Kelbach v. McCotter

Decision Date12 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 930252,930252
Citation872 P.2d 1033
PartiesWalter B. KELBACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. O. Lane McCOTTER, Director, Utah Department of Corrections, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Walter B. Kelbach, pro se.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:

Walter B. Kelbach appeals from the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Kelbach claims that he is entitled to the writ on three grounds: (i) he was denied the right to be tried before a representative jury; (ii) the trial court "lost jurisdiction" over him because it did not immediately resentence him to life imprisonment after the United States Supreme Court vacated his death sentence; and (iii) he was improperly sentenced to life imprisonment under a penalty provision not in effect at the time he committed the murders. We affirm.

On December 21, 1966, Kelbach and his companion, Myron Lance, entered a Salt Lake City tavern. A few minutes later, a patron heard a shot and observed Kelbach holding a gun. At about the same time, Lance shot James Sizemore in the head, turned to the bartender, and said, "This is a stick-up." The bartender placed the cash drawer on the bar, and Lance removed the money. Immediately thereafter, a fusillade of shots resounded through the tavern. Patrons Fred Lillie and Beverly Mace died of gunshot wounds; another patron was wounded. Kelbach and Lance fled but were arrested at a roadblock a few hours later. After his arrest, Kelbach was charged with the murders of Sizemore and Lillie. He was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.

Kelbach appealed his conviction and death sentence, and this court affirmed. State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 240, 461 P.2d 297, 303 (1969), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2858, 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). While Kelbach's appeal was pending before the United States Supreme Court, that Court declared unconstitutional a death penalty provision similar to Utah's. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court vacated Kelbach's death sentence and remanded his case to this court. Kelbach v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2858, 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). This court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. State v. Lance, 559 P.2d 543, 543 (Utah 1977). On February 25, 1977, the district court sentenced Kelbach to two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. Kelbach did not appeal the reduction of his sentence from death to life imprisonment.

Kelbach took no further action with regard to his sentence until November 16, 1992, at which time he moved to modify his sentence. After the district court denied his motion, Kelbach filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 On May 10, 1993, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that each of Kelbach's claims was procedurally barred or, in the alternative, without merit.

" 'In considering an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, no deference is accorded the lower court's conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal of the petition. We review those for correctness.' " Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)).

Kelbach challenges his incarceration, claiming that the jury which convicted him was chosen through a discriminatory and constitutionally improper procedure. We conclude that Kelbach waived the right to challenge his conviction on this basis when he failed to object to the composition of the jury at trial.

At the time Kelbach was tried for murder, Salt Lake County utilized a jury selection procedure that limited jury service to real property holders. See Leggroan v. Smith, 498 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir.1974). In 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down this selection procedure as unconstitutional. Id. at 171. Kelbach now asserts that based on Leggroan, he was denied a fair and impartial jury.

Kelbach's reliance on Leggroan is misplaced. The Leggroan court made the scope of its decision clear:

Our decision is so limited in scope ... that its effects will be minimal. It applies only to those persons convicted in Salt Lake County during the period of time the improper jury selection system was used, and is further limited to persons who timely objected to their jury panel, because a defendant, by accepting a jury, waives his right to object to the panel.

Id. (citations omitted). Kelbach failed to object to the composition of his jury. Thus, as the district court properly concluded, Kelbach is not entitled to any relief under Leggroan. Even if there were merit to his Leggroan claim, Kelbach failed to assert that claim on direct appeal, Kelbach, 461 P.2d at 297, and is barred from raising it here.

Kelbach also asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him to life imprisonment after the Supreme Court vacated his death penalty. In so asserting, he relies on section 77-35-1 of the Code, which provides:

After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in jeopardy, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than ten days after the verdict.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953). Kelbach alleges that his sentence is void because the district court lost jurisdiction to resentence him when it failed to act within the time limits set out in section 77-35-1.

As our opinion in State v. Fedder makes clear, the time fixed by section 77-35-1 is not jurisdictional. 1 Utah 2d 117, 120, 262 P.2d...

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8 cases
  • State v. Dawson
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • August 29, 2012
    ...1. Similarly worded statutes were addressed in, among other decisions, State v. Clark 146 Idaho 483, 197 P.3d 796 (2008); Kelbach v. McCotter, 872 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1994); State v. Klein, 200 N.W.2d 288 (N.D.1972); Grant v. McLeod, 325 P.2d 1083 (Okla.Crim.App.1958); People ex rel. Ingber v. ......
  • Miller v. Weaver
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • April 4, 2003
    ...by article I, section 25 of the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); Kelbach v. McCotter, 872 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah 1994). ¶ 30 We affirm the applicable portions of the district court's dismissal on the grounds that the first amended complaint pre......
  • State v. Dawson
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • August 29, 2012
    ...1. Similarly worded statutes were addressed in, among other decisions, State v. Clark, 146 Idaho 483, 197 P3d 796 (2008); Kelbach v. McCotter, 872 P2d 1033 (Utah 1994); State v. Klein, 200 NW2d 288 (ND 1972); Grant v. McLeod, 325 P2d 1083 (Okla Crim App 1958); People ex rel Ingber v. Jackso......
  • State v. Tyree
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • December 14, 2000
    ...under predecessor statutes to Rule 22(a) has consistently been held to be directory and not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Kelbach v. McCotter, 872 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah 1994) ("the time fixed [for sentencing] by section 77-35-1 is not jurisdictional"); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 19......
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