Kelvin L. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 27 September 1976
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: KELVIN L., a minor, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, JUVENILE DIVISION, Respondent, Clarence E. Cabell, acting chief probation officer, County of Los Angeles, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 47554.

Page 325

133 Cal.Rptr. 325

62 Cal.App.3d 823

KELVIN L., a minor, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, JUVENILE DIVISION, Respondent, Clarence E. Cabell, acting chief probation officer, County of Los Angeles, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 47554.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Sept. 27, 1976.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, John J. Gibbons, Robert Berke, John L. Ryan, Laurence M. Sarnoff, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.

Burt Pines, City Atty., Ward G. McConnell, Chief-Appellate Div., Los Angeles, for respondent.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

This is a proceeding in mandamus to compel discovery in a pending juvenile court matter (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) in which petitioner is charged with battery on a police officer.

Petitioner's discovery motion sought information in police files regarding citizens' complaints of excessive force or racial prejudice on the part of the arresting officers, Brogelman and Chryss, and of the department's investigation of such charges. The declaration in support of the discovery motion alleged, among other things, that it was the intention of the defense to show that if petitioner in fact struck an officer during the altercation which led to his arrest, he acted in self-defense, and that the defense would not have access to the sought after materials but upon order of the court.

In addition to serving the discovery motion, petitioner also served a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian of the Los Angeles Police Department records. The custodian appeared at the hearing on the discovery motion, bringing the subpoenaed records with him. He was called as a witness and asked to disclose the desired information whereupon Acting through the deputy district attorney, the witness requested that the court review the materials before determining whether or not they should be turned over to counsel. Petitioner's counsel was permitted to ask a few questions; the witness claimed a privilege against disclosure (Evid.Code, § 1040); petitioner's counsel then requested an In camera hearing to review whether the material was properly discoverable. An In camera hearing was held, from which petitioner's counsel was excluded over his objection.

The court in reviewing the officers' personnel files found that there had been two complaints against Brogelman and one against Chryss. The charge against Chryss was 'not sustained.' One of the charges against Brogelman was 'not sustained.' He was exonerated of the other one by the department. The court found that the evidence in the officers' files was neither relevant nor material to the issues presented in the case pending against petitioner and denied his discovery motion. The court stated that its ruling was not based merely upon the police department's conclusions regarding the citizens' complaints, but upon the court's independent detrmination that those conclusions were justified. Despite the fact that its ruling on the issue of relevance rendered it unnecessary for the court to consider the question of privilege, the court went ahead and sustained the witness' claim of privilege. It refused, however, to grant petitioner's request for a finding, pursuant to section 1042(a) of the Evidence Code, that the officers acted with excessive force against petitioner.

Opposition to the present petition has been filed by the city attorney as counsel for the Los Angeles Police Department, custodian of the material sought to be discovered. Amicus curiae briefs have been filed by the county counsel, attorney for the respondent court and for the Los Angeles County Sheriff, and by the district attorney, counsel for the People in the matter pending below. Collectively they: (1) challenge the sufficiency of the discovery motion on the ground that it is vague, overbroad and non-spcific, and that it failed to state the place of execution; (2) attack the procedure of issuing a subpoena duces tecum and of proceeding to an In camera hearing absent a prior ruling that petitioner has made a prima facie showing of his right to discovery; (3) contend that unsubstantiated citizen complaints of excessive force are not discoverable; (4) deny that Brogelman's file is relevant, in any case, since only Chryss was named as a victim in the juvenile court petition; (5) assert the 'constitutional right of privacy of the police officers involved as well as those who have provided information in confidence' to the police department; and (6) seek a ruling, if petitioner prevails on his claim that the information is properly discoverable, that invocation of the (Evid.Code § 1040) privilege will result in an adverse ruling (Evid.Code § 1042) more circumscribed than that which petitioner requested.

Preliminarily, we offer a few words as to what this case is not about. No issue was raised below as to the technical sufficiency of the discovery motion or the propriety of issuing the subpoena. No issue is presently before this court regarding compliance with the subpoena. The purported technical deficiencies in the discovery motion relate to petitioner's failure to comply with civil discovery statutes; but those statutes do not govern criminal discovery motions which are 'addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand.' (Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531, 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 900, 522 P.2d 305, 308.) That the motion was not vague is conclusively proved by the fact that the custodian of the records had no problem producing them for the court's In camera perusal. Furthermore, the In camera proceeding was first requested by the custodian of the records whose counsel will not now be heard to complain of that procedure.

The issues which are squarely presented by the present proceeding are: first, whether petitioner has made an adequate showing of relevance and necessity to warrant discovery; second, whether if otherwise discoverable the material sought is privileged; and third, if privileged, what ramifications follow from assertion of the privilege. In Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 536--537, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 901, 522 P.2d 305, 309, the court declared '. . . an accused in a criminal prosecution may compel discovery by demonstrating that the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (Citations.) The requisite showing may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery other than 'a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.' (Citations.)'

In the instant case the arrest report which was submitted in evidence at the hearing on the discovery motion, discloses that petitioner was detained by Brogleman and Chryss who saw him in a parked car in front of a location where a number of juveniles had congregated. When the officers requested identification, petitioner became verbally belligerent. The officers attempted to handcuff petitioner and an altercation ensued in the course of which, according to the report, petitioner struck Chryss on the chin and petitioner, in turn, sustained head injuries which necessitated his hospitalization. Following his arrest, petitioner denied striking the officer.

Evidence, if any, of prior acts of unwarranted or excessive violence by Chryss would be admissible at trial on the issue of self-defense. (Evid.Code, § 1103.) Furthermore, although evidence of prior misconduct, if any, by Brogelman may not turn out to be admissible at trial, discovery is not limited to admissible evidence, but encompasses information which may lead to relevant evidence. In Hinojosa v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.App.3d 692, 127 Cal.Rptr. 664, cited by People, discovery was only disallowed as to those officers who were not 'directly involved in the fracas.' The information sought as to Brogelman is relevant to an investigation of the incident and preparation of a defense.

Petitioner, of course, would have no way of knowing or ascertaining whether any complaints have been made against the officers in question except to obtain that information from the police department. (In re E., 50 Cal.App.3d 213, 123 Cal.Rptr. 242.) Petitioner has demonstrated the necessity for discovering the names, addresses and telephone numbers of citizens who have lodged complaints of excessive force against Officers Brogelman and Chryss, and of any witnesses interviewed by the department in...