Kellog v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 8:98CV494 (D. Neb. 2000)
| Decision Date | 01 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 8:98CV494.,8:98CV494. |
| Parties | CLYDE M. KELLOGG v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 22). Defendant contends that there are no material facts in dispute, as plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the American Disabilities Act, (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is qualified to perform his essential job functions as Senior Manager; that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability; that plaintiff cannot establish his claim of breach of contract; and that plaintiff cannot establish a legal basis for punitive damages. Plaintiff asserts that there is ample evidence to support these claims and asks this Court to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done by pointing to the lack of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). When viewing the evidence, all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
The trial court's "function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Rayes v. Eggars, 838 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D.Neb. 1993) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The Eighth Circuit has recognized that primarily legal issues are amenable to summary disposition. See, e.g., Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995); Mumford v. Godfried, 52 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir. 1995); and Crain v. Board of Police Comm'r, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990). Therefore, because some of the issues presented here for resolution are essentially legal in nature, they are subject to summary disposition.
The plaintiff, Clyde Kellogg, was employed by the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad, for approximately 26 years. His job positions included switchman/brakeman in 1973, a conductor in 1978, and he moved into management in 1981. He became a Senior Manager of Intermodal Service Delivery in 1996, overseeing all freight traffic for the defendant's biggest client, American Presidential Lines ("APL"). He was stationed out of and began working in the Harriman Dispatch Center in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1994. From this location, the Union Pacific oversees the operation of the railroad in 23 different states. As senior manager, plaintiff was on call 24 hours per day. He wore a beeper at all times, worked 60-80 hours per week at the office, took numerous calls at home for emergencies, worked many of his days off, and monitored traffic from his computer at home (Ex. 1, Kellogg Depo. 21-23, 27). The defendant acknowledges that senior managers are inherently required to work longer hours and remain available to take customer calls at any time (EX's. A, D, E, and F). Plaintiff contends that his job was an incredibly stressful one. It appears that the defendant had knowledge of the stress experienced by those working in the Harriman Center. A memo from James M. Horrocks, M.D., a fitness consultant for the defendant, stated ". . . the pressure at the dispatch center is particularly high at this time." (Ex. 4, dated 11/12/97).
On September 2, 1997, plaintiff failed to respond to questions and had a blank stare. Believing that the plaintiff was having a heart attack or a stroke, an ambulance was called. Plaintiff was rushed to the hospital, and it was later determined that the plaintiff suffered a severe panic attack. The doctors diagnosed him with major depression and anxiety (Ex. 6, Davis Depo. at 18; Ex. 7, Medical Records.)
Plaintiff was referred to the mental health unit at Richard Young. He was then referred to a psychiatrist, Rodney Nitcher, and he also received counseling from a psychologist, Dale Halpain, Ph.D. He took medication, including Wellbutrin, Paxil and Klonopin, for his depression and anxiety. On September 29, 1997, plaintiff was released to return to work, however, he was restricted to a 40-hour work week and to working during daylight conditions (Ex. H). Defendant contends that it allowed this accommodation, because of the representation from plaintiff's doctor that plaintiff should be able to resume his regular job duties within six weeks (Exhibit J).
Plaintiff was allowed to receive short-term disability benefits by the defendant, and initially the defendant accommodated the plaintiff's work restrictions. The accommodations lasted for approximately one month, when plaintiff had to take additional time off of work so the doctors could adjust his medications. Plaintiff then attempted to return to work with the same restrictions as before. His boss, Mr. Byron Schroeder, indicated that if these restrictions were permanent, plaintiff would not be able to return to his job.
According to the deposition testimony, Mr. Schroeder made an on-the-spot decision that Union Pacific could not accommodate plaintiff's restrictions (Ex. 8, Schroeder Depo. 36-40). Plaintiff contends that Mr. Schroeder did not consult anyone else nor did he consider any other alternatives (Ex. 8, Schroeder Depo. 36-42). Defendant argues that it could not grant these restrictions without waiving an essential function of the senior manager's position, being available to the customer's needs at any time.
Plaintiff then sent letters to the defendant asking that he be allowed to return to work (Ex. 9 and 10). Seven weeks later, on May 5, 1998, plaintiff received from the defendant a standard letter informing him about the short-term disability benefits.
Plaintiff was allowed to remain on medical leave for 18 months. When plaintiff's benefits under the Long Term Disability Income Plan expired, his employment was terminated (Exs. A and L). Plaintiff applied for eight other positions at Union Pacific but was not offered employment for any of the positions for which he applied.
Plaintiff then filed a charge with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC) for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The NEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.
The Court must first address a preliminary issue before addressing the substantive issues alleged in the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that at all times prior to the filing of this lawsuit, including the NEOC investigation, defendant never once raised an issue as to whether the ADA was applicable to this case. However, defendant does raise the defense in this lawsuit. According to the plaintiff, during the NEOC investigation, defendant raised only two defenses: (1) that extending the 40 hours a week accommodation would not be a reasonable accommodation; and (2) that when plaintiff applied for other positions at Union Pacific which he did not receive, there was no discrimination because the defendant just chose better qualified candidates. Not once, states the plaintiff, did the defendant argue that the plaintiff was not covered by the ADA. (See Ex. 15, Response to NEOC charge.) Based on the above, plaintiff urges this Court to apply the doctrine of estoppel to the defendant based on its initial accommodations and its failure to raise the issue at the NEOC level.
The plaintiff offers no support for his contention that the defendant is required to allege all defenses at the NEOC stage of the proceedings. In any event, the Court has reviewed the NEOC charge and response, as well as the defendant's answer and the facts and evidence submitted with this motion, and is of the opinion that the defendant has raised the issue in a timely manner.
Defendant contends that plaintiff is unable to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) he suffered adverse employment action because of the alleged disability. See, Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998); Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is proper if plaintiff fails to establish these claims. Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1998). The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for its decision to refuse to allow plaintiff to continue his position, and if the defendant is able to meet this burden, then the plaintiff must then demonstrate that discrimination was the real reason for the employment decision. Nesser, 160 F.3d at 445.
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot show that he is disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102. "Disability" is defined under the ADA as (1) a physical or...
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