Kelter v. Wasp, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:12–CV–00053–TBR.
• Citation: 5 F.Supp.3d 856
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
• Parties: Christopher S. KELTER, Plaintiff, v. WASP, INC., Watkins Aircraft Support Products, Conken Systems, Inc., Designed Conveyor Systems, Inc., Gems Conveyor Installations, Inc., and Automated Motor Control Systems, Inc., Defendants.

5 F.Supp.3d 856

Christopher S. KELTER, Plaintiff,

v.WASP, INC., Watkins Aircraft Support Products, Conken Systems, Inc., Designed Conveyor Systems, Inc., Gems Conveyor Installations, Inc., and Automated Motor Control Systems, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:12–CV–00053–TBR.

United States District Court,

W.D. Kentucky,

Paducah Division.

Signed March 11, 2014.

John W. Byrnes, Byrnes Law Office, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

James A. Sigler, Whitlow, Roberts, Houston & Straub, PLLC, Edwin A. Jones, William L. McCall, Boehl Stopher & Graves, LLP, Paducah, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS B. RUSSELL, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Designed Conveyor Systems, Inc.'s (“DCS”) Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Christopher S. Kelter (Docket No. 73). Kelter has responded, (Docket No. 77), as has Co–Defendant Conken Systems, Inc. (“Conken”). (Docket No. 76.) DCS has replied. (Docket No. 79). This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

Having reviewed the parties' submissions and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons that follow, DCS's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. An appropriate order will issue separately.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Christopher S. Kelter worked as a handler at a FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx Ground”) facility in Paducah, Kentucky. Conken manufactured the facility's conveyor system, utilizing parts and services from GEMS; ¹ DCS; Automated Motor Control Systems; and WASP, Inc. On April 7, 2011, as Kelter tried to clear an obstruction on a moving conveyor belt, his arm was pinned between two rollers. As a result of this accident, he suffered a traumatic amputation of his right arm.

Kelter alleges that the parties listed above were collectively negligent in designing, manufacturing, and installing the conveyor system used at the FedEx facility. He also brings claims against these defendants for failure to warn, breach of warranty, and negligence per se. Kelter now seeks compensatory and punitive damages for his injuries.

On March 2, Kelter filed his original Complaint in McCracken Circuit Court, naming WASP, Inc. and Watkins Aircraft Support Products (“WASP”) as defendants. (Docket No. 1–1.) On April 2, 2011, Kelter added Conken Systems, Inc. as an additional Defendant in his First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 6.) On the same day, WASP, Inc. removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. (Docket No. 1.) On July 31, 2012, Kelter filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding Designed Conveyor Systems, Inc. (“Designed Conveyor”), GEMS, and Automated Motor Control Systems, Inc. as defendants. (Docket No. 24.)

Kelter alleges that Conken hired DCS to “design, fabricate, and manufacture the components of the Material Handling Sortation System that was put into operation at the FedEx Ground facility.” (Docket No. 24, ¶ 4.) His claims against DCS include defective product and design, improper warning, punitive damages, and negligence per se. (Docket No. 24.)

In the instant motion, DCS moves for the dismissal of Kelter's claims, alleging that his failure to render them within the applicable statute of limitations period rendersthem time-barred. (Docket No. 73–1 at 4.)

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position; he must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for him. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: “[T]he mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.2012).

Finally, while the substantive law of Kentucky applies to this case pursuant to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity applies the standards of Federal Rule of Procedure 56, not Kentucky's summary judgment standard as articulated in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.1991). Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 165 (6th Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010).

DISCUSSION

1. Because the statute of limitations has not been tolled, Kelter's action against DCS is time-barred by the one-year limitation period.

DCS argues that Kelter's action must be dismissed, as Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations bars his personal injury, defective product and design, and negligence claims. Having considered the parties' arguments and reviewed the relevant precedents, the Court agrees. “Limitations statutes are by nature arbitrary and so sometimes seem to operate harshly. This harshness, of course, does not authorize courts to disregard the strict duties such statutes impose. On the contrary, the statutory duty to develop and file one's case diligently has been interpreted as an absolute except in the most compelling of circumstances.” Reese v. Gen.Am. Door Co., 6 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Ky.App.1998).

Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) requires potential plaintiffs to commence personal injury actions within one year after the cause of action accrued. Generally, then, a personal injury plaintiff must file suit within one year of his alleged injury. Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 289 F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Caudill v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky.1972)). Moreover, the same statute of limitations applies to his products liability claims. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a); Hazel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 863 F.Supp. 435, 438 (“[A] product liability plaintiff has one year, after the date he becomes aware of his injury and the offending instrumentality, to file suit.”).

An action is “commenced” when a complaint is filed and summons is issued. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.250 (“An action shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first summons or process issued....”). “[T]he statute of limitations runs until a summons is actually issued.” Steadman v. Gentry, 314 S.W.3d 760, 762 (Ky.App.2010) (quoting Simpson v. Antrobus, 260 Ky. 641, 86 S.W.2d 544, 546 (1935)).

Because Kelter's injury accrued on April 7, 2011, he had until April 7, 2012 to commence his claim against DCS. However, he failed to add DCS as a defendant until July 31, 2012, in his Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, no summons was issued against DCS until August 21, 2012. Consequently, Kelter's claims against DCS are time-barred and must be dismissed.

Kentucky law recognizes limited bases upon which the statute of limitations may be tolled. The discovery rule provides that a cause of action accrues only when the injury is, or should have been, discovered. McLain v. Dana Corp., 16 S.W.3d 320, 326 (1999). However, “the discovery rule does not operate to toll the statute of limitations to allow an injured plaintiff to discover the identity of the wrongdoer unless there is fraudulent concealment or a misrepresentation by the defendant of his role in causing the plaintiff's injuries. A person who has knowledge of an injury is put on ‘notice to investigate’ and discover, within the statutory time constraints, the identity of the tortfeasor.” Id.

The discovery rule does not save Kelter's claims against DCS. His injury on April 7, 2011 triggered his obligation to investigate within the one-year limitations period how and by whom he was injured. Kelter contends that although he contacted the FedEx legal department to ascertain the parties involved in implementing the conveyor system, his faxes were ignored. (Docket No. 77 at 5.) Neither did the state's OSHA investigation or administrative action reveal that DCS designed the component parts. (Docket No. 77 at 5.)

Furthermore, the discovery rule focuses on whether a plaintiff “acquired knowledge of existing facts sufficient to put the party on inquiry.” Blanton v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 797, 802 (E.D.Ky.2000). Plaintiffs must exercise “reasonable diligence” in obtaining such knowledge. Although this term has not been defined with specificity, courts have interpreted it to mean “a degree between absolute inaction and an extreme effort undertaken against apparent futility[;] it must be more than merely perfunctory.” Id. (quoting Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1952)). “One court applying Kentucky law has noted that ‘[a]ny fact that should excite his suspicion is the same as actual knowledge of his entire claim ... [and] the means of knowledge are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself.’ ” Blanton, 99 F.Supp.2d at 802 (quoting Hazel v. Gen.Motors Corp., 863 F.Supp. 435, 440 (W.D.Ky.1994) (citations omitted)).

Although Kelter learned that Conken was hired to install the conveyor system, no party disclosed that Conken contracted with DCS for...