Kelly v. State
| Decision Date | 30 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 30A01–1112–CR–584.,30A01–1112–CR–584. |
| Citation | 973 N.E.2d 110 |
| Parties | Danielle KELLY, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court; The Honorable Richard D. Culver, Judge; Cause No. 30C01–1009–FA–209.
James W. McNew, Jon A. Keyes, Allen Wellman McNew, Greenfield, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Danielle Kelly was charged with dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park or youth program center, both Class A felonies, following a search of a vehicle in which Kelly was a passenger. Kelly brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress, raising the following issues for our review: 1) whether the search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 2) whether the search violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; and 3) whether incriminating statements Kelly made to police officers should be suppressed. Concluding the search and seizure did not violate either the federal or state constitutions and Kelly's post- Miranda statements are admissible, we affirm the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress.
On September 15, 2010, Sergeant Michael Fuller with the Fortville Police Department responded to a call from Carolyn Goodwin who was known to Sergeant Fuller because she had previously been the victim of a crime. Although she had on occasion contacted police to report various crimes, she had never been used as a confidential informant by police. Sergeant Fuller went to Goodwin's home where she told him that, “to help clean up her community,” transcript at 10, she had arranged for an Indianapolis dealer who had sold cocaine to her friends in and around Fortville to bring cocaine to her house, but that she was afraid of what would happen when he arrived and she had no money to purchase the cocaine. She feared he might have a weapon. She expected the dealer, who she described only as an African American man, to arrive within fifteen minutes. While Sergeant Fuller was at Goodwin's home, she received several phone calls. From overhearing Goodwin's part of the conversations, it was apparent to Sergeant Fuller that the male caller was seeking directions to her house. Sergeant Fuller requested assistance from officers in his department. A vehicle arrived at Goodwin's home within the approximate time frame Goodwin had stated the dealer was expected. Police met the vehicle, driven by an African American man and carrying a passenger, with their guns drawn. Both the driver and Kelly, the passenger, were immediately ordered out of the vehicle and handcuffed. The vehicle was Kelly's; the driver was her cousin. While they were being interviewed, officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle prior to impounding it. During the inventory search, they discovered cocaine in a hollowed-out screwdriver. During the police interview of Kelly, she was asked if she knew about the cocaine in the car and admitted that she did. After she made this statement, Kelly was advised of her Miranda rights. She subsequently repeated her admission that she was aware of the cocaine.
The State charged Kelly with dealing in cocaine within one thousand feet of a public park or youth program center and possession of cocaine in an amount greater than three grams within one thousand feet of a public park or youth program center, both Class A felonies. Kelly filed a motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine found in the search of the vehicle as well as her incriminating statements, alleging both were obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the trial court entered the following order:
This matter was submitted to the Court on the issue of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. And the Court, after being duly advised in the premises, finds that said Motion should be granted in part and denied in part. The Court denies the [D]efendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence with exception of statements by Danielle Kelly after she was handcuffed and prior to the Miranda warnings. Subsequent statements, after being Mirandized, are not suppressed.
Appellant's Appendix at 72. Kelly sought and was granted certification of the trial court's order, and this court accepted jurisdiction of her interlocutory appeal.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind.2008).
Kelly first contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the warrantless seizure of herself and her vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part, “The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” A lawful search generally requires a judicially-issued search warrant. Wilson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and the State therefore bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.
There are three levels of police investigation, two of which implicate the Fourth Amendment. An arrest or detention for more than a short period must be justified by probable cause. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers are sufficient to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that an offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it. Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)). Second, it is well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Accordingly, limited investigatory stops and seizures on the street involving a brief question or two and a possible frisk for weapons can be justified by mere reasonable suspicion. Id. When a law enforcement officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen which involves neither an arrest nor a stop, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Id.
Here, Kelly was ordered out of the car by officers with guns drawn and immediately handcuffed when the vehicle in which she was a passenger arrived at Goodwin's house. See Tr. at 19 ). This was not a “casual or brief inquiry,” nor was it a “limited investigatory stop[ ] ... involving a brief question or two.” Kelly was seized when her freedom of movement was restrained by a show of authority immediately upon her arrival. Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. Therefore, her detention and the ensuing search must be supported by probable cause and authorized by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The pertinent inquiry regarding probable cause is whether the facts and circumstances at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect is committing or had committed a crime. Conwell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 764, 766–67 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The action here was precipitated by Goodwin's call to police. In Pawloski v. State, 269 Ind. 350, 380 N.E.2d 1230 (1978), our supreme court considered whether probable cause for an arrest existed on the basis of a tip to police. The court first noted that an informant's reliability must be established before a finding of probable cause can be made. Id. at 353, 380 N.E.2d at 1232. There are two categories of informants: professional informants or anonymous tipsters and concerned or cooperative citizens. Id. at 354, 380 N.E.2d at 1232. The reliability of professional informants or anonymous tipsters “must be established by reference to underlying facts and circumstances which indicate that the information is trustworthy ... because information of this type may be unreliable or self-serving....” Id. When a citizen volunteers information to the police, there may be more reason to believe that the information is reliable because informants who come forward voluntarily are ordinarily motivated by good citizenship or a genuine effort to aid law enforcement officers in solving a crime. Id. The court noted that “[s]ome jurisdictions have therefore held that informants of this type are to be considered reliable for the purpose of determining probable cause unless incriminating circumstances exist which cast suspicion upon the informant's reliability.” Id. at 354, 380 N.E.2d at 1232–33....
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