Kelly v. Covington

• Decision Date: 16 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. DKC 14-1636
• Parties: CANDICE QUINN KELLY v. ANTHONY B. COVINGTON
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

CANDICE QUINN KELLY v. ANTHONY B. COVINGTON

Civil Action No. DKC 14-1636

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 16, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this defamation case is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Anthony Covington. (ECF No. 6). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are either alleged in Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1), or are matters of public record of which the court may take judicial notice.

Plaintiff Candice Kelly is the former President of the Board of Commissioners for Charles County, Maryland. Defendant Anthony Covington is the current State's Attorney for Charles County. On December 29, 2011, Plaintiff, while serving as President, obtained a copy of an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") W-2 Form that was prepared by the County and issued to aformer County Commissioner who served in the year prior to Plaintiff's election as President of the County Commission. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 22). Plaintiff asserts that she requested the W-2 Form to ascertain whether the County was understating Commissioners' personal use of County-owned vehicles, which is a form of taxable income, and consequently whether Commissioners were receiving a de facto salary increase without any public notice or legislation. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). According to Plaintiff, her request to view the W-2 Form was well within her rights as County Commissioner because she had supervisory rights over County employees' compensation plans and over County property, and additionally, the County has a duty to prepare and submit accurate W-2 Forms. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25).

On April 16, 2012, Defendant and his Deputy State's Attorney began to investigate Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 20). During the course of the investigation, Defendant interviewed several County employees and learned from these interviews that Plaintiff had obtained a former Commissioner's W-2 Form. (Id. ¶ 22). Although a grand jury investigation was conducted, Defendant never charged Plaintiff with any criminal conduct. (Id. ¶ 37). Defendant was advised by the Office of Special Prosecutor not to prosecute Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 32).

On January 7, 2014, Defendant filed a petition with a particular judge, requesting the release of the grand jurytranscripts from the investigation of Plaintiff's conduct. (Id. ¶ 38). The judge, who was a former Deputy State's Attorney of Defendant, had previously participated in the investigation of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 39). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant bypassed the standard judicial procedure for obtaining the order, which required that Defendant file a petition with the clerk of court, in order to ensure that the judge assigned to the motion was unbiased. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40). The judge granted Defendant's petition and issued a judicial order permitting the release of the grand jury transcripts that were generated during the investigation of Plaintiff. (Id.).

On February 5, 2014, Defendant released the grand jury transcripts and made comments to a reporter regarding the grand jury investigation. The comments were later published. Defendant stated that "just because a case is not prosecuted does not mean a crime has not occurred." (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). Defendant also remarked that:

W-2 forms are considered tax information. They are not considered discloseable or releasable. To attempt to get that information is not right unless you're entitled to it. I know Commissioner Kelly has said repeatedly there was no wrongdoing. Well I just gave you what the law is, so I think people can look at the grand jury documents and decide for themselves.

(Id. ¶ 47).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions have "caused substantial damages to Plaintiff Kelly, including damage to her reputation, damage to her ability to perform her job responsibilities . . . , damage to her future income-earning capacity, and damage to her mental health and well-being." (Id. ¶ 57). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. (Id. at 12).

B. Procedural History

On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in this court, asserting federal question jurisdiction, and alleging two counts: (1) a violation of her due process rights (both substantive and procedural) and her right to confrontation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) defamation under Maryland common law. On June 30, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 6). The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 7 and 8).

II. Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4^th Cir. 2006). A complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Rule 8(a)(2)still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). That showing must consist of more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). As recently explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:

[A] complaint must contain "[f]actual allegations [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that a complaint "tender[ing] 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" does not "suffice" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). The Supreme Court has accordingly held that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that "a complaint . . . contain[] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" in the sense that the complaint's factual allegations must allow a "court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Coleman, 626 F.3d at 191 (finding a complaint inadequate because its allegations "fail[ed] to establish a plausible basis for believing . . . that race was the true basis for [the adverse employment action]").

McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dept. of Transp., No. 13-2488 (4^th Cir. March 13, 2015).

At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4^th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4^th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations need not be accepted. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4^th Cir. 1989). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4^th Cir. 1979).

III. Analysis

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim (Count I)

Count I of Plaintiff's complaint alleges a 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim based on Defendant's "abuse of his governmental power" which has allegedly "violated Plaintiff Kelly's Constitutional rights, including her due process rights (both substantive and procedural) and her right to confrontation." (ECF No. 1 ¶ 60). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a suit for damages against any individual "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States orother person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." In order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutional right or some right secured by the laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a state actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendant argues that to the extent Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his official capacity, her Section 1983 claim is barred because he is a state official entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 6-2, at 7). Plaintiff does not appear to understand the difference between official capacity and individual capacity suits:

While "[p]ersonal capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law," official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent" and in essence are "suit[s] against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the entity, a plaintiff can only recover damages from the entity itself, in contrast to a personal-capacity suit, in which a plaintiff can seek a judgment against the official's personal assets. See id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. Furthermore, different legal theories of liability arerequired for the plaintiff, and different defenses are available to the defendant, in a personal-capacity action than in an official-capacity action. See id. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099.

Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 (4^th Cir. 2000). The complaint asserts that Defendant was acting "in his official capacity," yet she disavows any intent to sue the State of Maryland. (ECF No. 7, at 8).¹

In Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 431 (4^th Cir. 1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit discussed...