Kelly v. Marcantonio

• Decision Date: 11 July 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 94-727-A,s. 94-727-A
• Citation: 678 A.2d 873
• Parties: Michael E. KELLY et al. v. Robert MARCANTONIO et al. Daniel HEROUX et al. v. Robert CARPENTIER et al. ppeal, 95-39-Appeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 873

678 A.2d 873

Michael E. KELLY et al. v. Robert MARCANTONIO et al.

Daniel HEROUX et al. v. Robert CARPENTIER et al.

Nos. 94-727-Appeal, 95-39-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 11, 1996.

John A. MacFadyen; Susan E. McGuirl, Providence; Lise M. Iwon, Wakefield, R. Daniel Prentiss, Providence, Richard A. Cappalli, Woodsocket; Carl P. DeLuca, Providence; Mitchell S. Riffkin, Warwick; Paul P. Baillargeon, North Smithfield, Arlene Violet, East Providence, and Denis L. Ventriglia, Wilmington, N.C., for Plaintiff.

James T. Murphy; Thomas R. Bender; William T. Murphy, Robert J. Quigley, Jr., James P. Marusak, Raymond A. LaFazia, James J. McKenna, Providence, for Defendant.

Carolyn A. Mannis, Providence, Thomas A. Pavlinic, for Amicus Curiae.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

This matter comes before us by submission of three certified questions from the Honorable Ernest J. Torres, a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, and four certified questions from the Honorable Richard J. Israel of the Rhode Island Superior Court. ¹ The request is made by the United States District Court pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The request made by the Superior Court is pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-24-27.

There is litigation now pending in both the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Superior Court arising out of the alleged sexual molestation of minors by priests of the Catholic Church. In addition to the claims made against the priest-perpetrators, the victims of the molestation also assert claims sounding in negligence and vicarious liability against various Church-employers of the accused priest-perpetrators, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence and other nonperpetrator-agents of the Diocese of Providence. ² As a result of these claims, the following four questions have been certified to the justices of this court for our opinion:

1. "Is the time within which a claim must be brought for injury resulting from sexual abuse of a minor governed by R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-51 or R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-14(b) when the claim is asserted against someone other than the alleged abuser?"

2. "If § 9-1-14(b) governs, does the claimant's cause of action accrue

(a) at the time the abuse occurs; or,

(b) at the time the resulting injury first manifests itself; or,

(c) at the time the victim becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware that he was abused, or

(d) at the time the victim becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware that the injury was caused by the abuse, or

(e) at some other time."

3. "Does the inability to recall incidents of sexual abuse constitute a disability that extends the time within which claims for resulting injury may be brought pursuant to the provisions of § 9-1-19 or otherwise?"

4. "Assuming that § 9-1-51, and not § 9-1-14(b), is pertinent to any claim alleged by any plaintiff, may § 9-1-51 extend or enlarge any limitation period applicable to that claim, as to which an otherwise applicable limitation period had already run prior to the effective date of § 9-1-51, without violating the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island?"

I Is the Time within Which a Claim for Injury Resulting from Sexual Abuse of a Minor Governed by § 9-1-51 or § 9-1-14(b) When the Claim Is Asserted against Someone Other Than the Alleged Abuser?

The first certified question presented to this court asks us to determine whether claims for injuries resulting from the sexual abuse of a minor are governed by G.L.1956 § 9-1-51, as amended by P.L.1993, ch. 274, § 1 or G.L.1956 § 9-1-14(b) when those claims are asserted against someone other than the alleged abuser.

Section 9-1-51 reads in pertinent part as follows:

"(a) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within seven (7) years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or seven (7) years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act, whichever period expires later.

"(b) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or exploitation incidents cause the injury complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of the last act by the same perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation.

" * * *

"(e) As used in this section, 'childhood sexual abuse' means any act committed by the defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been a criminal violation of chapter 37 of title 11." (Emphasis added.)

The General Assembly did not specifically include in § 9-1-51 a cause of action against nonperpetrator-defendants. Although it did not explicitly limit the statute's application only to perpetrator-defendants, the language used by the General Assembly permits no other interpretation. When the General Assembly defines a word or a phrase used in its enactment, that definition is binding upon this court. Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I.1983); Town of Scituate v. O'Rourke, 103 R.I. 499, 512, 239 A.2d 176, 184 (1968); Broadway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asselin, 93 R.I. 403, 406, 176 A.2d 714, 716 (1961). When one reads the definition contained in § 9-1-51(e) together with the main body of that statute, the rule that emerges is that all actions brought pursuant to § 9-1-51 must be based on the intentional conduct of "the " defendant-perpetrator.

Subsection (e) of § 9-1-51, in which the General Assembly defines "childhood sexual abuse," reads,

"As used in this section, 'childhood sexual abuse' means any act committed by the defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been a criminal violation of chapter 37 of title 11."

Thus, the only intended target of the legislation is the person who at the time of the abuse would have been subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to chapter 37 of title 11 of our General Laws. That person under our law can only be the person who actually commits the criminal sexual act, namely, the perpetrator, and not his or her employer or supervisor, unless that employer or supervisor actually aids and assists in the commission of the criminal act to the degree that he or she would be subject to prosecution under chapter 37 of title 11 as a principal. The statute's definition of "childhood sexual abuse" dictates that only violators of chapter 37 of title 11, actual perpetrators, can be defendants under § 9-1-51 because by using "the" as opposed to "a" when referencing defendants, the Legislature limited the class of potential defendants subject to § 9-1-51. See, e.g., Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 862 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo.1993). That strict interpretation of the General Assembly's language is consistent with our mandate to strictly construe such legislation as the § 9-1-51 discovery rule that is in derogation of the common law. In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488 (R.I.1992). At common law there was no discovery rule. Our interpretation of § 9-1-51 we find consistent with interpretations of similar statutes by other state courts.

In Debbie Reynolds Professional Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.4th 222, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 514 (1994), the statute at issue provided that:

"(a) In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.

(b) 'Childhood sexual abuse' as used in this section includes any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and which act would have been proscribed by [the applicable California penal code section] * * *." 25 Cal.App.4th at 230, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 518. (Emphasis added.)

The California court interpreted that statute as applying only to actions against perpetrators, explaining that "[t]he obvious goal of amended section 340.1 is to allow sexual abuse victims a longer time period in which to become aware of their psychological injuries and remain eligible to bring suit against their abusers. Nothing contained within the Legislative history suggests that section 340.1 was intended to apply to 'related, ancillary' causes of action such as those asserted against petitioner." 25 Cal.App.4th at 232-33, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 520.

The court further noted that to interpret the statute as applying to claims made against nonperpetrator-defendants would be to "assume that our Legislature chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an important and easily expressed message." Id. at 232, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 519. The California court declined to adopt that strained interpretation. We do likewise.

Section 9-1-51 of our General Laws is similar in all material respects to the California statute reviewed in Debbie Reynolds. The only difference between the statutes is that the California statute does not limit actions to those "based on intentional conduct" as does the Rhode Island statute. That difference, if relevant at all to this court's response to the certified question, supports the reading of our statute as applying only to the actual perpetrators because our statute is worded more strictly than the California statute. See also Hawley v. Kenley, 261 Ill.App.3d 307, 199 Ill.Dec. 420, 634 N.E.2d 20 (1994).

We note additionally...