Kelley v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen

• Decision Date: 28 July 1952
• Citation: 90 A.2d 717,148 Me. 95
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: , 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2079, 22 Lab.Cas. P 67,237 KELLEY et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al. KELLEY et al. v. POIRIER et al.

Page 717

90 A.2d 717

148 Me. 95, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2079,

22 Lab.Cas. P 67,237

KELLEY et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al.

KELLEY et al. v. POIRIER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 28, 1952.

Paul L. Woodworth, Fairfield, for plaintiffs.

Saul H. Sheriff, Portland, for Brotherhood.

Edward H. Wheeler, Brunswick, E. Spencer Miller, Archibald M. Knowles, Portland, for Maine Central Railroad.

Before THATER, FELLOWS, MERRILL and NULTY, JJ.

NULTY, Justice.

The two above entitled cases are before us on appeals from final decrees of the Supreme Judicial Court in Equity for Kennebec County wherein demurrers by the defendants in each case were sustained and the bills dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs in the first case instituted a bill in equity against The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and The Maine Central Railroad Company and filed the same in the Supreme Judicial Court for Kennebec County on February 16, 1946. On the same day a second bill in equity was filed by certain of the plaintiffs named as plaintiffs in the first bill against other various individuals and including the same defendants named in the first bill. The allegations in both bills are essentially the same and from the record it appears that both bills have been regarded throughout their history as cases which will stand or fall on the same pleadings or testimony. The claim of the plaintiffs in each case in so far as it is pertinent to the issue before us is that The Maine Central Railroad Company, a common carrier, maintained prior to 1926, there operating divisions. In that year one division--the Mountain Division--was discontinued and its facilities were merged with those of another division--the Portland Division. The merged division was then divided into two districts. The plaintiffs were employees in the original Portland Division and continued as employees of the Portland District after the merger. The bills further alleged that The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and The Maine Central Railroad Company entered into an agreement dated April 28, 1926, providing, among other things, for seniority rights and also for certain procedures for the laying off of employees and the retention of seniority rights. By an amendment effective March 1, 1930, Art. 53 of said agreement was amended to read as follows:

'Article 53--Trainmen Laid Off. When reducing forces on a district or division, roster rights shall govern. When forces are increased, trainmen will be returned to the service in the order of their roster rights, provided they are again called to the service within one (1) year. Trainmen desiring to avail themselves of this rule must file their address with the proper official at the time of reduction * * *.'

The bills further allege that there was an understanding that said Article 53 in said: agreement concerning the laying off of men would not be enforced because of a severe business and economic depression existing in the country in the early 1930's until normal conditions should again prevail; that the plaintiffs were dropped from the roster on March 2, 1933, and were duly notified but that other men working in other divisions or districts under the same conditions were not laid off or dropped from the roster; that the application of said rule of said agreement gave certain trainmen seniority rights which properly, the plaintiffs claim, belonged to them. The bills also aver generally that the plaintiffs did everything in their power to retain their status and did nothing to forfeit their seniority rights and also state that the plaintiffs in the year 1933 had not paid their dues and were not affiliated with said Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

The defendants in each of the two cases filed certain pleadings which included demurrers for various causes. It appears that the plaintiffs failed to prosecute the bills until July 17, 1951, when a hearing was held on the demurrers. It should be noted that by agreement of the parties the two bills were heard at the same time upon the bills and demurrers with the understanding that only if the demurrers should not be sustained would decision be rendered upon the other pleadings. The sitting justice found that the demurrers assigning laches in each case should be sustained and final decrees in each case issued sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the bills from which decrees the present appeals were taken.

The issue before us is the correctness of the ruling of the sitting justice in sustaining the demurrers on the ground of laches.

We have heretofore considered the effect of a demurrer where on the face of the bill laches appear without any statement of justifiable cause or excuse therefore and we said in Shattuck v. Jenkins, 130 Me. 480, 482, 157 A. 543, 544;

'It is well settled that, where a bill in equity shows such laches on the part of the plaintiff that a court ought not to give relief and no sufficient reasons for the delay are stated, the defendant need not interpose a plea or answer, but may demur on the ground of want of equity apparent on the face of the pleading. Leathers v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96, 101, 79 A. 161, Ann.Cas.1913B, 366; Stewart v. Joyce, 201 Mass. 301, 87 N.E. 613; Snow v. [Boston Bank-Book] Manufacturing Co., 153 Mass. 456, 26 N.E. 1116; Kerfoot v. Billings, 160 Ill. 563, 43 N.E. 804; Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U.S. [391,] 392, 1 S.Ct. 350, 27 L.Ed. 219. * * *

'And it is held that reasons for delay which will excuse gross laches in prosecuting a claim or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights must be set forth with sufficient certainty to apprise the court as to how the pleader or his privies remained so long in ignorance, how and when knowledge of the matters alleged first came to their knowledge and the particular means used to effect the concealment alleged, so that from the pleading itself it may be determined whether by the exercise of ordinary diligence the discovery might not have been before made. Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 U.S. 547, 14 S.Ct. 671, 38 L.Ed. 548; Tetrault v. Fournier, 187 Mass. 58, 72 N.E. 351; 1 Pom.Eq.Rem., 54; 10 R.C.L., 416.'

We have also held that the bringing of suit is not anough to relieve the plaintiffs from the charge of laches. We said in Stewart v. Grant, 126 Me. 195, 201, 137 A. 63, 66:

'The bringing suit is not sufficient, to relieve the plaintiff from the charge of laches. He must prosecute his action with reasonable diligence. Streicher v. Murray, 36 Mont. 45, 92 P. 36; Tinsley v. Rice, 105 Ga. 285, 31 S.E. 176; Thomas v. Van Meter, 164 Ill. 304, 45 N.E. 405. A long and unexplained delay in the prosecution of a suit amounts to laches. Taylor v. Carroll 89 Md. 32, 42 A. 920, 44 L.R.A. 479. A party is as much open to the charge of laches for failure to prosecute a case diligently as for undue delay in its institution. U. S. v. Fletcher, [8 Cir.] 242 P. 818; Sullivan v. Portland & Kennebec R. R., 94 U.S. 811, 24 L.Ed. 324. It has frequently been held that the mere institution of a suit does not of itself relieve from laches. If one fails in the diligent prosecution of his action, the consequences are the same as though no action had been begun. Johnston v. [Standard] Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360, 13 S.Ct. 585, 37 L.Ed. 480.'

We also defined laches in Leathers v. Stewart, supra [108 Me. 96, 79 A. 18]:

'Laches is negligence or omission seasonably to assert a right. It exists when the omission to assert the right has continued for an unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time, and under circumstances where the delay has...