Kells v. Town of Lincoln

• Decision Date: 03 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-239-Appeal.,2004-239-Appeal.
• Citation: 874 A.2d 204
• Parties: Robert T. KELLS v. TOWN OF LINCOLN et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

874 A.2d 204

Robert T. KELLS v. TOWN OF LINCOLN et al.

No. 2004-239-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 3, 2005.

Robert D. Goldberg, Pawtucket, for Petitioner.

James P. Marusak, Providence, for Respondent.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

FLAHERTY, Justice.

Does the charter of the Town of Lincoln permit the town administrator to terminate, without a hearing or just cause, the employment of the Lincoln chief of police? What is the proper process, pursuant to the charter, for removing the chief of police, and has the current town administrator attempted to circumvent that process? These are the essential questions in the defendants' appeal of a Superior Court judgment obtained by the plaintiff, Robert T. Kells, against the Town of Lincoln, by and through its finance director, Stephen Woerner, and current town administrator, Sue P. Sheppard, which enjoined the defendants from removing the plaintiff from his position as chief of police. The defendants contend that the Superior Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, and improperly awarded attorney's fees to him in accordance with G.L.1956 § 9-1-45 for actions arising out of breach of contract. This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 6, 2005, pursuant to an order directing all parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and we will proceed to decide the case at this time. For the reasons stated below, we deny the defendants' appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

The issues in this case center primarily on how certain sections of the Lincoln Town Charter should be applied.¹ Specifically, the parties differ in their interpretations of the procedures governing the removal of the town's chief of police. In November 2001, then Lincoln Town Administrator Jonathan Oster appointed Robert T. Kells to the position of chief of police. Approximately one year later, on November 19, 2002, the Lincoln Town Council ratified an employment contract between Lincoln and Kells. The critical language of the agreement is as follows:

"For application of compensation and benefit purposes only, the term of this employment Agreement is for three years beginning December 1, 2002 and continuing through November 30, 2005. It is understood and agreed that in accordance with Sec. 9-1 of the Charter, the Chief's appointment is for an indefinite term and subject to removal in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."

On January 8, 2003, defendant Shepard,² on her first day in office as the new Lincoln town administrator, fired Kells without cause³ and effective immediately. She also informed him that his contract with the town was void. Later that day, Kells sought and was granted a temporary restraining order preventing defendants from removing him from his position as chief of police or otherwise interfering with him in the performance of his duties.

After defendants answered and counter-claimed for declaratory relief, the parties were heard on December 2, 2003, on cross-motions for summary judgment. The hearing justice in the matter examined both the charter and Kells's contract. He found that the contract neither subverts nor frustrates the charter, nor does it conflict with or contradict the process set out in the charter for removal of employees. The hearing justice declared that under his reading and interpretation of the clear provisions of the charter, the chief of police serves for an indefinite term and cannot be fired at the "whim" of the town administrator, but only "for the good of the service." The justice further found that if the chief is to be terminated, he is entitled to a hearing at which the specific charges motivating termination must be demonstrated. The hearing justice granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and denied that of defendants. He determined that, irrespective of contractual status, the chief of police is entitled to certain substantive and procedural job protections under the charter, that were ignored by defendants in their attempt to remove Kells from office. The hearing justice permanently restrained and enjoined defendants from removing Kells from office, but, crucially, noted that nothing in his order would bar Kells's removal if warranted and if proper procedures were followed.

Kells later filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-45,⁴ which was granted by the court. The defendants have timely appealed the judgment of the trial court, including the award of attorney's fees.

Standard of Review

"It is well settled that this Court reviews the granting of a summary judgment motion on a de novo basis." M & B Realty, Inc. v. Duval, 767 A.2d 60, 63 (R.I.2001) (citing Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc., 682 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I.1996)). "In conducting such a review, we are bound by the same rules and standards as those employed by the trial justice." Id. See Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I.1996)

. "[A] party who opposes a motion for summary judgment carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996). "[W]e will affirm a summary judgment if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Woodland Manor III Associates v. Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I.1998) (quoting Rotelli, 686 A.2d at 93).

Analysis

I The Contract

We first address defendants' contention that Kells's contract with the Town of Lincoln is invalid and unenforceable, and that it impinges upon defendant Sheppard's rights to hire or fire a police chief according to her own desires. We disagree. The plain terms of the Lincoln Town Charter give the town administrator the power to "[n]egotiate contracts on the behalf of the Town subject to the approval of the Town Council." "[W]hen construing a municipal charter, the usual rules of statutory construction apply." Providence Teachers Union Local No. 958 v. Napolitano, 554 A.2d 641, 643 (R.I.1989); see also Coventry School Committee v. Richtarik, 122 R.I. 707, 713, 411 A.2d 912, 915 (1980)

. "It is the accepted rule that the provisions of city charters should be construed so as to give, so far as possible, reasonable meaning and effect to all parts of the section in question. Further, the words used therein should be given their usual and ordinary meaning." Carter v. City of Pawtucket, 115 R.I. 134, 138, 341 A.2d 53, 56 (1975). Thus, giving the words of charter section 6-6 their plain and ordinary meaning, it seems perfectly clear to us that the town administrator may negotiate contracts, subject to a blessing by the town council, including an agreement with the chief of police.

Moving to the terms of the agreement, and the issue of whether Kells's contract impinges upon the present town administrator's rights to appoint and terminate officers and employees, we see no conflict between the contract and the charter.⁵ Of particular concern to defendants is the three-year term of Kells's contract, given that the charter establishes that the chief of police shall be appointed for an "indefinite term." However, by its very terms, the contract both anticipates and resolves any durational issue. The agreement establishes a three-year term, but, critically, specifies that the three-year period is "for application of compensation and benefit purposes only." (Emphasis added.) Addressing the charter provisions, the contract provides that "[i]t is understood and agreed that in accordance with Sec. 9-1 of the Charter, the Chief's appointment is for an indefinite term and subject to removal in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." Thus, despite the three-year term for benefit and compensation purposes, the parties acknowledged that the chief's tenure is for an indefinite period. Despite its recitation of wages, hours, and benefits, nothing in the agreement conflicts with or alters charter provisions relating to the removal of the chief of police. Because the contract is in harmony with the charter provisions, there is utterly no merit to defendants' arguments that it is a void and unenforceable interference with the town charter.

II The Removal Process

The defendants contend that the town administrator has unfettered discretion in the hiring and firing of political appointees who hold policymaking positions in the administration, and that as a result, Sheppard was well within her rights to remove Kells in order to further her own political goals and objectives and those of her administration. However, we do not agree that defendants' argument is applicable in this case. The United States Supreme Court has determined that "politically motivated firings of non-civil-service governmental employees were unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments," but limited such protections to nonpolicymaking employees. Montaquila v. St. Cyr, 433 A.2d 206, 208 (R.I.1981) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)). Several years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) when it held "that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county government. The primary, if not the only, responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual...