Kemp v. Spivey, COA03-1022.
Decision Date | 05 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. COA03-1022.,COA03-1022. |
Citation | 602 S.E.2d 686,166 NC App. 456 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Lillie Freeman KEMP, Plaintiff, v. Kristy Gayle SPIVEY and Tabor City Rescue Squad, Defendants. |
Hill & High, L.L.P., by John Alan High, Whiteville, for plaintiff-appellant.
Barnes, Braswell & Haithcock, P.A., by Glenn A. Barfield, Goldsboro, for defendant-appellees.
Lillie Freeman Kemp (plaintiff) appeals an order filed 19 March 2003 granting Kristy Gayle Spivey and Tabor City Rescue Squad's (defendants') joint motion to dismiss the complaint based on a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim).
On 14 January 1999, Kemp and Spivey were involved in an automobile accident. At the time of the collision, Kemp, a school bus driver, was operating a school bus with students on board. Spivey, an emergency technician, was operating a Rescue Squad ambulance. Several persons, both on the school bus and ambulance, were injured.
Multiple claims were filed between 1999 and 2000 in Columbus County concerning the accident. In each of the claims, the plaintiffs alleged that Spivey, in the course and scope of her employment with the Rescue Squad, negligently operated the ambulance, causing the collision. Defendants Spivey and the Rescue Squad answered in each case, denying negligence on the part of Spivey, and filed third-party complaints against Kemp, alleging Kemp's negligence caused or contributed to the collision. In each case, Kemp was represented by the Attorney General's Office of the State of North Carolina. In each case, Kemp filed an answer to the third-party complaint and counterclaimed for indemnity. Each civil action was resolved by way of a settlement agreement and a release from further liability. Kemp was represented in each settlement agreement by an attorney from the Attorney General's Office who participated in, and signed each settlement and release agreement.
Kemp filed her complaint against defendants on 21 December 2001, alleging Spivey, while acting in the course and scope of her duties as an employee of the Rescue Squad negligently operated an ambulance, causing the accident. Defendants filed an answer denying negligence on the part of Spivey and asserting the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. On 10 February 2003, defendants filed a motion to dismiss Kemp's complaint on the ground that the claim was a compulsory counterclaim that she failed to previously assert, and thus waived her right to bring the separate action. By order filed 19 March 2003, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
Kemp presents two arguments on appeal: (I) whether her claim was mature at the time the original complaints and third-party complaints were filed; and (II) whether the trial court erred in dismissing her claim instead of allowing her to maintain a separate action.
Kemp first argues that her claim was not mature at the time the original complaints and third-party complaints were filed; therefore, she was not barred from filing her counterclaim thereafter. We disagree.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 13(a) provides as follows regarding compulsory counterclaims:
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 13(a) (2003).
"The purpose of Rule 13(a), making certain counterclaims compulsory, is to enable one court to resolve `all related claims in one action, thereby avoiding a wasteful multiplicity of litigation.'" Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 176-77, 240 S.E.2d 399, 403 (1978) (citation omitted). Determining whether a particular claim "arises out of the same transaction or occurrence" requires consideration of "(1) whether the issues of fact and law are largely the same; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is involved in each action; and (3) whether there is a logical relationship between the two actions." Brooks v. Rogers, 82 N.C.App. 502, 507-08, 346 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1986). In addition, there must be "a logical relationship in the nature of the actions and the remedies sought." Id. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 681.
We are satisfied in the instant case that plaintiff's claim for damages is a compulsory counterclaim with regard to defendants' previously filed third-party claims. Kemp argues, however, at the time the third-party complaints were filed, she was unaware of the total amount of her damages; therefore, her claim was not mature.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 13(e) provides: In the instant case, Kemp was fully aware of the events and circumstances leading to her injury; only the exact amount of injury sustained was speculative. In Moretz v. Northwestern Bank, 67 N.C.App. 312, 313-14, 313 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (1984), this Court stated:
Accordingly, the speculative nature of the amount of damages sustained in the instant case did not render the claim premature at the time the third-party complaints were filed. This assignment of error is overruled.
Kemp next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim rather than allowing her to maintain the claim as a separate action. We are unable to locate any North Carolina cases analyzing whether a separate action should be dismissed outright when the original actions have already been settled by agreement of the parties versus a judicial determination. We have, however, located two federal cases interpreting Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding similar circumstances.1
In Dindo v. Whitney, 451 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1971) (citations omitted), the court stated:
In the instant case, Kemp was aware of the events and circumstances leading to her claim. Moreover, she had an opportunity to present her counterclaim prior to settlement of the prior actions. Kemp was represented by attorneys from the Office of the Attorney General in each of the settlement agreements, and the signature of Kemp's counsel appears on each of the settlement and release agreements. In fact, in four out of the five civil actions, the State of North Carolina agreed to pay one-half of the damages on behalf of Kemp, and in the fifth settlement the State agreed to pay one-third of the damages on behalf of Kemp. In one civil action the plaintiff filed...
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