Kelley v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 10 September 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 41637,41637 |
| Parties | Earl R. KELLEY, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. Ruth M. KELLEY, Defendant-in-Error. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The test of the identity of causes of action for the purpose of determining the question of res adjudicata is the identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. It is of the essence of estoppel by judgment, that it be made certain that the precise facts were determined by the former judgment. If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.
Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; A. P. Van Meter, judge.
Action by plaintiff to reform deeds exchanged by him and the defendant, his former wife, in compliance with the decree of their divorce. After judgment sustaining defendant's plea of estoppel by judgment, and the overruling of his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Woodrow McConnell, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Robert D. Crowe, Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
As the parties appear here in the same order in which they appeared in the trial court, they will hereinafter be referred to by their trial court designations.
Plaintiff and defendant were previously the 'plaintiff' and 'defendant' in a divorce action docketed as Cause No. 100,467, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. In the divorce decree entered in said cause on August 19, 1959, the court found, among other things, that the defendant should be granted the divorce on the ground asserted in her cross petition, and that the couple had certain jointly acquired property that should be divided between them. This included a farm in Canadian County, a ranch in Pontotoc County, and an approximate 4-acre parcel of improved real estate at the corner of Oklahoma City's Sixteenth and McArthur Streets, described, by geographical subdivision, as a part of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 27, Township 12 North, Range 4 West, in Oklahoma County, on a part of which their home was located. This parcel of city real estate consisted of four adjoining parts, at least partially separated by fence lines, and used for different purposes, and referred to in the decree as 'tracts'.
In said decree, the court awarded two of these tracts to plaintiff and the other two tracts to defendant, and ordered the two parties to exchange quit claim deeds to effect the property settlement and division prescribed in said decree. The two parts of the 4-acres, that, according to the decree, were to become plaintiff's separate property, were described therein as follows:
'(a) A tract in the Southeast Corner 129 feet North and South by 276.82 feet East and West.
'(b) A tract or lot 129.5 feet East and West by 329.34 feet North and South, being the West lot of the East portion of said tract.'
The two other parts awarded to defendant by the decree were described therein as:
'(1) A tract in the Northwest Corner 200 feet North and South by 276.88 feet East and West.
'(2) The East tract or lot being 129.9 feet East and West by 329.34 feet North and South.'
Within a few days after entry of the above described divorce decree in 1959, the parties exchanged deeds, including one from defendant to plaintiff containing descriptions, by metes and bounds, that conformed to those set forth in the decree opposite '(a)' and '(b)' as shown above.
Thereafter, in October, 1961, the Oklahoma City real estate, here involved, was surveyed. The survey revealed, according to plaintiff, that division of the four acres into the tracts described in the divorce decree has unconscionable and absurd results never contemplated at the time it was ordered. In less than a month thereafter plaintiff filed an application wherein he alleged that:
'* * * the land described in said decree as 'a tract in the Southeast Corner 129 feet North and South by 276.82 feet East and West' does not lie in the Southeast Corner but lies in the Southwest Corner and said description places the North line of the tract awarded to the plaintiff several feet south of a chain link fence and overlays the tract awarded to the defendant which is described in said decree as 'a tract in the Northwest Corner 200 feet North and South by 276.82 feet East and West' which description not only overlays the tract awarded to the plaintiff as aforesaid, but would place the defendant's South line several feet South of said chain link fence and would extend through the approximate center of a twenty-five foot tin garage; * * *.'
After alleging other respects in which the tracts to be exchanged were erroneously described in the divorce decree, and in the deeds executed in conformity therewith, plaintiff's application prayed that, after hearing evidence on the matter, the court enter an order correcting the decree and the deeds, 'to the end that each of the parties may enjoy the property rights awarded to them * * * and intended to be described, but which were erroneously described and incorporated * * *' in the Journal Entry of said decree, and the deeds which followed it.
The evidence introduced at the hearing on plaintiff's application, over defendant's objection that the court then had no jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree, included a deposition by the attorney who had represented plaintiff in the divorce proceedings. In this deposition, the attorney stated, in substance, that, at the time of the divorce proceedings, it was the intention of the parties concerned that one of the tracts plaintiff was to have, with the above mentioned tin garage on it, would extend north to the chain link fence on the southern edge of the family home's yard, and that, on the east, this yard around the home, that was to be defendant's would extend to a retaining wall extending, from north to south, along that side of the home. According to this attorney's deposition, the judge who granted the divorce had unintentionally failed to carry out this plan because he had used incorrect...
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