Kellogg v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

• Citation: 504 P.3d 796
• Decision Date: 24 February 2022
• Docket Number: 99724-1
• Parties: Certification from United States District Court Western District of Washington at Tacoma in Mary A. KELLOGG, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Hamre, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

504 P.3d 796

Certification from United States District Court Western District of Washington at Tacoma in Mary A. KELLOGG, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Hamre, Plaintiff,

v.NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION et al., Defendants.

No. 99724-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued: November 16, 2021

Filed: February 24, 2022

Benjamin T.G. Nivison, Rossi Vucinovich, PC, 1000 2nd Ave. Ste. 1420, Seattle, WA, 98104-1033, for Plaintiff.

Timothy David Wackerbarth, Andrew Gordon Yates, Callie Anne Castillo, Lane Powell PC, P.O. Box 91302, 1420 5th Ave. Ste. 4200, Seattle, WA, 98111-9402, for Defendants.

Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, Valerie Davis McOmie, Attorney at Law, 4549 Nw Aspen St., Camas, WA, 98607-8302, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Assoc. for Justice Foundation.

MONTOYA-LEWIS, J.

¶1 James Hamre died when an Amtrak train catastrophically derailed in Dupont, Washington, in 2017. He was survived by his mother, who lived with him, and three adult siblings. Under the wrongful death statutes in effect at the time, James' mother could recover for his wrongful death because she was dependent on him, while his siblings could recover nothing because they did not rely on James financially. Former RCW 4.20.020 (2011). The wrongful death beneficiary statute in effect at that time also denied any recovery to beneficiaries like parents or siblings if they did not reside in the United States. In 2018, one of James' brothers, acting as his personal representative, agreed to a settlement and release with the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, aka Amtrak, on behalf of their mother, the only then qualifying wrongful death beneficiary.

¶2 In 2019, the Washington Legislature amended RCW 4.20.020 to remove the requirement that second tier beneficiaries (parents and siblings) be both dependent on the decedent and residents of the United States. It explicitly stated that the amendment should apply retroactively to claims that are not time barred. In 2020, James' siblings who qualify as beneficiaries under the revised statute brought wrongful death actions against Amtrak. Amtrak argues that retroactive application would violate its contracts clause and due process rights under the Washington Constitution. The federal district court certified two questions to this court to address the issue of retroactivity.

¶3 We conclude that the Washington State Legislature intended the 2019 amendments to RCW 4.20.020 to apply retroactively to permit newly qualified second tier beneficiaries to assert wrongful death claims that are not time barred. The amendments apply retroactively regardless of the tortfeasor's prior release with the personal representative because a claim that does not yet exist cannot be waived. Last, retroactive application of the amendments to RCW 4.20.020 to permit the new claims does not violate the contracts or due process clauses of the Washington Constitution because the new beneficiaries were not party to the release and the tortfeasor has no affected vested right.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Background

¶4 On December 18, 2017, Amtrak train 501 derailed at a trestle near Dupont, Washington. Sixty-one-year-old James Hamre was a passenger on the train and died in the derailment. James had no spouse or children, and he died intestate.¹ He was survived by his mother, Carolyn Hamre, and siblings Thomas Hamre, Mary Kellogg, and Michael Hamre. Carolyn had lived with James, and she was his sole heir.²

¶5 Amtrak admitted fault for the derailment. James' brother Thomas was appointed James' personal representative and administrator of his estate in January 2018, and Thomas entered into a settlement agreement and release with Amtrak in April 2018. The release identified James' estate and Thomas (as personal representative of the estate) as "Releasor" and Amtrak and its employees and agents "Releasees." It stated that Thomas released

[a]ny and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action of every kind, ... for any injuries or damages ... and losses now existing, or which may hereafter arise, whether known or unknown, sustained or received by the Releasor and Decedent James H. Hamre, as a passenger on Amtrak Train 501 ....

By executing this Release, it is Releasor's intention to enter into a final agreement with Releasees, and to ensure that Releasees have no further obligations to Releasor.

Ex. H (release) at 1. It also stated that "[a]nyone who succeeds to Releasor rights and responsibilities is also bound." Id. at 2. Amtrak paid a confidential settlement amount to Thomas, and Carolyn received 100 percent distributive share of James' estate, as his mother and sole heir. It is undisputed that Carolyn was financially dependent on James at the time of his death and that she was the only person eligible to assert a wrongful death claim under the version of the wrongful death statute in effect at that time. Former RCW 4.20.020. At the time, the wrongful death statute set out two tiers of beneficiaries to a wrongful death action: first tier beneficiaries included spouses, registered domestic partners, and children of the decedent; second tier beneficiaries included parents and siblings who were dependent on the decedent for support and resided in the United States at the time of the death. Id. James had no first tier beneficiaries because he had no spouse, domestic partner, or children. His mother was the only qualifying second tier beneficiary.

¶6 In 2019, the legislature passed an act amending Washington's wrongful death statutes, removing the dependency and residency requirements for second tier beneficiaries. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 159, § 2. The legislature also declared, " This act is remedial and retroactive and applies to all claims that are not time barred, as well as any claims pending in any court" as of July 2019. Id. § 6.

¶7 In spring 2020, Mary was appointed successor personal representative to James' estate, and Mary and Michael sought to bring their own wrongful death claims in federal district court as newly eligible second tier beneficiaries. Thomas has not asserted any wrongful death claim on his own behalf.

B. Procedural History

¶8 In July 2020, Mary filed a wrongful death action against Amtrak in federal court on behalf of Michael and herself. Amtrak filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that all claims arising from James' death were covered by the release and that permitting Mary and Michael to proceed with their claims would violate the due process and contracts clauses of the Washington and United States Constitutions.³

¶9 The court denied Amtrak's motion to dismiss and determined that "[t]he application of the new statute in this context presents a novel question of Washington law best resolved by the Washington Supreme Court" and that it would certify questions of local law to this court. Order Denying Mot. To Dismiss & Notifying Parties of Intent To Certify Questions at 10; RCW 2.60.030. The federal court certified the following questions:

1. Is the revised RCW 4.20.020 remedial, such that it applies retroactively to permit second tier beneficiaries who were not eligible to assert wrongful death claims at the time of the decedent's death, or at the time the Estate's Personal Representative settled all claims arising out of the death, to assert wrongful death claims notwithstanding the tortfeasor's settlement with, payment to, and release by, the Personal Representative, so long as such new claims are not time-barred?

2. If so, does the application of the revised RCW 4.20.020 to permit such claims in this context affect Amtrak's vested substantive rights, thus violating the Washington Constitution's Due Process ( Wash. Const., art. I, § 3 ) or Contracts ( Wash. Const., art. I, § 23 ) Clauses?

Order Certifying Questions at 1-2.⁴ The Washington State Association for Justice Foundation (WSAJF) filed a brief of amicus curiae.

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS PRESENTED

¶10 This court may reformulate a certified question.

Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc. , 165 Wash.2d 200, 205 & n.1, 193 P.3d 128 (2008) (plurality opinion); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Wash. Tr. Bank , 186 Wash.2d 921, 931, 383 P.3d 512 (2016). Since retroactive application is not limited to statutes that can be characterized as remedial and the question of vested rights does not entirely resolve the constitutional issues, we reformulate the certified questions as follows:

1. Do the 2019 amendments to RCW 4.20.020 apply retroactively to permit second tier beneficiaries who were not eligible to assert wrongful death claims at the time of the decedent's death to assert new claims that are not time barred, notwithstanding the tortfeasor's prior settlement and release with the personal representative?

2. If so, does the application of the 2019 amendments to RCW 4.20.020 in this context violate the Washington Constitution's due process or contracts clauses, Wash. Const., art. I, §§ 3, 23 ?

¶11 We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

¶12 A federal court may certify a question of local law to the Washington Supreme Court when, in the federal court's opinion, "it is necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in order to dispose of [a] proceeding [pending before the federal court] and the local law has not been clearly determined." RCW 2.60.020. "We treat certified questions as ‘questions of law that we review de novo.’ " Allen v. Dameron , 187 Wash.2d 692, 701, 389 P.3d 487 (2017) (quoting Carlsen v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC , 171 Wash.2d 486, 493, 256 P.3d 321 (2011) ). "We consider the legal issues not in the abstract but based on the certified record provided by the federal court." Carlsen , 171 Wash.2d at 493, 256 P.3d 321.

¶13 We also review the meaning of a statute de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d...