Kelly v. Marcantonio

• Decision Date: 03 May 1999
• Docket Number: 98-2137,Nos. 98-1438,98-1542,98-1533,98-1439,s. 98-1438
• Citation: 187 F.3d 192
• Parties: (1st Cir. 1999) MICHAEL E. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. STEPHEN B. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. MICHAEL E. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, Defendant, Appellee. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. STEPHEN B. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, Defendant, Appellee. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. KENNETH SMITH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WILLIAM C. O'CONNELL, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. KENNETH SMITH, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. WILLIAM C. O'CONNELL, ET AL., Defendant, Appellee. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. , and 98-2138. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 192

187 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1999)

MICHAEL E. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.

STEPHEN B. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.

MICHAEL E. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, Defendant, Appellee.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants.

STEPHEN B. KELLY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ROBERT MARCANTONIO, Defendant, Appellee.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants.

KENNETH SMITH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WILLIAM C. O'CONNELL, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.

KENNETH SMITH, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. WILLIAM C. O'CONNELL, ET AL., Defendant, Appellee.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP, ET AL., Defendants, Appellants.

Nos. 98-1438, 98-1439, 98-1533, 98-1542, 98-2137, and 98-2138.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Heard May 3, 1999.

Decided Aug. 6, 1999.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Richard C. Bicki, with whom Susan E. McGuirl, Cerilli, McGuirl & Bicki, Lise Iwon and Laurence & Iwon were on brief, for appellants Michael E. Kelly and Stephen B. Kelly.

Carl P. DeLuca for appellant Kenneth Smith.

Thomas R. Bender, with whom James T. Murphy, Hanson, Curran, Parks & Whitman and William T. Murphy were on brief, for appellees Roman Catholic Bishop, et al.

Gerald C. DeMaria, with whom Paul S. Callaghan and Higgins Cavanagh & Cooney, LLP were on brief, for appellee Robert Marcantonio.

Charles Wilson, with whom William T. Murphy, James T. Murphy, Thomas R Bender and Hanson, Curran, Parks & Whitman were on brief for defendants.

Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

In these consolidated cases, plaintiff-appellants Michael Kelly, Stephen Kelly, and Kenneth Smith seek to recover damages for alleged sexual abuse they suffered when they were minors. Plaintiff-appellants allege that the perpetrators of this sexual abuse were priests serving in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Providence, Rhode Island. The defendant-appellees are the priests, Father Robert Marcantonio ("Marcantonio") and Father William C. O'Connell ("O'Connell"), various diocesan officials, and the churches to which the priests were assigned (collectively, the "hierarchy defendants"). Plaintiff-appellants appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendant-appellees on the ground that plaintiff-appellants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The hierarchy defendants also appeal, challenging the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss on the ground that adjudication of the claims asserted against them would violate the religious autonomy principle rooted in the First Amendment.

BACKGROUND

Because these appeals focus on the specific issues of whether plaintiff-appellants' claims of childhood sexual abuse are time-barred, and whether the First Amendment precludes the district court from adjudicating the claims asserted against the hierarchy defendants, it is not necessary to provide a complete account of the allegations set forth in the complaints. We will, however, sketch the facts central to the issues before us.

In their consolidated cases, plaintiff-appellants seek to recover damages under various state law tort theories for the alleged sexual abuse they suffered when they were minors. In addition to the claims asserted against the priest-perpetrators, plaintiff-appellants assert various claims sounding in negligence and vicarious liability against the non-perpetrator hierarchy defendants.

Specifically, plaintiff-appellant Kenneth Smith alleges that he was sexually abused by O'Connell during the period between 1972 and 1977 while he was in high school. Plaintiff-appellants Stephen and Michael Kelly allege that they were sexually abused by Marcantonio. Stephen alleges that the assaults on him took place between 1975 and 1981, and Michael alleges that he was assaulted between 1981 and 1985. Plaintiff-appellants further allege that the hierarchy defendants knew that O'Connell and Marcantonio previously had committed sexual assaults and that the hierarchy defendants not only failed to disclose this information, but also engaged in a "cover-up" after the fact by transferring the priests to different parishes. All three plaintiff-appellants filed their lawsuits in 1993 -- more than eight years after the alleged abuses occurred.

Prior to 1992, the statute of limitations set forth in § 9-1-14(b) applied to all claims of childhood sexual abuse. It requires all "actions for injuries to the person" to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.¹ See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b). Under § 9-1-14(b), a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues on the date of injury. See Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 877 (R.I. 1996).

In its 1993 legislative session, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted § 9-1-51, which enlarged the statute of limitations period for claims against perpetrators² of childhood sexual abuse. See id. at 876. Section 9-1-51 permits an action against the perpetrator to be brought up to seven years after the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the abuse occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51(a). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held, however, that § 9-1-51 may not be applied retroactively to revive claims previously time-barred as of July 25, 1993, the effective date of the legislation. See Kelly, 678 A.2d at 882, 883. It is undisputed that all of plaintiff-appellants' claims were time-barred prior to the effective date of § 9-1-51. Therefore, the seven-year statute of limitations contained in § 9-1-51 does not apply here.

To avoid dismissal under § 9-1-14(b), plaintiff-appellants rely primarily upon two separate tolling theories. The first is contained in § 9-1-19, which tolls the period of limitations with respect to persons of "unsound mind." Section 9-1-19 provides, in relevant part:

If any person at the time any such cause of action shall accrue to him or her shall be . . . of unsound mind . . . the person may bring the cause of action, within the time limited under this chapter, after the impediment is removed.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-19. Plaintiff-appellant Smith argues that his inability to remember the alleged sexual assaults by Fr. O'Connell until sometime in 1991 or 1992 qualifies as a tolling feature under the "unsound mind" provision, thus saving his claims from dismissal. Plaintiff-appellants Stephen and Michael Smith make a slightly different argument. The Smiths claim that although they have been conscious of the assaults on them ever since they occurred, they did not appreciate their wrongful nature until sometime in 1991 because Fr. Marcantonio informed them that such assaults were part of their religious training in sexuality. The Smiths contend that they were of "unsound mind" up until the time they realized the wrongful nature of Fr. Marcantonio's advances, and thus their claims against Fr. Marcantonio are also preserved.

The second tolling provision upon which plaintiff-appellants rely is contained in § 9-1-20. Section 9-1-20 postpones accrual of a cause of action that has been fraudulently concealed:

If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-20. Plaintiff-appellants assert that the hierarchy defendants' failure to disclose their knowledge of prior sexual misconduct by both O'Connell and Marcantonio constitutes fraudulent concealment within the meaning of § 9-1-20. Thus, plaintiff-appellants contend that the period of limitations on their claims against the hierarchy defendants did not begin to run until they first discovered the hierarchy defendants' prior knowledge and concealment. Plaintiff-appellants Stephen and Michael Kelly also rely on § 9-1-20 to preserve their claims against Fr. Marcantonio. The Kellys assert that Fr. Marcantonio fraudulently concealed the existence of their causes of action against him by falsely representing that his sexual assaults constituted religious training in sexuality. Thus, the Kellys contend that their causes of action against Fr. Marcantonio did not accrue until they first discovered the falsity of these representations.

DISCUSSION

Before we can delve into the issues raised in this appeal, we must first determine the order in which we must proceed. As noted supra, in response to the claims asserted against them, the hierarchy defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the religious autonomy principle rooted in the First Amendment precluded the district court from adjudicating the claims asserted against them. Throughout this litigation, both parties have characterized the hierarchy defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Whether the defendants' motion involves subject matter jurisdiction at all is a debatable point, but we will accept, arguendo, the parties' characterization. Therefore, on appeal, the first question we must resolve is whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), requires us to address the hierarchy defendants' First Amendment argument before considering the merits of plaintiff-appellants' claims.

In Steel Co., the Supreme Court declared that courts should generally determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's claim. See 523 U.S. at 92, 96. In its opinion, however, the Court narrowly used the term "subject matter jurisdiction," making a clear distinction between Article III subject matter jurisdiction and other sources...