Keller v. Friendly Ford, Inc., 16309

• Decision Date: 10 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. 16309,16309
• Citation: 782 S.W.2d 170
• Parties: Richard D. KELLER, Appellant, v. FRIENDLY FORD, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 170

782 S.W.2d 170

Richard D. KELLER, Appellant, v. FRIENDLY FORD, INC., Respondent.

No. 16309.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Jan. 10, 1990.

Richard D. Keller, pro se.

Christopher J. Stark, Springfield, for respondent.

CROW, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff Richard D. Keller sued defendant Friendly Ford, Inc., for $591.13. Trial before an associate circuit judge sitting as "small claims court," § 482.300.2, ¹ produced a judgment for plaintiff in the amount prayed, plus costs. Defendant filed a timely application for trial de novo. § 482.365.2. The cause was tried anew-- without a jury--before a different associate circuit judge, resulting in judgment for defendant. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff's testimony at the trial de novo ² established that he bought a "new Taurus station wagon" from defendant in late 1986, that during the ensuing months the engine stopped running on numerous occasions during trips to sundry locations, that when such episodes occurred the Taurus was towed to various Ford agencies, and that all efforts by the agencies to correct the problem proved futile.

At the "beginning of the summer" of 1987 plaintiff had to go from his home in Eureka Springs, Arkansas, to Tulsa to bring his daughter home from college. At that time plaintiff's Taurus was at defendant's place of business in Springfield, Missouri, where defendant's mechanics were attempting to identify and fix the defect. At plaintiff's request defendant's new car sales manager, Dan Wise, loaned plaintiff an automobile from defendant's "rental department" for the trip to Tulsa, at no cost to plaintiff.

Defendant's efforts to solve the Taurus mystery were unsuccessful. At that point plaintiff appealed to Ford's "Consumer Appeals Board" for a full refund or replacement of the vehicle "because obviously it was a lemon."

In August, 1987, plaintiff's Taurus was at defendant's place of business, having been left there by plaintiff while he awaited the Board's decision. Plaintiff had "dropped all insurance" on the Taurus because he "was not going to ever take this car back again." Plaintiff's daughter was planning to attend college in Colorado and plaintiff intended to take her there. Other members of plaintiff's family were to accompany them on the trip.

While the evidence as to the date the journey was to begin is ambiguous, we have deduced it was to commence Monday, August 24, 1987. Plaintiff testified that the week before the departure date he telephoned Dan Wise and informed Wise he (plaintiff) could not risk taking the Taurus to Colorado "in the heat of the summer" because of the danger it would break down. Plaintiff testified Wise assured plaintiff he could "have a loaner vehicle" for the journey. Plaintiff testified that the day following this conversation defendant's assistant new car manager, Jay Loveland, phoned plaintiff confirming that the "loaner" would be available for plaintiff to pick up at defendant's place of business on the Monday morning the excursion was to begin.

On the appointed date plaintiff loaded his family, including a baby granddaughter, into an "old clunker" he owned and drove the 85 miles from his home to defendant's place of business. Upon arrival plaintiff learned Dan Wise was out of town. Plaintiff talked to Earl Wise, father of Dan Wise and president of defendant. The elder Wise refused to supply plaintiff a free automobile for the trip to Colorado. Plaintiff testified he then conferred with assistant new car manager Loveland. Loveland, according to plaintiff, went to Earl Wise's office and returned a few minutes later with the report that Wise would not authorize the loan of an automobile to plaintiff. Defendant did offer to rent plaintiff an automobile but plaintiff declined.

At that point, testified plaintiff, he had no choice but to embark for Colorado in his Taurus "and hope and pray it didn't break down on the trip." Plaintiff, with his passengers and baggage, thereupon departed Springfield in the Taurus. When they reached Mission, Kansas, "in the middle of rush-hour traffic" the Taurus stopped running, backing traffic up "about two miles." The Taurus was towed to the nearest Ford agency. There it "started right up," and the mechanics could find no problem with it.

The next day plaintiff and his passengers resumed the journey. Before they got out of town the Taurus stopped running. It was towed to the same Ford agency, where it remained a couple of days. During that interval plaintiff rented a small car from the agency "to run around in while we were there."

On Friday, August 28, 1987, the agency still had not identified the source of the trouble. Plaintiff thereupon rented a van from the agency, used the van for the journey to Colorado, and returned the van to the agency September 2, 1987. At that time plaintiff was informed by the agency's service manager that while plaintiff was gone the manager had discovered that the problem with the Taurus was the distributor cap. The manager replaced it and the Taurus ran flawlessly thereafter.

Upon returning to Springfield in the Taurus plaintiff went to defendant's place of business and demanded of Dan Wise that defendant reimburse plaintiff for the cost of renting the van and the small car in Kansas. Those expenses totaled $591.13. Plaintiff's demand was rejected, precipitating this suit.

The small claims judge--who, it will be recalled, awarded plaintiff the $591.13--set forth his rationale for the judgment in a letter to the parties. The judge found that Dan Wise had indeed promised plaintiff a free vehicle for the Colorado journey. The judge noted that the promise was unsupported by consideration and that such promises are generally unenforceable. However, said the judge, that doctrine is not without exceptions. The judge explained:

"One exception is called the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.' This doctrine says that if the person receiving the promise, though he gives no consideration in return, acts in reliance on the promise to his detriment, then the promise is enforceable. In this case, I believe the plaintiff did act in reliance on the promise. He came up to Springfield in a vehicle which was not capable of taking him on the trip. He made no other arrangements for transportation for this trip, like airline tickets or bus tickets. He loaded up his family and his luggage and headed for Springfield. He did all this while relying on Friendly Ford's promise. These actions were to his detriment since they placed him in a position where his only alternative was to take off in a car which he thought to be unreliable (which proved to be true) and eventually caused him to have to make other rental arrangements (not to mention the lost time ...)."

At the trial de novo plaintiff did not rely on any clause in the warranty on the Taurus in support of his contention that defendant was obliged to provide him a free vehicle for the Colorado trip, nor did plaintiff point to any other contractual provision imposing such an obligation on defendant.

The de novo judge made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, none having been requested. See: Rule 73.01(a)(2). ³ The judgment entered by the de novo judge merely said: "Judgment for Defendant at cost of Plaintiff."

Plaintiff's sole point relied on in this appeal reads:

"The trial court erroneously interpreted or applied the law and erred in reversing the small court claims [sic] judgment for plaintiff, and the judgment is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, in that promissory estoppel was clearly established and applicable. The undisputed evidence was that [plaintiff] was promised and provided a free loaner car for an identical reason in June of 1987, and when his new car still had not been properly repaired in August and could not be counted on for reliable transportation, he relied on [defendant's] promise to provide a substitute loaner car once again under the same conditions and for the same length of time, at no further cost. The uncontradicted evidence thus showed a prior oral contract with identical terms which was performed, and upon which [plaintiff] relied in commencing his trip without making provision for a reliable vehicle due to [defendant's] promise to once again provide a free loaner car. When this promise was refused, plaintiff suffered detrimental and unwarranted delays, anxiety, anguish, and expense."

Plaintiff begins his argument by citing two early decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri--Bates v. Bower, 17 Mo. 550 (1853), and Derrick v. Jewett, 21 Mo. 444 (1855)--for the proposition that when a cause is tried by the court...