Kemp v. State

• Decision Date: 15 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1D14–2738.,1D14–2738.
• Citation: 166 So.3d 213
• Parties: Joe Lee KEMP, IV, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

166 So.3d 213

Joe Lee KEMP, IV, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D14–2738.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 15, 2015.

Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jessica DaSilva, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion

THOMAS, J.

Appellant appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We address only the first issue, whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA), as we reverse on this ground and order Appellant's discharge from the conviction.

Facts

While in the course of executing a search warrant, police arrived at the residence in question; inside were Appellant and four other males. Adjacent to the residence was a fenced-in area where a newer-model Chrysler was located, with other cars. Detective Hanson was the first officer to search the Chrysler. In the glove compartment he found a rental car agreement in Appellant's name with what appeared to be Appellant's signature. According to the agreement, the rental period began on August 29, 2013, and was due to end at 6:00 p.m. on September 5, 2013, the day of the search.

In the front-seat center console, which was closed, the detective found a handgun and a receipt for payment of a T–Mobile cell phone bill. Appellant's name was on the receipt, which reflected that the bill had been paid in cash two days before the search. Another officer noted a number of items in the back seat area, including a student handbook. No DNA or fingerprint testing was done on the firearm or any other items, and no one in the residence claimed ownership of the gun.

Detective Hanson was unable to recall with certainty whether the car was locked. None of the testifying officers could recall how the car keys were obtained, when the men in the residence had arrived there, or who drove the rental car to the residence that day, who had been driving it during the rental period, or who owned the various items in the back seat area of the car.

Appellant moved for JOA at the close of the State's evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove a prima facie case of possession of a firearm. Acknowledging that the firearm was found in the closed center console of a vehicle that contained items that purportedly were Appellant's, Appellant argued that the car was located within a residence that contained several people; no one identified Appellant as the sole driver of the Chrysler; no DNA or fingerprint evidence linked Appellant to the firearm; and the keys to the vehicle were not obtained from Appellant. The State argued that the element of knowledge was established by the location of the T–Mobile receipt dated September 3, 2013, found in the same console as the firearm. In denying the motion, the court acknowledged that the fact that the car was rented in Appellant's name was insufficient to prove possession of the gun, but found that, at that point in the trial, there was no evidence that anyone other than Appellant had been in the car. The court also acknowledged, however, that “nobody is really sure exactly where the keys came from either. But in the end you've got this phone bill sitting there in the container which is holding the gun, and I think that is enough to require the Court to deny” the motion.

Appellant then called one witness, Mr. Byrd, who testified that he drove the rental car all day on August 31, 2013, and that others were in the car with him, but he had not driven it since that day. When he was finished driving the car, the witness turned it over to Appellant's girlfriend. He also testified that, in addition to the girlfriend, two of the men who were at the residence when police arrived had also driven the car during the week before the search. Mr. Byrd testified that on the day of the search he drove to the residence in a car belonging to Appellant's girlfriend. Mr. Byrd did not observe the rental car when he arrived, and Appellant was alone at the residence. Mr. Byrd testified that he did not know how either Appellant or the other men got to the residence, or who drove the rental car that day. Mr. Byrd testified that, although he owned a handgun, the firearm found in the rental car was not his.¹

Appellant rested his case and renewed his motion for JOA, adding to his previous argument that he had presented evidence that other persons had been in the rental car during the week prior to the search. The trial court acknowledged the circumstantial nature of the State's case and that this required the State to present evidence rebutting Appellant's reasonable hypothesis of innocence:

However, I think the state has done that again with the phone bill being there; also the fact that [Byrd] said he gave the car to [Appellant's] wife or girlfriend. The girlfriend was not there. His girlfriend didn't drive it, okay. [Byrd] had no idea who drove it over there on the day in question. And, again, you've got the phone bill in there from a very close ... date to when the vehicle was searched and the gun was found and I think that the phone bill ... identifies [Appellant] and the container ... there is something that identifies [Appellant] in the container that is holding the gun ... I think the state ... has some evidence to rebut that reasonable hypothesis of innocence....

The trial court found that this was not undermined by Mr. Byrd's testimony, and pointed out that the gun did not belong to Mr. Byrd. The court also found that it “clearly” wasn't the girlfriend to whom Byrd handed over custody of the vehicle.

Analysis

A trial court's denial of a motion for JOA is reviewed de novo to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). An appellate court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla.1974). Here, the State's case was based on a theory of constructive possession of the handgun.

Florida law requires this court to apply a “special” standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases, such that, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this court must determine whether the evidence viewed in this light excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla.1989). If such evidence has been introduced at trial which contradicts any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the jury's verdict of guilt must be affirmed, as it is solely the prerogative of the factfinder to accept or reject contradictory evidence. Id. at 188. This “special standard” applicable in circumstantial evidence cases has been questioned in Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. granted, 151 So.3d 1226 (Fla.2014), in which the Fifth District noted that the “special standard” is inconsistent with Florida's Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, federal law, and the majority of jurisdictions. Under the United States Constitution, no such “special standard” is required. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954) ). Under federal law, the “rational trier of fact” test is the rule of law. Id. And of course, in Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981), our Supreme Court prohibited appellate courts from reweighing the evidence when reviewing an order denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal.

In Westbrooks v. State, the Second District affirmed the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, stating:

Generally, a motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied “[i]f after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). However, in cases in which the evidence is “wholly circumstantial,” a special standard of review applies: “the evidence must also exclude the defendant's reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id ; see also Mosley v. State, 46 So.3d 510, 526 (Fla.2009) (“If the state presents both direct and circumstantial evidence, courts do not apply the special standard of review applicable to circumstantial evidence cases.” (citing Pagan, 830 So.2d at 803 )). “Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant's theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So.3d 543, 557 (Fla.2010). “ ‘The state is not required to ‘rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the [d]efendant's theory of events.' ” Id. (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla.1989) ). The state is not required to rebut a hypothesis of innocence that is unreasonable. See Henderson v. State, 679 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“While we must agree with [appellant] that the State was required to provide evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we emphasize that the State was not required to exclude any unreasonable hypothesis.”).

145 So.3d 874, 877–78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis in original).

In a concurring opinion, two judges of the panel decision expressed their concern with Florida law which requires courts to apply a special rule in circumstantial criminal cases, noting the Fifth District's analysis in Knight v. State, and the statement there that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” Id. at 881 (Morris and Black, JJ., concurring) (quoting Knight v. State...