Kelly v. Foley
| Decision Date | 01 December 1933 |
| Citation | 284 Mass. 503 |
| Parties | THOMAS KELLY, trustee, v. HELEN v. FOLEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 8, 1933.
Present: RUGG, C.
Judgment. Trustee Process.
Practice, Civil Appellate Division: jurisdiction, report; Discharge of trustee; Entry of judgment; Rule 34 of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston (1932). Jurisdiction. Words, "Ripe for judgment.
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The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of a district or a municipal court is confined to questions of law raised before the action is ripe for judgment and does not extend to matters raised after the entry of a valid judgment; and therefore an appellate division has no jurisdiction of a petition to establish a report which seeks to raise questions relating to rulings made after what the petitioner contends is the entry of a final judgment in the action.
Where the entries on the docket of a municipal court respecting an action begun by trustee process disclosed at 10 A.M. on a Friday that the defendant had been defaulted, that claims by adverse claimants to funds admitted by the alleged trustee to be in his hands had been heard by the judge and decision thereon had been reserved, and that the plaintiff had discharged the trustee, the action was not "ripe for judgment" within the provisions of Rule 34 of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston
(1932), and a judgment for the plaintiff then entered by the clerk was invalid.
While one, who has filed a claim to funds in the hands of an alleged trustee in an action begun by trustee process, has no right to a judgment in his favor against the trustee, the defendant, or another claimant, or, except for costs, against the plaintiff, he has a right to an adjudication of the matter of his claim which will become res judicata binding the other parties to the proceeding, and neither the plaintiff nor another party, after the claim has entered upon a hearing, is free to deprive him of that adjudication without his assent or an order of the court: he is entitled to a record of an adjudication respecting his right.
A court after entry of a final judgment has jurisdiction to correct errors of its clerk.
In the action and in the circumstances above described, it was proper for the judge, before whom the claims to the fund in the possession of the alleged trustee were heard, to grant a motion presented by the adverse claimant five days after the entry by the clerk upon the docket of judgment for the plaintiff that there be entered upon the docket, nunc pro tunc as of 9:30 A.M. on the Friday in question, the fact that at that time a finding had been made for the adverse claimant.
A report of a judge of a district court under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231,
Section 108, is the report of the trial judge, although the rules of the court may require preparation of a draft report by the party requesting the report; and the judge has authority and a duty to include in such a report all material facts bearing upon questions of law raised by the claim for a report.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated August 18, 1932.
Proceedings in the Municipal Court before Adlow, J., are described in the opinion.
H. R. Donaghue, for the plaintiff.
G. A. Stavros, (B.
L. Schwalb with him,) for the claimants.
This is an appeal from orders of an appellate division denying a petition to establish a report and dismissing a report.
Thomas Kelly trustee, brought an action by trustee process in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston against Helen V. Foley on a promissory note and summoned The Atlantic National Bank of Boston, The First National Bank of Boston and The National Shawmut Bank of Boston as trustees. The First National Bank of Boston answered funds in the names of Helen V. Foley, Helen V. Foley, agent, and Helen V. Foley, trustee. On September 27, 1932, a petition was filed by Nora and Katheryn C. Donoghue claiming the funds standing in the name of Helen V. Foley, trustee, alleging ownership of such funds, praying that the attachment be discharged as to such funds and that the claim be sustained. On the same day Sewall W. Abbott and others, trustees under the will of John Brewster, filed their petition alleging ownership of the funds in The First National Bank of Boston standing in the name of Helen V. Foley, agent, and praying that the attachment as to these funds be discharged and their claim be sustained. The defendant was defaulted on October 3, 1932, when the action appeared on the trial list. Defendant's motion to discharge the trustee was denied. The claimants' petitions were heard by a judge of the court on November 16 and 17, 1932. The judge reserved his decision. On November 18, 1932, at 9:50 A.M. the plaintiff discharged the trustees, and at ten o'clock judgment was entered for the plaintiff on his note. On November 23, 1932, the claimants filed a motion that a finding on their claimants' petitions be made as of Friday, November 18, 1932, at 9:30 A.M. The judge allowed the motion to be filed and allowed the motion. The plaintiff before argument filed requests for rulings of which the judge granted, (2) "The judgment entered by this honorable court was in conformity with the General Laws," and (4) "The plaintiff as a matter of law has an absolute right to discharge the trustee at any time." No objection nor request for report on the granting of these requests was made. The judge denied the other requests for rulings. On November 25, 1932, the plaintiff duly claimed a report. A draft report setting out the foregoing was presented for his signature to the judge who refused to sign it; but signed a report containing, in addition, statements that on November 18, before the opening of the court at 9:30 A.M., the judge made findings establishing the claimants' petitions and handed them to the assistant clerk who did not file them with the clerk until after 10 A.M. when, it appearing that the trustees had been discharged and the case gone to judgment, nothing further was done by the clerk with regard to the findings. The plaintiff contends that the judgment entered at 10 A.M. on November 18 was a final judgment and that, thereafter, the judge had no jurisdiction over the case. He further urges that since the judge ruled, without exception or request for report, that the plaintiff had an absolute right to discharge the trustee at any time and that the judgment entered was in conformity with the General Laws, those rulings have become the law of this case and, as a result, establish his contention that the judgment is final.
The essential question for decision is whether the judgment entered put an end to authority of the court to act further in the case. A preliminary question, however, is presented -- whether the Appellate Division had jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiff's petition for establishment of the draft report rejected unless as amended by the trial judge, and for any report. The question of jurisdiction may be raised by the court itself, and here the Appellate
Division did so. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 108, provides: "Any party to a cause brought in the municipal court of the city of Boston . . . aggrieved by any ruling on a matter of law by a single justice, may, as of right, have the ruling reported for determination by the appellate division when the cause is otherwise ripe for judgment, or sooner by consent of the justice hearing the same." The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division is, therefore, confined to questions of law raised before the case is ripe for judgment and does not extend to matters raised after the entry of a valid judgment. The validity of the judgment entered on November 18 is, thus, the test of the jurisdiction here. All that is challenged by the plaintiff's petition or report took place after the entry of that judgment. He has mistaken his remedy, if the judgment is, as he contends it to be, a valid judgment. See Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Creditors National Clearing House, 235 Mass. 114 , and Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Creditors National Clearing House, Inc. 237 Mass. 505 .
The judgment however, is not valid. The statute G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 235, Section 2, and Rule 34 of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston (1932) provide that judgment in civil actions and proceedings ripe for judgment shall be entered by the clerk, unless the party entitled thereto otherwise requests in writing and the court otherwise orders, at ten o'clock in the forenoon of Friday of each week; or at any time on notice and motion in a case ripe for judgment. As stated in the case of the Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Creditors National Clearing House, Inc., just cited (237 Mass. 505 , 507), it is not easy to give a definition universally applicable to "ripe for judgment." One sufficiently broad is there quoted from American Wood Working Machinery Co. v. Furbush, 193 Mass. 455 , 457: "when, under the last entry, the case seems to have been brought to a final determination, and everything seems to have been done that ought to be done before the entry of a final adjudication upon the rights of the parties." Within that definition the case before us was not ripe for judgment. See Norcross v. Crabtree, 161 Mass. 55 . In Bennett v. Powell, ante, 246, 248, more than a year had elapsed after entry of judgment and thereby a further statutory provision...
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