of law the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
On March 5, 1996, the plaintiff was involved in a verbal altercation with her supervisor, Michael McCool. Defs.' Mot., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss ( ) at 1. Following this incident, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the Board's Office of Equal Opportunity ("OEO"), alleging "Sexual Harassment under Title VII[], a violation of [her] Civil Rights, and a denial of [her] Equal Employment Opportunity." Id. at 2 (citing Exhibit ("Ex.") 1 (OEO Complaint dated March 7, 1996) at 2). On April 1, 1996, the plaintiff's supervisor issued a memorandum entitled Apology for Using Inappropriate Language, in which he stated: Id., Ex. 2 (). On April 17, 1996, the plaintiff entered into an informal settlement agreement with the Board, in which her supervisor 3 Id. at 2-3 (). This notice of informal resolution also provided the plaintiff the following appeal options "if she believed the Agency failed to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement":
(1) request enforcement of the settlement agreement within 30 days of any alleged violation occurring after plaintiff accepted the terms of the settlement;
(2) within 30 days of plaintiff's acceptance of the settlement, request that her informal complaint be reinstated for further processing; or
(3) within 15 days of plaintiff's receipt of the notice, file a discrimination complaint with the Board's OEO.
The apology submitted by her supervisor did not satisfy the plaintiff and on May 17, 1996, she "appealed to the Board's OEO office to reinstate her informal complaint contending that the Agency breached the agreement because she believed that [her supervisor's] written apology did not comply with its terms." Id. at 4 (). Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the
[l]etter was insufficient, because Mr. McCool's letter represents that he `used' curse words, yet he had used those curse words directly towards me and had called me a bitch ... [and she pointed out that] the Informal Resolution states that Mr. McCool will provide a letter which will include `assurances that outburst[s] as the one which occurred' will not happen again. The [l]etter only states that Mr. McCool will `make an effort to refrain' from using curse words. Mr. McCool's letter does not make `assurances' that his behavior will not continue, but only states that he will `try.'
Id., Ex. 4. On May 22, 1996, the plaintiff's supervisor issued a second written apology, in which he stated:
I apologize for using curse words during or after our conversation of March 1, 1996,4 regarding sick leave notification and scheduling. My loss of composure was not appropriate.
I hope this will clarify my earlier apology. You are a valuable part of our working-group here. I have always thought so and continue to believe so. I will not use curse words in our future conversations.
Id., Ex. 5 (). Following the issuance of this second apology letter, the Board's OEO denied the plaintiff's appeal and her request to reinstate her informal complaint on May 29, 1996, because it found that the "new apology letter addresse[d] all the issues [the plaintiff] raised in [her] breach of agreement letter[,]" and informed her that an appeal of the denial must be filed within 30 days of receipt of the denial. Id., Ex. 6 (Board's Letter to Geraldine Keith dated May 29, 1996).
On June 25, 1996, the plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the EEOC. Id. at 6, (citing Ex. 7 ()). The plaintiff then elected to take "Early Retirement" from the Board on April 1, 1997. Id. at 7 (). On October 10, 1997, the EEOC denied the plaintiff's appeal of the OEO's decision, finding that the Board did not breach the settlement agreement. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 8 (EEOC Decision dated October 10, 1997)). The EEOC noted that the plaintiff was Id. The EEOC Decision informed the plaintiff of her appeals rights, stating that she could "(1) move for reconsideration within 30 days of receipt of the decision; or (2) file a civil action in an appropriate U.S. District Court within 90 days from the date she received the decision." Id. at 7-8 (citing Ex. 8). It was not until January 9, 1998, when the plaintiff sent a letter to the EEOC seeking reconsideration of its October 10, 1997 decision.5 Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 9). For the first time, the plaintiff stated that she "want[ed] to bring to [the EEOC's] attention [] that [she] was mentally and emotionally ill when [she] signed the Informal Resolution on April 17, 1996." Id., Ex. 9. Plaintiff also represented that "[a]t that time [she] did not have a lawyer, and ... felt pressured to sign the Informal Resolution." Id. As support for her position, the plaintiff enclosed a letter from her psychiatrist, Dr. Julia B. Frank, and asked the EEOC "to vacate the Informal Resolution and allow [her] to file [her] discrimination complaint with the agency at [that] point in time." Id.
In response to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, "the Board argued that the Plaintiff failed to file her request with the EEOC in a timely manner and that she should be precluded from raising new allegations (mental capacity) that were not previously exhausted during the administrative process." Id. at 9. On October 19, 2000, the EEOC denied the plaintiff's request for reconsideration and informed her that she had 90 days from the date of receipt of the decision to seek review in a federal district court. Id. (). The EEOC's Certificate of Mailing indicated that a copy of the decision was mailed to the plaintiff, the "plaintiff's representative (if applicable)," and the agency on October 19, 2000. Id., Ex. 12. The Denial also stated that the EEOC would presume that the decision was received within five calendar days after it was mailed. Id. The plaintiff did not initiate her action in this Court until May 30, 2002.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires that the plaintiff bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001) (); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F.Supp.2d 15, 18 (D.D.C.1998); Darden v. United States, 18 Cl.Ct. 855, 859 (Cl.Ct.1989). While the Court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), because the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction, the "`plaintiff's factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion' than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police, 185 F.Supp.2d at 13-14 (citation omitted). Finally, the Court notes that in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it is...
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