Keller v. Keller

• Decision Date: 21 July 1997
• Docket Number: 22503,Nos. 22502,s. 22502
• Parties: Jeffrey E. KELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mina Benton KELLER, Defendant-Respondent. Jeffrey E. KELLER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mina Benton KELLER, Defendant-Appellant. Pocatello, September 1996 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 623

946 P.2d 623

130 Idaho 661

Jeffrey E. KELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mina Benton KELLER, Defendant-Respondent.

Jeffrey E. KELLER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mina Benton KELLER, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 22502, 22503.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Pocatello, September 1996 Term.

July 21, 1997.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing

Nov. 18, 1997.

Swafford Law Office, Chtd., Idaho Falls, for appellant. Ronald L. Swafford argued.

Simpson, Gauchay & Gardner, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Craig W. Simpson argued.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a case involving a petition to modify a child support order and decree of divorce.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Jeffrey Keller (Jeffrey) and Mina Keller (Mina) were married on December 27, 1978. Jeffrey and Mina were divorced on January 7, 1992. Jeffrey and Mina have four minor children.

During Jeffrey and Mina's marriage each of them received extensive amounts of education, Jeffrey received his M.D. and Mina completed an associates degree as well as courses towards a civil engineering degree.

On July 22, 1993, Jeffrey filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) (Petition). On July 30, 1993, Jeffrey filed an amended Petition. Jeffrey's amended Petition asserted that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred since the entry of the divorce decree. Jeffrey's amended Petition requested that the trial court reduce his child support payments and spousal maintenance, and that the court modify other terms set forth in the January 7, 1992 divorce decree.

Jeffrey claimed that he was no longer able to maintain his current work schedule of 80-100 hours per week, which was necessary for him to meet his current financial obligations. If Jeffrey's professional obligations were not reduced, he contended that he was a prime candidate for professional "burnout." Even at Jeffrey's current work load he was behind on his child support payments and had to borrow money to make the majority of the payments to date.

After a three day trial before the magistrate division of the Seventh Judicial District which began on January 25, 1994, the magistrate judge found that Jeffrey had demonstrated a substantial and material change in circumstances. The magistrate judge found

that a substantial and material change has occurred in that the Plaintiff is no longer physically or emotionally able to continue with his present work schedule. The Court is convinced that requiring Plaintiff to do so would likely result in a professional 'burnout.' Because he cannot continue to work as before, his earning power will decrease and as such there is good cause under § 32-709 and Rule 60(b)(5) I.R.C.P. to modify his Divorce Decree as to child support and maintenance provisions.

The magistrate judge found that Jeffrey should be allowed to reduce his Emergency Room shifts to avoid "burnout." The magistrate judge concluded that Mina had no source of income other than the child support and maintenance payments from Jeffrey and that Mina should continue to receive maintenance from Jeffrey in the amount of $800 per month for the next three years to allow Mina to pursue her degree in civil engineering. The magistrate judge found that Jeffrey's child support payments would be $800 per month per child and that Jeffrey would pay additional child support in the amount of fifteen percent of any pre-tax earnings that exceeded $14,000 per month. In addition, the magistrate judge found that Jeffrey was required to pay the childrens' medical insurance and non-insured medical costs, but Jeffrey was allowed a reduction in the amount of life insurance Jeffrey was required to provide for the benefit of the children.

Jeffrey filed a motion requesting the magistrate judge reconsider his order regarding Jeffrey's child support and maintenance obligations. Jeffrey requested the magistrate judge further reduce Jeffrey's child support and maintenance obligations. On April 19, 1994, the magistrate judge, although finding no new change of circumstances, modified his previous order by temporarily eliminating the provision in the original order requiring Jeffrey to pay fifteen percent of his monthly pre-tax income over $14,000. This provision was eliminated only until Jeffrey no longer had to pay Mina's maintenance to pursue her education. The Amended Decree of Divorce did not carry out this decision.

On May 12, 1994, Jeffrey appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision, except with regard to the additional amount in child support of fifteen percent of any pre-tax earnings in excess of $14,000 per month. The district court ruled that an automatic escalation clause was not considered by either party in response to the instant litigation and that there was no direct (nexus) link between Both Jeffrey and Mina appealed to this Court.

the escalation clause and the factors set forth in the Idaho Child Support Guidelines (I.C.S.G.), that are used to determine support where the income level is over $70,000.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing decisions of a magistrate judge, this Court will uphold the magistrate judge's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 958, 855 P.2d 40, 43 (1993). This Court exercises free review over questions of law. Downey Chiropractic Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant Corp., 127 Idaho 283, 285, 900 P.2d 191, 193 (1995). This Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the magistrate judge, and is free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented. Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Washington Power Co., 127 Idaho 432, 435, 901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995); Cluff v. Bonner County, 126 Idaho 950, 952, 895 P.2d 551, 553 (1995). This Court independently reviews the decision of a magistrate judge, with due regard for a district court's decision that was made in an appellate capacity. Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118, 121 (1995).

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Did the magistrate judge err in ordering Jeffrey to pay a percentage of income over a given amount per month in addition to the fixed sum ordered as child support?

2. Did the magistrate judge abuse his discretion and incorrectly apply the law when he awarded child support in excess of $70,000.00 of combined gross income of the parties and required Jeffrey to pay 100% of all medical, dental, optical and orthodontic expenses of the minor children?

3. Did Jeffrey's maintenance obligation, as set forth in the divorce decree, cease upon Mina's remarriage?

4. Did the magistrate judge abuse his discretion in not applying the modified divorce decree to the date of filing of the Petition to Modify?

5. Did the magistrate judge abuse his discretion by failing to award attorney's fees to Mina in answering Jeffrey's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, and is Mina entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 32-704 or I.C. § 12-121?

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

Before addressing the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused his discretion in awarding child support as determined in his decision, we must address one issue:

Was there a substantial, material change of circumstances that had occurred since the entry of the divorce decree justifying the trial court's amendment of child support and medical, dental, optical and orthodontic expenses?

This Court reviews the decision of the trial court and the record on appeal to determine if there is substantial, competent evidence to support a finding that a substantial and material change of circumstances occurred justifying modification of the divorce decree. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 911 P.2d 133 (1996); Osteraas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 350, 859 P.2d 948 (1993).

The trial court found:

Plaintiff has shown physical and emotional signs of an impending "burnout." He has become depressed more frequently; last summer became ill; and is more irritable. Dr. Draper, a friend of the Plaintiff and a psychiatrist, testified that Plaintiff tends to make irrational or unrealistic assessments of his abilities. He opined that unless Plaintiff cut back and reduced his workload and stress level, it was only a matter of time before he would reach the "burnout" phase. Dr. Stieglitz That a substantial and material change has occurred in that the plaintiff is no longer physically or emotionally able to continue with his present work schedule. The trial court is convinced that requiring plaintiff to do so would likely result in a professional 'burnout' because he cannot continue to work as before, his earning power will decrease and as such there is good cause under I.C. § 32-709 and Rule 60(b)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to modify his divorce decree as to child support and maintenance provisions.

his managing partner, has advised Plaintiff that he must cut back on his workload for health reasons. If plaintiff does not voluntarily cut back, the partnership will force him to do so.

The evidence addressed at the trial and the findings of the trial judge support the decision of the trial court that a substantial material change of circumstances had occurred as required by I.C. § 32-709 and Rule 60(b)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

V.

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING JEFFREY TO PAY A PERCENTAGE OF INCOME OVER A GIVEN AMOUNT PER MONTH.

Jeffrey argues that an automatic increment based upon earning above a given level on the part of Jeffrey was beyond the trial court's jurisdiction and authority.

This Court has addressed this matter in the case of Toyama v. Toyama, 129 Idaho 142, 922 P.2d 1068 (1996):

[T]he purpose of I.C. § 32-709 is to minimize the number of occasions when divorce decrees must be disturbed. This purpose is well served by providing for automatic future adjustments in payments, even when the factor upon which the automatic adjustment hinges is...