Kelsey v. State
| Decision Date | 03 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 49256,49354.,49256 |
| Citation | 283 NW 2d 892 |
| Parties | Dwight W. KELSEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, State ex rel. Frank Wood, Warden, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Dwight W. Kelsey, pro se.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Jane Prohaska, and Gary Hansen, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, and Linda Matthews Britton, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, John O. Sonsteng, President, and Stephen J. Askew, Minnesota County Attorneys Council, St. Paul, Delaney & Thompson, Peter J. Thompson, and John W. Lundquist, Minneapolis, National Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., Monte M. Miller, Minneapolis and Stanley E. Karon, St. Paul, Minnesota Trial Lawyers Assn., for respondents.
Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
Petitioner is serving a 10-year indeterminate prison term at Stillwater for attempted first-degree murder. These combined pro se appeals1 are from two separate orders of the Washington County District Court dismissing without hearings petitions of petitioner for habeas corpus. In the one petition (our File No. 49256) petitioner sought release on the ground that he was wrongfully denied a pretrial evidentiary hearing prior to the 1971 trial. The court dismissed this petition because (a) it did not comply with the requirement of Minn.St. 589.04(4) that a copy of the warrant of commitment be attached to the petition, and (b) a petition for habeas corpus will only reach matters relating to the jurisdiction of the trial court, not trial errors. In the other petition (our File No. 49354) petitioner sought release primarily on the ground that the corrections board acted unlawfully in denying his parole. The court dismissed this petition because the decision to grant or deny parole is a matter that rests in the discretion of the corrections board and is not subject to review by habeas corpus.
We have no hesitancy in holding that the district court properly dismissed the petition in File No. 49256, which basically was an attempt by petitioner to use habeas corpus as a means of obtaining review of trial errors. Direct appeal and the postconviction remedy — both of which petitioner has used — are available for that purpose and the need for another means of raising the claim of trial error is therefore not apparent.
We have had more difficulty in deciding the issue presented by the appeal in File No. 49354 and have sought and received amicus briefs from a number of parties and a supplemental brief by the state. The issue is whether state habeas corpus — or some other remedy — should be made available as a means of reviewing allegations of failure of parole authorities to follow applicable statutory and constitutional principles in denying parole. We conclude that state habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for this purpose in the absence of an amendment of the postconviction remedy statute to permit the postconviction remedy to be used for this purpose.
The traditional view was that the decision to grant parole was an act of grace by the parole authorities that was not subject to judicial review. However, in State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612 (Minn.1978), we held that parole release decisionmaking must be conducted in accordance with due process. Accordingly, some judicial remedy must be made available to ensure the legal adequacy of procedures followed by parole authorities in denying parole.
The general rule in Minnesota has been that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy if the relief to which the petitioner may be entitled is immediate release from confinement and if the petitioner is not confined pursuant to a final judgment of a competent court having jurisdiction over him. Thus, habeas corpus would not be available to a prison inmate who was confined pursuant to a final judgment unless the inmate challenged the jurisdiction of the court rendering the final judgment or the legality of his sentence. See, Minn.St. 589.01, .15.
This court expanded habeas corpus into a kind of all-purpose postconviction remedy in the early 1960's, prior to the enactment of the postconviction remedy act in 1967. Minn.St. 590.01, subd. 2, in effect provided that the newly-enacted postconviction remedy was to take the place of the expanded habeas corpus remedy whenever the two conflicted.
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Post-Conviction Remedies (Approved Draft, 1968) § 1.1 recommends that the postconviction remedy should be unitary and comprehensive, encompassing all claims, including a claim of illegality of custody or supervision based on a judgment of conviction. Such a comprehensive remedy could include challenges to procedures followed in denying parole. See, also, id. § 2.1. The Minnesota statute, however, does not clearly provide for the availability of postconviction relief to challenge the fairness of procedures used in denying parole. It provides as follows:
Minn.St. 590.01, subd. 1.
Since the postconviction remedy act does not provide for the availability of the remedy to challenge the fairness of procedures used in denying parole, we must address the issue whether habeas corpus should be made available. While the habeas statute, see, Minn.St. 589.01, does not provide for the use of habeas in this kind of situation, this court clearly has the inherent judicial power to create an exception to the general rule that habeas is unavailable to a prisoner confined pursuant to a final judgment. In fact, both in Minnesota and in other states, exceptions have been made to the rule so as to provide prisoners with a ready means of relief where none would otherwise be available. Thus, habeas corpus is available under certain circumstances to test a claim of a prisoner that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State ex rel. Crosby v. Wood, 265 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.1978). In fact, some courts in other states have allowed the use of habeas corpus to challenge conditions of confinement that allegedly abridge interests protected by statute rather than by the constitution. See, e.g., In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640 (1970), certiorari denied, 401 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 890, 27 L.Ed.2d 814 (1971). Some of these same courts permit the use of habeas to challenge the determination of the length of confinement. See, e.g., In re Streeter, 66 Cal.2d 47, 56 Cal.Rptr. 824, 423 P.2d 976 (1967). See generally 39 C.J.S Habeas Corpus § 101a and cases cited therein.
A number of factors persuade us that habeas corpus should be made available as a remedy in the absence of an amendment to the postconviction remedy act:
(a) First, a high percentage of prisoners who seek judicial review of denial of parole are likely to be unrepresented. A recent study of civil suits brought by prisoners in Federal courts against state and local officials under 42 U.S.C.A., § 1983 revealed that over 80 percent of these cases were filed and prosecuted by prisoners unrepresented by counsel. Turner, When Prisoners Sue, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 610, 617. Habeas corpus, like the postconviction remedy, is a remedy that is easily sought by uncounseled prisoners.
(b) A second factor is the speed with which judicial review can be obtained using the remedy. One of the virtues of habeas corpus has always been that it is a quick way of obtaining judicial review.
(c) A third factor is the matter of venue. Under the habeas statute, venue would be in the...
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